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Chapter 1
Introduction
2 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Prosocial behavior – a range of individual actions that not only take into account
individual benefits, but also those of the group – forms one of the building blocks
of human society, and having helped a small East African ape become a globally
dominant species, it underlies our evolutionary success (Nowak and Highfield,
2011, p.17). Humanity should not, however, rest on its laurels. In the words of the
renowned theoretical physicist and cosmologist Stephen Hawking (2016):
...now, more than at any time in our history, our species needs to
work together. We face awesome environmental challenges: climate
change, food production, overpopulation, the decimation of other
species, epidemic disease, acidification of the oceans.
Together, they are a reminder that we are at the most dangerous
moment in the development of humanity. We now have the technology
to destroy the planet on which we live, but have not yet developed
the ability to escape it. Perhaps in a few hundred years, we will have
established human colonies amid the stars, but right now we only have
one planet, and we need to work together to protect it.
Unfortunately, some of the very environmental challenges which necessitate our
cooperation undermine it at the same time. Taking a broad look at changes in
both the physical and social environment, this thesis explores the ways in which
environmental shocks affect human willingness to cooperate. Based mostly on
field-experimental evidence from Uganda, it first identifies the negative effects
that natural and man-made environmental shocks faced by unborn children in the
womb have on their later-life cooperativeness. It then explores how an abrupt
change in the social environment – the introduction of a formal health insurance
– crowds out cooperation in informal sharing arrangements. It ends on a more
positive note, outlining possible policy tools to foster prosocial behavior.
Each of the main chapters can be read as a self-standing research article. However,
they have one common message: There are many – sometimes unexpected – ways
in which we can lose our preference for cooperation, but there are also ways in
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which prosocial behavior can be successfully nurtured.
1.2 Origins of prosocial behavior
The willingness to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group forms one of
the cornerstones of human society (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). However, prosocial
behavior is by far not unique to homo sapiens. Well documented examples of
complex cooperation in other species (with arguably lower cognitive abilities than
humans) range from hunting wolf packs (Macdonald et al., 2004), through certain
bird species helping strangers build their nests (Skutch, 1935), to ants building
living rafts to survive floods (Cassill et al., 2015), and bees sacrificing their lives
to protect the hive (Shorter and Rueppell, 2012). Many have seen this as an
indication that prosociality is a natural preference which evolved in numerous
species – including humans – and with which we are born (Rushton, 1991; Wesson,
1991; Nowak, 2006).
For centuries, the notion of such innate altruism would seem perfectly natural to
religiously inspired thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, who considered virtue to
be of divine origin (Aquinas, 1274, I, q.100, a.1, co.1). However, early modern
philosophers started finding inconsistencies in this ethical paradigm, moving so
far from the idea of innate goodness that at the brink of the industrial revolution,
Adam Smith (1776, book 1, chapter 2) could famously write:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Smith was not the first to entertain the thought that selfish motivations can lead
to cooperative behavior, but his formulation of this idea has survived centuries,
and inspired an entire academic discipline.
As much as self-interest can and does foster cooperation in many circumstances
(as aptly illustrated by Smith), it prevents it in many others, especially in
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“social dilemma” situations where individual and social welfare maxima do not
overlap, such as in various versions of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (Flood,
1958). Viewed through the lens of Darwinian theory of evolution, this creates
an apparent paradox: If non-cooperation is the dominant strategy in so many
situations, the process of natural selection should prevent cooperative behavior
from developing on a large scale, which is in direct contradiction to the empirical
evidence mentioned at the beginning of this section. An important step towards
reconciling this seeming contradiction was made by Trivers (1971), who proposed
a formal model to account for natural selection of reciprocally altruistic behavior,
and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), who extended it to the context of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, showing that cooperation can establish itself as an evolutionary stable
strategy in a population of self-interested individuals. Finally, building on
extensive empirical evidence, Gintis et al. (2003) show that a small number of
prosocial individuals can help establish cooperative norms even in a society with
an initially self-interested majority.
Cooperation has thus become ubiquitous in human societies, and virtually every
society has developed strong mechanisms which discourage its members from
deviating from the prosocial norm, and which enforce the return to the norm
if they do stray too far from it (Henrich et al., 2001, 2006). These enforcement
mechanisms typically rely on the willingness of individuals to incur the cost of
punishing antisocial behavior towards themselves and – crucially – towards others
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Such “altruistic punishment” is in itself another form of
prosocial behavior (Yamagishi, 1986) which has over time evolved as a dominant
strategy (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gintis, 2007; Hauert et al., 2007; Buckholtz
and Marois, 2012). Through their culture of prosocial behavior, societies thus
further nurture their individual members’ prosociality. In other words, prosocial
preferences are endogenous with respect to an individual’s environment (Bowles,
1998).
In their attempts to explain prosocial behavior, different academic disciplines have
historically tended to emphasize either the importance of individual characteristics
and preferences or that of culture, social norms, and institutions. Psychologists
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and economists typically pay more attention to the former, while sociologists and
anthropologists gravitate to the latter, often falling on the opposite sides of the
larger nature versus nurture argument. Nevertheless, there is now a growing
consensus that rather than operating independently, nature and nurture influence
each other, and it is their interplay that largely determines individual prosocial
preferences (Rutter, 1997; Goldschmidt, 2006).
Insofar as cooperation is essential to much of economic activity, this has some
important implications for economic development. On the one hand, it is affected
by preferences that have developed over – and are transmitted across – many
generations (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). On the other, economic development
can also be hampered or buoyed up by changes in the environment within which
individuals operate and to which their preferences are – contrarily to accepted
economic wisdom (see for example Stigler and Becker, 1977) – endogenous (Fehr
and Hoff, 2011). The overarching aim of this thesis is to shed more light on how
environmental changes affect prosocial behavior.
1.3 Exogenous shocks and cooperation
A recent but growing body of research shows that environmental shocks affect
individual preferences even before one’s birth. Various markers of conditions in
utero such as weight and length at birth or the ratio between the lengths of the
index and ring fingers (second-to-fourth digit ratio, or 2D:4D), have been linked
to later-life outcomes, including prosocial preferences.
As a direct consequence of intrauterine growth retardation, preterm birth, or both,
low birth weight is a telltale sign of adverse conditions in utero. The exact nature
of the physiological processes that lead to low weight at birth (often collectively
referred to as intrauterine programming) are still subject to vigorous scientific
debate, but there is growing consensus that they may involve decreased fetal
nutritional intake (whether due directly to low maternal nutritional intake or to
suboptimal placental size, blood flow or function), low fetal oxygen supply, and
hormonal imbalances. These can in turn be triggered by conditions as diverse
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as maternal malnutrition, stress, disease, substance abuse, and environmental
exposure (such as to high altitude or ambient temperature) (Fowden et al., 2006).
As a general marker of unfavorable intrauterine conditions, low birth weight has
been linked to various later-life outcomes ranging from cardiovascular disease
(Barker, 1990) to lower income (Black et al., 2007) and reduced cognitive abilities
(Hack et al., 2005), which in turn reduce the taste for cooperation (Moore et al.,
1998; Zhang et al., 2015).
Considering the abundant evidence that ambient temperature during gestation
is one of the factors affecting birth weight (Wells and Cole, 2002; Lawlor et al.,
2005; Deschênes et al., 2009), its effects on later-life outcomes in general and
social preferences in particular have received surprisingly little attention. By
investigating the effects of prenatal temperature shocks on cooperative behavior
in public goods games, I fill in part of this gap in Chapter 2, where I use historical
climate data combined with data on child and adult behavior in public goods games
to show that abnormally high ambient temperatures during gestation decrease
individual contributions to the public good.
The 2D:4D ratio is determined in early stages of fetal development by epigenetic
modifications, i.e. changes to gene expressions which take place without a change
in the DNA sequence (Jirtle and Skinner, 2007). It reflects relative levels of
androgen and estrogen hormones in the womb during early gestation, and remains
constant throughout the rest of an individual’s life (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng
and Cohn, 2011). Hormonal imbalance is one of the physiological reactions to
trauma (de Kloet et al., 2008; Song et al., 2008; Steudte et al., 2011), and
is transmitted from mother to fetus during pregnancy (Mancuso et al., 2004;
Weinstock, 2008). The 2D:4D ratio is thus a useful phenotypic marker of maternal
distress during early gestation.
Variations in hormone levels have been found to influence a wide range of behaviors
(Mehta and Josephs, 2011). Increased levels of testosterone – an androgen hormone
– cause an increase in fair behavior in ultimatum bargaining (Eisenegger et al.,
2010), while increased levels of oxytocin – a hormone whose secretion is regulated
by estrogen levels – cause an increase in trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005) and in parochial
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altruism (De Dreu et al., 2010). The 2D:4D ratio itself predicts prosocial behavior
in several lab experiments (Buser, 2012). Building on these findings, I investigate
the effects of war-induced prenatal stress on cooperation. In Chapter 3, I show that
fetal hormone exposure manifested in the 2D:4D ratio explains why children whose
caregivers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder are more likely to free-ride in
a public goods game than children of non-traumatized caregivers.
It is, however, not only the physical aspect of people’s environment that shapes
their preferences; its social aspect is equally important in this respect. By
restricting individual behavior within defined limits, institutions – “the humanly
devised constrains that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3) – effectively
mold people’s preferences, including the prosocial ones (Bowles et al., 2003). In
social dilemma situations where individual interests and social welfare are at odds,
institutions that reward cooperators, punish free-riders, or do both, are vital to
sustaining high levels of cooperation (Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). This
applies to both formal and informal institutions, where the former are typically
thought of as exogenous constraints enforced by an outside party, and the latter
as endogenously determined self-enforcing rules which result from the sub-game
perfect equilibrium of a repeated game (Greif, 1993; Aoki, 2001a,b).
As formal institutions expand into areas of human interaction hitherto governed
by informal arrangements, the former may substitute or complement the
latter, depending on the context (see e.g. Roland, 2004; Williamson, 2009;
Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Chandrasekhar et al., 2016).
Institutional innovations in the formal sphere may therefore crowd out, or solidify,
existing informal arrangements, with far reaching consequences for economic
development (Pejovich, 1999). Chapter 4 illustrates the effects of such interaction
between formal and informal institutions on the cooperation fostered by the latter
by showing how the introduction of formal community-level health insurance
reduces cooperative behavior in other (informal) settings.
8 Introduction
1.4 Towards prosocial policy
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (introduced in section 1.3) outline several ways in which
changes in people’s physical and social environment hamper prosocial behavior.
While reversing these changes – or preventing them altogether – would likely have
positive effects on prosociality, few policymakers are in a position to reverse climate
change or prevent violent conflict, no matter how desirable such achievements
would be in light of all their other potential benefits. The complexity of
these problems puts the policies that are required to resolve them squarely out
of the scope of this thesis. Reverting to informal arrangements after formal
institutions have been introduced would possibly be a less complex task, but one
of dubious overall merit considering that formal institutions are scarcely designed
to undermine cooperation, and that they may be fundamental to economic
development in their intended purpose (Rodrik et al., 2004).
The environmental shocks discussed so far affect prosocial preferences, which give
people an intrinsic motivation to cooperate. Prosocial preferences are fundamental
to prosocial behavior, but are not the only source of motivation for individuals to
behave prosocially. Ariely et al. (2009) identify two other categories of motives:
extrinsic motivation – material rewards associated with prosocial behavior –
and image motivation – the utility an individual derives from being perceived
by others as being prosocial. Similarly to formal and informal institutions,
intrinsic, extrinsic, and image-related motives have the potential of complementing
each other, but also of crowding each other out. Extrinsic motivation has the
standard direct price effect on prosocial behavior, making it more or less attractive
(depending on whether the incentives take the form of rewards or punishment),
but it also affects prosocial behavior indirectly through psychological channels.
Extrinsic incentives can put a value on the social good provided by the incentivized
individual. If this value is lower than the individual previously assumed, he may
react by decreasing the effort put into providing the good (Gneezy et al., 2011).
Moreover, extrinsic incentives can create doubts about the intrinsic motives for
behaving prosocially, decreasing the probability of being perceived as intrinsically
prosocial, thus crowding out the image motives for prosocial behavior (Bénabou
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and Tirole, 2006). The image value of prosocial behavior is especially likely to
suffer when both the behavior in question and the extrinsic rewards are visible, and
less so when either or both cannot be readily observed (Ariely et al., 2009). There
is nonetheless abundant empirical evidence that incentivizing prosocial behavior
can backfire, and does so in many – although not all – cases (Titmuss, 1970; Ariely
et al., 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010a,b; Gneezy et al., 2011).
Yet, thanks to the relative ease of its provision, extrinsic motivation is a popular
policy tool to foster prosocial behavior, and in light of the difficulties associated
with addressing the root causes of low intrinsic motivation, it is not one to be
readily dismissed. To illustrate the potential of extrinsic incentives as a policy
tool for promoting prosocial behavior, I take a look at a specific example of
its implementation. In Chapter 5, I evaluate the impact of performance-based
financing in small healthcare facilities on the their output. I show that financial
rewards for increased staff effort can lead to a sustained increase in the provision
of healthcare, demonstrating how simple policy measures which exploit extrinsic
incentives can alleviate the symptoms of low intrinsic motivation.
1.5 Objectives
Economic production is largely based on cooperation, and the process of economic
development involves many social dilemmas. It is therefore crucial to understand
how the preferences which guide our behavior vis-à-vis these situations are shaped.
The ability and willingness to work for the benefit of the group rather than just
one’s own has evolved over many generations, and is – to some extent – innate
to any healthy human being (Rushton, 1991; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). At
the same time, individual prosocial preferences are – also to a certain extent
– endogenous to the physical and social environment within which we operate
(Bowles et al., 2003; Fehr and Hoff, 2011). The overarching objective of this
thesis is to identify ways in which environmental changes affect intrinsic prosocial
preferences, and to outline a possible direction for fixing any such negative
effects.
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1.6 Methodology
To advance knowledge, economics relies on iterations between formulating
theoretical propositions about the functioning of the world, and their empirical
testing. Theory provides empiricists with testable models and hypotheses, while
empirical research identifies unexpected behavioral patterns which can inform
more accurate theories (Becker, 1993). In this sense, economics is not much
different from other scientific disciplines (though its classification as a science
is sometimes disputed even by economists themselves – see e.g. Eichner, 1983).
Where economics does, however, differ from natural and life sciences is its
reliance on statistical analysis of observational data (typically gathered using
questionnaires in the case of microeconomics) rather than on experimental methods
to test hypotheses. Economists’ reliance on statistics is traditionally so heavy
that they have even coined a special term for using statistical inference to analyze
economic phenomena – econometrics. Nevertheless, empirical economists have
for the past few decades been borrowing the experimental method, designing
incentive-compatible experiments that randomly assign subjects to treatment and
control conditions. Inspired by natural sciences, these have been conducted in the
laboratory (Smith, 1976, 1982, 2010; Wilde, 1981; Levitt and List, 2007), but also
in the field (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2009; Gerber and Green,
2012).
1.6.1 Field experiments
Field experiments span a wide range of types in terms of the level of their
contextualization (List, 2006). Closest to the laboratory setting, lab-in-the-field
experiments (or artefactual field experiments) simply transplant the laboratory to
the field, facilitating the recruitment of subjects from the population of interest,
but providing them with no further context (Binswanger, 1980; Bouma et al.,
2008; Voors et al., 2011). Framed field experiments contextualize the experimental
setting by directly comparing it to real life situations (Reichhuber et al., 2009;
Alpizar et al., 2011; Fochmann and Weimann, 2013). In randomized controlled
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trials (or natural field experiments), researchers design the treatment and control
conditions, and randomly assign subjects to them, observing the subjects’ natural
behavior, doing away with the artificiality of choices in a laboratory environment
(Duflo and Kremer, 2005; Björkman and Svensson, 2009; Duflo et al., 2011;
Peabody et al., 2013). On the far end of the contextualization spectrum, natural
experiments take advantage of naturally occurring random variation in a condition
of interest to provide the treatment and control assignment (van Os and Selten,
1998; Almond, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2010; Almond and Mazumder, 2011).
In line with economic tradition, the research on which this thesis is based makes
frequent use of econometric methods, ranging from basic regression analysis to
the generalized method of moments. However, it also exploits the advantages
of experimental methods to both elicit preferences which would be difficult to
observe in non-incentivized settings, and to provide (quasi) natural variation in
environmental conditions. Preference for cooperation – one of the main themes
of this thesis – is elicited using lab-in-the-field experiments in Chapters 2 and
3, and framed field experiments in Chapters 2 and 4. Thus elicited preferences
are then treated as an outcome of random variation in natural (Chapter 2) and
man-made (Chapter 3) environmental shocks, or of quasi-random assignment to
treatment (Chapter 4). The research described in Chapter 5 mostly uses standard
econometric methods.
1.6.2 Impact evaluation and academic research
Funded for the most part by the The Netherlands Foundation for Scientific
Research (NWO), the research underlying this thesis was conducted in various
parts of Uganda as part of a broader world-wide effort to evaluate development
projects (co-)financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Impact
evaluations in general aim to provide the foundations for successful development
initiatives by showing what interventions work (or not), as well as how and under
which conditions they work. The rationale behind conducting this particular
impact evaluation, which painted a mixed picture of the efficacy of development
aid, was to do just that, so as to inform future funding policies to maximize their
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impact. The findings presented in this thesis thus go far beyond the original
intent of the underlying studies at minimal additional cost. Besides its scientific
contribution, this work can serve as an example of the synergies which lie at the
intersection of practical development work and academic research, and which often
remain unexploited.
1.7 Outline
The rest of this book is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 investigate
the effects of environmental shocks on people’s willingness to behave prosocially
as elicited in incentivized public goods games. Chapter 2 shows that later-life
cooperation in public goods games is negatively affected by ambient temperature
shocks faced before an individual’s birth. Chapter 3 looks at a similar effect of
maternal stress, transmitted to the fetus by epigenetic processes. Moving away
from changes in physical environment, Chapter 4 instead focuses on a change in
the social environment, showing how the introduction of formal health insurance
erodes cooperation in informal sharing arrangements. By evaluating the impact
of performance-based financing on staff effort in healthcare facilities, Chapter 5
outlines a possible way to remedy low levels of prosocial behavior. Chapter 6
concludes.
Chapter 2
Prenatal Temperature Shocks Reduce
Cooperation
Evidence from Public Goods Games in Uganda
Abstract: Climate change has not only led to a sustained rise in mean global
temperature over the past decades, but also increased the frequency of extreme
weather events. This chapter explores the effect of temperature shocks in utero
on later-life taste for cooperation. Using historical climate data combined with
data on child and adult behavior in public goods games, we show that abnormally
high ambient temperatures during gestation decrease individual contributions to
the public good in a statistically and economically significant way. A 1 standard
deviation rise in mean ambient temperature during gestation lowers children’s
cooperation rate in a dichotomous public goods game by 11% points, and the
reduced taste for cooperation lasts into adulthood.
This chapter is based on:
Duchoslav, J. (2017). Prenatal Temperature Shocks Reduce Cooperation:
Evidence from Public Goods Games in Uganda. Working paper.
14 Prenatal Temperature Shocks
2.1 Introduction
Climate scientists have reached solid consensus that global climate change is
occurring over a decade ago (Oreskes, 2005). There has been a sustained rise
of mean global temperature, and extreme temperatures have become increasingly
common (see Figure 2.1, adapted from Coumou and Rahmstorf (2012)). The focus
of scientific discourse on the topic has therefore shifted towards estimating the
economic implications of future climate change as well as finding feasible, effective
countermeasures and mitigation strategies (Dell et al., 2009). The severity of the
former justifies the costs of the latter. Careful assessment of the damage function
is thus of utmost importance.
Recent contributions to this literature have investigated the effects of immediate
temperature on outcomes ranging from economic production (Dell et al., 2009;
Burke et al., 2015) through the onset of conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013), to human
reproductive behavior—with consequences for physical health and educational
outcomes of the offspring (Wilde et al., 2017). Inspired by another growing body
of literature – that on fetal origins, i.e. the impact of events during gestation on
later-life outcomes – I take a step back and consider behavioral implications of
temperature shocks in utero. Using historical variation in ambient temperature
as a natural experiment, and behavior in an incentivized public goods game as
an outcome measure, I assess the impact of unusually high temperatures during
gestation on later-life taste for cooperation – a preference essential to much
economic production. I find that abnormally high ambient temperatures during
gestation significantly reduce cooperativeness in children, and that this effect lasts
into adulthood.
I first provide a brief overview of the fetal origins literature in Section 2.2. In
Section 2.3, I describe the experimental design and my empirical strategy. The
results are presented in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes.
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Figure 2.1 – Extreme temperatures
2.2 Fetal origins
Stemming from an observation by the epidemiologist David Barker (1990) that
low birth-weight and premature birth are associated with coronary heart disease
in later life, the fetal origins literature has grown considerably beyond the medical
field into other domains including economics, psychology or management science.
Conditions in utero and their proxies have now been linked to later life outcomes
ranging from educational achievement (Bhutta et al., 2002; Almond, 2006) through
trading ability (Coates et al., 2009) to sexual identity (Csathó et al., 2003). Using
the 1918 influenza pandemic as a natural experiment, Almond (2006) finds that
mother’s illness during pregnancy reduces the educational attainment and income
of the offspring. Other natural experiments make use of the Ramadan (Almond
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and Mazumder, 2011) and the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands (van Os and Selten,
1998) to show that fasting and stress (respectively) during pregnancy increase the
chance of mental disability in the offspring. In a similar fashion, Banerjee et al.
(2010) use the case of the advancing phylloxera infestation of French vineyards to
show that negative income shocks during gestation reduce adult height—a marker
of overall health (Banerjee et al., 2010).
In another strand of the fetal origins literature, various markers of conditions in
utero such as preterm birth, weight and length at birth or the ratio between the
lengths of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) are linked to later-life outcomes.
Preterm birth predicts poor educational attainment (Bhutta et al., 2002), while
low birth weight is associated with reduced cognitive abilities (Hack et al., 2005),
which in turn reduce the taste for cooperation (Moore et al., 1998; Zhang et al.,
2015). Low weight at birth also predicts behavioral problems (Hille et al., 2007),
and low income (Black et al., 2007). The 2D:4D ratio – a marker of prenatal stress
– predicts risk and prosocial preferences (Sapienza et al., 2009; Buser, 2012, and
Chapter 3 of this thesis). Considering that ambient temperature during gestation
is known to affect preterm birth (Lajinian et al., 1997; Yackerson et al., 2008;
Flouris et al., 2009) and birth weight (Wells and Cole, 2002; Lawlor et al., 2005;
Deschênes et al., 2009), its effects on later-life outcomes have received surprisingly
little attention. To be sure, much of this non-experimental strand of fetal origins
literature consists of comparative cohort studies without sufficient controls for
socioeconomic and behavioral confounders (Zhang et al. (2015), Black et al. (2007),
Dell et al. (2009), and Deschênes et al. (2009) being noteworthy exceptions), and
is therefore prone to suffer from omitted variable bias. Moreover, there is no
consensus regarding the physiological mechanisms linking ambient temperature
during gestation to birth outcomes.1 Taken as a whole, this body of literature
nonetheless points toward a link between ambient temperature during gestation
1Reduced fetal nutrient intake caused directly by altered maternal nutrient intake or indirectly
by impaired placental function is often mentioned as a potential mechanism through which
temperature shocks during pregnancy affect birth outcomes, as are hormonal imbalances caused
by heat shocks. There is some evidence that these mechanisms are at play in other mammals
such as sheep (Hansen, 2009; Bloomfield et al., 2003), but studies of their role in human gestation
are rare (Yajnik, 2002; Smith and Nicholson, 2007).
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and later-life outcomes. The methodologically well-executed study by Deschênes
et al. (2009) (as well as that by Lawlor et al. (2005), which may suffer from an
omitted variable bias) further suggests that it is relative – rather than absolute –
temperature shocks that matter in this respect.2
To my knowledge, the hitherto only study to look at the effect of in utero
temperature shocks on later-life outcomes links temperature during gestation to
depression in adulthood (Adhvaryu et al., 2015). The present chapter fills in part of
the remaining gap by studying the effects of ambient temperature during gestation
on the taste of cooperation.
2.3 Experimental design and data
Employing new data from behavioral games, anthropometric measurements
and an extensive socioeconomic survey conducted in Uganda, I exploit the
quasi-experimental variation in weather to gauge the impact of prenatal
temperature shocks on later-life cooperation.
I use several distinct datasets in my analysis.3 Temperature data come from
Willmott and Matsuura’s (2015) gridded monthly time series interpolated from
weather station observations. I combine the temperature values with my main
and secondary self-collected datasets. The main set contains data from a survey
of primary school pupils from Northern Uganda, and also includes their choices
in a one-shot dichotomous public goods game, as well as their anthropometric
measurements. The secondary set contains data from a household survey from
Southern Uganda, and records of the behavior of the representatives of these
households in a standard public goods game.
2Wells and Cole (2002) come to a different conclusion, providing between-population evidence
that absolute – rather than relative – temperature shocks during gestation drive changes in
birth-outcomes. Although they control for various confounding factors such as income and
nutritional intake, these are aggregated at the national and yearly levels. Due to this design,
the study cannot distinguish between regular seasonal variation in temperature and relative
temperature shocks.
3See Appendix Appendix 2.B: for an overview of variable definitions.
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2.3.1 Temperature
I construct my measure of ambient air temperature during gestation using
Willmott and Matsuura’s (2015) historical time series – one of two publicly
available datasets with values spatially intrapolated from terrestrial weather
station measurements. Although the alternative dataset produced by Harris
et al. (2014) is generally more popular, that of Willmott and Matsuura is better
suited for my purposes as it uses a much denser set of weather stations in East
Africa (as well as globally).4 The dataset contains a single temperature value for
each historical month and spatial grid cell of 0.5°×0.5° (roughly 55km×55km in
Uganda).
My behavioral and survey data come from two clusters of locations—one
in Northern Uganda, spanning four neighboring grid cells (2.5°N-3.5°N,
32.5°E-33.5°E), and one from a single grid cell in Southern Uganda (0.5°S-1.0°S,
30.0°E-30.5°E). Since the differences between the values in the four neighboring
cells in any given month are minimal, I use their mean values for all observations
4The dataset produced by Harris et al. (2014) at the Climate Research Unit at the University
of East Anglia is clearly more popular than that assembled by Willmott and Matsuura (2015) at
the University of Delaware. While Willmott and Matsuura’s dataset has been cited by 149 studies
since its publication in 2009, the CRU dataset has been cited 751 times since its publication five
years later according to Google Scholar. In 2015 alone, the CRU dataset was cited in 226
publications on Africa, compared to only 20 citations of Willmott and Matsuura (including
citations of previous versions of their dataset). I find the preference for Harris et al. odd, given
that their data is based on a much sparser set of weather stations than Willmott and Matsuura’s.
Willmott and Matsuura use measurements from between 3 and 19 (on average 8) weather stations
within a 5° (about 555 km) radius of my main research site in Northern Uganda, and between
3 and 19 (with an average of 6) stations within a 5° radius from my secondary research site in
Southern Uganda, depending on the month and year of measurement. Harris et al. use only
0 to 4 (on average 3) and 0 to 2 (on average 1) stations respectively in the same regions, and
until 1941, the nearest weather station used in their dataset was Harare—21° (2300 km) from my
main research site and 17° (1900 km) from my secondary research site. Willmott and Matsuura’s
data predict over 25% of the variation in actual temperature data from Entebbe, Uganda, while
Harris et al.’s predict less than 7%. I therefore consider Willmott and Matsuura (2015) superior
to Harris et al. (2014) in the East African context, despite the overwhelming popularity of the
latter.
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in the northern cluster, obtaining a single monthly temperature value for each of
the two location clusters. To obtain the value of ambient temperature during the
gestation of a respondent in the northern cluster, I average the temperature in the
northern location during the month of his or her birth and in the preceding eight
months. The values for respondents from the southern locations are constructed
analogously. For an individual born in November, for example, I average the
monthly values from March until November.
The historical monthly means are plotted in Figure 2.2, where the gray curves
represent the monthly temperature means in the two clusters, the red curve
represents the temperatures in the months in which the respondents in the northern
cluster (main sample) were gestating, and the blue curve denotes the temperatures
in the months in which the respondents in the southern cluster (secondary sample)
were gestating. The mean values of ambient air temperature during the gestation
(9 months) of individual respondents are denoted by black circles.
Mean temperatures of 9-month-long gestational periods have, by construction, a
much smaller variance than monthly mean temperatures (as Figure 2.2 illustrates).
Similarly, the variance of monthly means is smaller than that of daily means.
Basing my analysis on overall mean values therefore somewhat reduces its
sensitivity. Using more detailed temperature data such as a set of 9 monthly values
for each individual would not, however, correspond to the level of precision with
which I can determine the dates of conception – and thus the periods of gestation –
of the respondents. By its nature, I can only infer an individual’s probable date of
conception from their date of birth. The possibility of premature and late births
introduces in such inference a level of uncertainty which is only aggravated by
the fact that I only know the month (rather than the exact date) of birth of my
respondents. The margin of error associated with these imprecisions can easily be
more than a month. In extreme cases, there would thus be no overlap between
actual and assumed values of temperatures in any given month of gestation. Using
instead the mean value over the whole assumed period of gestation largely reduces
the effect of such inaccuracies.
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Figure 2.2 – Temperature trends
2.3.2 Main sample
My main sample consists of 531 children and their caregivers from Pader district
in Northern Uganda. The children come from 42 primary schools visited in June
and July 2014. In each school, 16 pupils were randomly selected from a list of
those enrolled at the beginning of the year.5
I measure children’s and caregivers’ willingness to cooperate by involving them
in a one-shot dichotomous public goods game similar to those in Cárdenas et al.
(2009) and Barr et al. (2014). In each school, children were randomly assigned to
groups of 8, but were not told which other 7 children (of the 15 participating in
that school) belonged to their group. Each child then anonymously selected either
5Out of a total of 672, the caregivers of 141 pupils did not know their children’s birth date.
These children were excluded from my analysis.
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a “private card” or a “group card”.6 By choosing the private card, the respondent
allotted 4 candies to himself, but none to the other unknown members of the group.
By selecting the group card, the respondent instead ensured 1 candy for each of the
8 group members, including himself (see Appendix 2.C: for a reproduction of the
two cards). In this set up, total welfare is maximized when all 8 game participants
opt for the group card, such that they each receive 8 candies. A sole free rider
selecting the private card would receive 11 candies, but in the Nash equilibrium,
everyone selects the private card and ends up with only 4 candies each.
Caregivers played a similar public goods game, but made their decisions in
the isolated environment of their home, unaware of the identity of the other
8 participants with whom they were grouped. If they chose the private card,
they received 4,000 UGX (roughly 1.5 USD at the time). Choosing the group
card instead meant an allocation of 1,000 UGX to each anonymous member of
the group, including themselves. In the Nash equilibrium, each participant thus
received 4,000 UGX, total welfare was maximized at a return of 8,000 UGX for each
group member, and a sole free rider would earn 11,000 UGX. 26% of the children
chose the cooperative option, while the cooperation rate among their caregivers
was 34%.
The descriptive statistics for the children are presented in Table 2.1. The mean
ambient temperature faced by the mothers of the children in my sample during
their pregnancy was 24.9°C. The children are on average 10 years old, and girls and
boys are equally represented. The height of the children in the sample is practically
identical to the mean for their age, but their body mass is 1.39 standard deviation
below the mean for their age (de Onis et al., 2007).7 This suggests that some
may have been nutritionally deprived in their early life, which could confound
6Contrarily to many public goods games in which participants can choose their preferred
contribution level, I opted for a dichotomous choice, effectively reducing the game to a prisoner’s
dilemma: respondents could either cooperate or not. While this reduced my ability to pick up
the nuances present in the experimental sample, I believe that it facilitated the decision making
process, especially for the youngest.
7Based on WHO recommendations for treating outliers (de Onis et al., 2007), I truncate the
anthropometric data at 6 standard deviations from the mean. This results in 15 and 14 dropped
observations for height-for-age and BMI-for-age respectively.
22 Prenatal Temperature Shocks
my results (I address this issue below). Children’s cognitive ability was measured
through standard Raven’s progressive matrices (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 2012). It
is an intelligence quotient (IQ) adjusted for age and scaled relative to the sample
(with a mean at 100 and a standard deviation of 15).
I further proxy for child prenatal stress by the second-to-fourth (2D:4D) digit ratio
(a marker of hormonal exposure in utero). The lengths of the index and ring fingers
were measured on the palmar surface of the right hand, from the midpoint of the
palmar digital crease to the tip of the finger. Given the constraints due to the
remoteness of the field location,8 the measurement is only precise to the nearest 1
mm, resulting in measurement error of ±3.3% at the mean of the estimates.9 While
the precision of this measurement is still well bellow that obtained in laboratory
settings (see Voracek et al., 2007), my measurements should be at least as accurate
as those in other field studies which often only report whether the index finger is
longer, shorter, or of the same length as the ring finger (Buser, 2012).
Child postnatal conflict exposure – a potentially important confounding factor
considering that most children in the sample were born during a period of civil
war in Northern Uganda – is a composite measure derived from the exposure of
the caregiver and the child’s year of birth. Given their young age at the time
of the conflict, children were not asked any war-related questions. Instead, I
use caregiver responses to an adapted version of the War Trauma Questionnaire
(Macksoud, 1992; Papageorgiou et al., 2000).10 It consists of 23 yes-no questions
about various violent events witnessed by the caregiver, from which I construct
a conflict exposure index using the number of positive responses as a measure of
exposure (Bellows and Miguel, 2009) and normalizing it for the sample. To proxy
the child’s postnatal conflict exposure I weight the caregiver’s conflict exposure
index by the portion of violence their child could have potentially witnessed after
8The state of the art in measuring finger lengths is to use an office scanner to take a perfectly
flat image of the palmar surface of the hand, and computer software to measure the exact lengths.
I instead used clipboards and tape measures.
9A pilot in which 30 raters each separately measured the digit lengths of 35 individuals
revealed comparable margins of error.
10Any questions about shelling and bombardment are irrelevant in the Ugandan setting, and
were therefore omitted from the questionnaire.
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birth. To obtain the weights, I divide the number of civilian fatalities that occurred
in Pader district following the child’s birth by the total number of civilian facilities
recorded in the district throughout the length of the conflict (Figure 2.3).11 For
example, a child born in December 2003 – by which time 62% of reported fatalities
took place – whose caregiver’s conflict exposure is 87% is likely to have witnessed
38% of the violence that the caregiver was exposed to. For my purposes, the child’s
conflict exposure index would therefore be 33% ((1− 0.62)× 0.87 = 0.33).
Finally, precipitation and consumer prices during gestation are constructed
analogously to the temperature variable.
Figure 2.3 – Civilian targeting
To account for further environmental and genetic effects on preferences, I also
11Source: ACLED Version 5, 1997-2013
24 Prenatal Temperature Shocks
Table 2.1 – Descriptive statistics (children)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Temperature 24.915 0.505 23.464 25.681 531
Cooperation 0.256 0.437 0 1 531
Female 0.493 0.5 0 1 531
Age in years 10.478 2.731 6 20 531
Height-for-age -0.025 1.005 -3.391 3.571 516
BMI-for-age -1.387 0.935 -3.99 2.26 517
IQ-for-age 100.619 14.815 73.993 148.458 488
Prenatal stress 0 1 -3.273 5.028 215
Postnatal conflict exposure 0 1 -4.971 2.885 477
Precipitation 5.408 1.233 2.889 8.347 531
Consumer prices -2.113 2.163 -5.954 4.937 531
interviewed each child’s main caregiver—the adult household member with whom
the child spends most time. The descriptive statistics for the caregivers are
presented in Table 2.2. About half of the caregivers in my sample chose to
cooperate in the public goods game. Caregivers are on average 41 years of
age,12 58% are female. Additionally, I collected information about their education
level and risk preferences. All caregivers were exposed to at least some kind of
conflict-related violence, though the level of exposure varies greatly.13 Almost
all respondents are Christian and belong to the Acholi ethnic group. A typical
household is composed of 8 people. I also collected information about their relative
asset wealth (Sahn and Stifel, 2003).
In my setting, information about the current main caregivers can only serve as a
proxy for environmental and genetic influences to which the children have been
subjected throughout their lives. Of the 531 caregivers in my sample, only 265
are biological mothers of the children, while 206 are their biological fathers. The
remaining 60 were grandparents, uncles or aunts, other relatives, and siblings (in
descending order of prevalence). One caregiver was not related to the child at all.
Nonetheless, the average caregiver in my sample had been taking care of the child
12Nine caregivers did not know their age, reducing the number of observations to 522.
13Three caregivers refused to complete the conflict exposure module of the survey, reducing
the number of observations to 528. This reduction carries over the measure of child postnatal
conflict exposure, which is derived from that of their caregiver.
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Table 2.2 – Descriptive statistics (caregivers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age in years 40.588 9.738 20 94 522
Age at birth of child 30.207 9.545 10 85 522
Female 0.58 0.494 0 1 531
Acholi 0.976 0.155 0 1 531
Christian 0.998 0.043 0 1 531
Years of education 3.84 3.431 0 18 531
Married 0.772 0.42 0 1 531
Functional literacy 0.234 0.423 0 1 531
Conflict exposure 0 1 -3.035 1.688 528
Household size 7.945 2.491 2 20 531
Wealth 0 1 -1.54 3.068 531
Risk averseion 0.516 0.5 0 1 531
Cooperation 0.335 0.473 0 1 531
for 82% of the child’s life, making the information about the caregivers a strong
proxy for the environment surrounding the children.
2.3.3 Secondary sample
My main dataset contains rich information about the children and their
environment, but suffers from two important shortcomings. The first is its conflict
setting. If temperature shocks invite conflict (O’Loughlin et al., 2012; Hsiang
et al., 2013), then the physiological effects of ambient temperature during gestation
would be hard to disentangle from the effects of temperature-induced conflict.
Second, it does not allow us to repeat the analysis using the caregiver’s behavior
and temperature during their gestation, because I only know the caregivers’ year
of birth. This means that I cannot tell whether the behavioral effects that
temperature shocks in utero have on children last into adulthood. To address
these concerns, I turn to a second sample of 257 adults from Sheema district in
Southern Uganda, which was untouched by the conflict in the north.
In July and August 2014 I visited 45 villages in the district, and surveyed a random
sample of 10 households per village selected from a census. A randomly selected
adult representative of each surveyed household was invited to participate in an
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incentivized public goods game.14
The game was played in groups of 5 participants who could anonymously decide
to contribute between 0 and 5 tokens (worth 1,000 UGX or 0.38 USD each) to
a common pot, keeping the rest for themselves. Shared funds were doubled and
redistributed equally (after rounding). After an initial practice round, 5 rounds
of the game were played with each group, though the participants did not know
beforehand how many rounds the game would last.15 One round was selected at
random for payment.
In this design, total welfare is maximized when all participants contribute their
entire endowment of 5 tokens to the common pot, receiving 10 each in return.
Nevertheless, free riders could receive up to 13 tokens, and the Nash equilibrium
is reached with all players keeping their 5 tokens. On average, participants
contributed 3.44 tokens to the public good. The descriptive statistics for the game
participants are presented in Table 2.3. The mean ambient temperature faced by
the mothers of the adults in my sample during their gestation was 19.2°C. The
participants are on average 42 years old, a third are female, and 84% are married.
On average, they fell just short of completing primary education, and half are
functionally literate. Nearly the whole sample is ethnically Ankole and Christian
by religion.
2.4 Analysis and results
2.4.1 Main finding
I hypothesize that exposure to high ambient temperatures during an individual’s
gestation may impact his or her later-life preference for cooperation. Combining
the findings of Wells and Cole (2002), Lawlor et al. (2005) and Deschênes et al.
14Out of a total of 450 randomly selected household representatives, 193 either did not know
their month and year of birth, or did not show up to play the public goods game. These people
were excluded from my analysis.
15Withholding the information about the exact length of the game helps ensure that all rounds,
including the final one, are played in a strategic way.
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Table 2.3 – Descriptive statistics (adults)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Temperature 19.222 0.347 18.278 20.233 257
Contribution 3.437 1.174 0 5 257
Age in years 42.004 15.711 16 92 257
Female 0.335 0.473 0 1 257
Years of education 6.743 3.866 0 17 257
Married 0.844 0.363 0 1 257
Munyankole 0.977 0.151 0 1 257
Christian 0.996 0.062 0 1 257
Functional literacy 0.498 0.501 0 1 257
Wealth 0 1 -1.212 5.515 257
(2009) with those of Hack et al. (2005) and Zhang et al. (2015), I expect prenatal
exposure to high ambient temperatures to reduce cooperative behavior. I first
analyze this relationship by fitting the following probit model:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym) = Φ(α+ βTemperatureym) (2.1)
where Cooperationiyms equals 1 if child i born in monthm of year y and attending
school s selects the cooperative option, and Temperatureym is the mean ambient
temperature during the likely gestation of children born in month m of year y.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of running month of birth.
I find that exposure to high ambient temperature during gestation is negatively
correlated with the child’s probability of contribution to the public good.
Parametrically, a 1 ◦C increase in mean ambient temperature during gestation
reduces the child’s probability of contribution by 7.5% points (Table 2.4, column
1). At mean prevalence of 25.6%, this is equivalent to a 29% reduction in the
likelihood of cooperation.
To account for non-temperature seasonal confounds and unobserved background
characteristics potentially related to season of birth similar to those described
by Buckles and Hungerman (2013) in the United States, I include calendar
month fixed effects, which only increases the magnitude of the detected effect
of temperature (Table 2.4, column 2). The relationship could potentially also be
driven by other child characteristics. Prosocial preferences develop throughout
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childhood and adolescence, and become increasingly gender-dependent with
approaching adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Controlling for age, gender and
their interaction, however, does not change the interpretation of the result (Table
2.4, column 3), nor does controlling for caregiver characteristics and school fixed
effects to account for family and peer demographics (Table 2.4, columns 4-5), both
of which have been linked to children’s prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 2006).
Gradually including these additional controls, I reach the following fully specified
model:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs)
(2.2)
where Cooperationiyms equals 1 if child i born in monthm of year y and attending
school s selects the cooperative option, Temperatureym is the mean ambient
temperature during the likely gestation of children born in month m of year y,
xiyms is a vector of individual child characteristics (female, age, age×female),
ziyms is a vector of caregiver characteristics (female, age, age×female, Acholi,
years of education), ζm are month-of-birth fixed effects, and ηs are school fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of running month of birth. In
all specifications, I find a strong negative effect of ambient temperature during
gestation on children’s cooperation.
Table 2.4 – High temperature decreases taste for cooperation
Child cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature -0.075∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.141∗ -0.208∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.052) (0.072) (0.076) (0.067)
Month of birth FE N Y Y Y Y
Child characteristics N N Y Y Y
Caregiver characteristics N N N Y Y
School FE N N N N Y
N 531 531 531 522 499
Area under ROC curve 0.556 0.610 0.620 0.625 0.742
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Caregiver characteristics:
Female, Age (in years), Age×Female, Acholi, Years of education.
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Result 1: Exposure to abnormally high ambient temperature during gestation
decreases later-life taste for cooperation. A 1 ◦C (1 s.d.) increase in mean ambient
temperature during gestation decreases the probability of cooperation in a public
goods game by up to 21% points (11% points), leading to a 17% (8%) drop in
total welfare.
The result is robust to excluding high-leverage and high-influence observations (see
Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix), as well as to limiting the analysis to children born
in the same area (see Table 2.A.2). Including the mean air temperature during
a 9-month period 1 year prior to the assumed period of gestation as a placebo
treatment leaves the result unaffected (see Table 2.A.3), as does assuming other
periods of gestation (see Table 2.A.4).16
2.4.2 Indirect temperature effects and other factors
Both in theory and in my data, temperature is strongly negatively correlated
with precipitation, which in turn affects agricultural yields and – by extension –
food prices. The combination of high temperatures and low precipitation during
gestation could thus lead to malnutrition in infancy, whose negative consequences
for the child’s cognitive abilities can persist for years (Beckett et al., 2006; Figlio
et al., 2014). On the other hand, low precipitation levels decrease the likelihood of
malaria contraction (Craig et al., 1999), and could thus also have a positive effect
on later-life outcomes (Barreca, 2010). I control for the environmental covariates
and the indicators of early-life deprivation separately by estimating the following
16In my analysis, I assume the period of gestation to correspond with the calendar month
of the respondent’s birth and the previous 8 months. To obtain the mean temperature during
the gestational period of a respondent born in November, for example, I average the mean
temperatures from March until November. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, this is quite a
simplification. A child born full term on the 1st of November would have gestated between
February and October, while a child born 1 month prematurely on the 30th of November would
have gestated between April and November. As a robustness check, I re-estimate model (2.2)
using these two extremes as alternative individual regressors, as well as each others instruments
in an instrumental variable probit setting.
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probit models:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms, eym) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs + θ′eym)
(2.3)
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms, ciyms) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs + ι′ciyms)
(2.4)
where eym is a vector of environmental variables Precipitation (monthly mean
of daily precipitation) and Consumer prices (linearly detrended consumer price
index) in month m of year y, ciyms is a vector of personal characteristics
Height-for-age, BMI-dor-age and IQ-for-age of child i born in month m of year y
and living in village s, and all other notation has the same meaning as in (2.2).
Combining (2.3) and (2.4), I get the following fully specified model:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms, eym, ciyms) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs + θ′eym + ι′ciyms)
(2.5)
where all notation is the same as in (2.3) and (2.4).
I find that high precipitation during gestation decreases children’s taste for
cooperation, while consumer prices do not significantly affect it (Table 2.5, columns
1 and 3). This suggests that – at least in the context of Northern Uganda –
the effects of precipitation during gestation on later-life prosocial preferences via
exposure to malaria dominate those via agricultural yields. Importantly, however,
they do not wash away the effect of temperature itself (Table 2.5, columns 4 and
6).
High cognitive abilities proxied by the age-adjusted IQ predict higher probability
of contributing to the public good in accordance with Zhang et al. (2015). From
Beckett et al. (2006) and Figlio et al. (2014), I would expect height-for-age and
BMI-for-age – both markers of early-life nutritional deprivation – to also be
positively correlated with child cooperation. Instead, I estimate their effects to
be statistically insignificant and significantly negative respectively (see Table 2.5,
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columns 2-3). Their inclusion in the model does not however alter my main result
(Table 2.5, columns 5-6).
There is increasingly conclusive evidence that high temperatures may trigger or
intensify violent conflict (O’Loughlin et al., 2012; Hsiang et al., 2013). Pre-
and post-natal exposure to conflict have in turn been found to influence social
preferences: Conflict-induced prenatal stress reduces contributions to the public
good in later life (see Chapter 3), while post-natal exposure leads to more prosocial
behavior within close networks (Voors et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2014; Gilligan et al.,
2014). Many of the children in my sample were born during a period of civil war
in Northern Uganda. Using a sub-sample for which information on war exposure
and prenatal stress is available,17 I control for potential conflict-related confounds
by estimating the following fully specified probit model:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms,wiyms) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs + κ′wiyms)
(2.6)
where wiyms is a vector of conflict exposure measures of child i born in monthm of
year y and living in village s, comprising Prenatal stress (a z-score of the reverse
2D:4D ratio—a marker of prenatal stress) and a measure of Postnatal conflict
exposure. All other notation is the same as in (2.2).
I find that prenatal stress reduces the taste for cooperation, as does postnatal
conflict exposure (Table 2.6, column 1). While the former is in line with the
findings in Chapter 3, the latter contrasts with other studies (Voors et al., 2012;
Bauer et al., 2014; Gilligan et al., 2014). Nonetheless, the inclusion of these
war-related controls does not wash away the effect of ambient temperature during
gestation; it rather makes it stronger (Table 2.6, column 2).
17Part of the children in this study were also interviewed in 2012, at which time I measured
the lengths of their fingers to calculate the 2D:4D ratio. I made the same measurements for
this study, but after explaining to the research assistants that the digit ratio is “usually around
1”, the frequency of precisely that value being reported increased dramatically. While I do not
believe that this was a result of intentional misenumeration, it does constitute a heavy bias,
forcing me to discard the 2014 2D:4D values. This reduced the available sample to those children
interviewed in 2012.
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Table 2.6 – Conflict exposure
Child cooperation
(1) (2)
Temperature -0.355∗∗∗
(0.110)
Prenatal stress -0.081∗∗ -0.083∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Postnatal conflict exposure -0.036∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.022) (0.021)
Child characteristics Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y
N 164 164
Area under ROC curve 0.825 0.841
Notes: Probit marginal effects. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. SE clustered at the level of running month of
birth in parentheses. Child characteristics: Female, Age, Age2, Age×Female, Age2×Female.
The preferences of children may be influenced by those of their caregivers through
both environmental and – when the two are blood related – genetic mechanisms
(Dohmen et al., 2012). I control for caregiver preferences in the following fully
specified probit model:
Pr(Cooperationiyms = 1|Temperatureym,xiyms,ziyms,piyms) =
Φ(α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δ′ziyms + ζm + ηs + λ′piyms)
(2.7)
where piyms is a vector of the preferences of the caregiver of child i born in month
m of year y and living in village s, comprising Caregiver cooperation (a dummy
equal to 1 if the caregiver chose the cooperative option) and Caregiver risk aversion
(a dummy equal to one if the caregiver chose the least risky of a series of lotteries).
All other notation is the same as in (2.2).
I find that a child’s social preferences are strongly correlated with the social
preferences of their main caregiver, but not with the caregiver’s risk preferences.
Children are about 11% points more likely to contribute to the public good if their
main caregiver contributes to to it as well in a separate game (Table 2.7, column
1). The effect of ambient temperature during gestation is however not affected
by these controls (Table 2.7, column 2), and the results hold when analysis is
restricted to caregivers who are biological parents of their children (Table 2.7,
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columns 3-4).
Table 2.7 – Caregiver preferences
Child cooperation
All caregivers Biological parents only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature -0.199∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.072)
Caregiver cooperation 0.105∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041)
Caregiver risk aversion -0.030 -0.023 -0.007 0.001
(0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
Child characteristics Y Y Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y Y Y
N 499 499 443 443
Area under ROC curve 0.738 0.751 0.724 0.738
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Caregiver characteristics:
Female, Age (in years), Age×Female, Acholi, Years of education.
Finally, it is conceivable that different types of parents are more likely to conceive
at times with different weather and climate patterns. If the different types of
parents would also have different social preferences, such self-selection could bias
my results. In my setting, much of any such bias should be absorbed by the
month of birth fixed effects. To further verify that no self-selection bias is present,
I regress a battery of caregiver characteristics on mean temperature during the
child’s gestation according to the following model:
yiyms = α+ βTempym + γ
′xiyms + δm + ζs + εiyms (2.8)
where yiyms refers to one of the following characteristics of the caregiver of child i
born in month m of year y in village s: gender, marital status, functional literacy,
risk aversion, public goods game choice, age at birth of child, years of education,
conflict exposure, wealth, and household size. All other notation is the same as
above.
If parents did not self-select into conceiving at the onset of a particularly hot (or
cold) 9-months period based on these characteristics, the estimated β coefficients
should be statistically insignificant. I summarize the estimated β coefficients and
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their 95% confidence intervals in Figure 2.4. As expected, none is statistically
different from zero, indicating no detectable parent self-selection bias.
Figure 2.4 – Caregiver self-selection does not drive the results
Result 2: The relationship between ambient temperature during gestation and
cooperation is stable and robust to controlling for other environmental factors,
early life deprivation markers, pre- and post-natal conflict exposure and caregiver
preferences.
2.4.3 Long-term effects
To gauge the long-term effects of ambient temperature shocks during gestation on
the taste for cooperation and to test the external validity of my main finding, I
apply a similar analytical approach to a sample of adults from a different part of
the country playing a different type of public goods game. I first fit the following
simple OLS model:
Contributioniyms = α+ βTemperatureym + εiyms (2.9)
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where Contributioniyms represents the average amount of tokens contributed to
the public good by participant i born in month m of year y and living in village
s. Temperature has the same meaning as above, and εiyms is a stochastic error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the levels of running month of birth and
game group. I find a negative effect of ambient temperature during gestation on
the contribution to the common pot.
To bring the model closer to (2.2), I next extend it to include all the available
confounds:
Contributioniyms = α+ βTemperatureym + γ
′xiyms + δm + ζs + εiyms (2.10)
where xiyms is a vector of personal characteristics of participant i born in month
m of year y and living in village s, which is comprised of Age (age in months),
Female (a dummy equal to 1 if the participant is female), and their interaction.
δm are month of year fixed effects and ζs village fixed effects. The rest of the
notation is the same as in (2.9).
I find a negative and statistically significant effect of ambient temperature
during gestation on contribution to the public good, with every 1°C increase in
temperature lowering contributions to the public good by about 0.5 token or some
13%. The result is robust to outlier exclusion (see Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix)
as well as to a placebo test by older temperatures (see Table 2.A.6).
Result 3: The negative effects of exposure to unusually high ambient
temperature during gestation on later-life taste for cooperation last into adulthood.
A 1 ◦C (1 s.d.) increase in mean ambient temperature during gestation decreases
contributions to the public good by about 13% (5%), thus decreasing total welfare
by 6% (2%).
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 37
Table 2.8 – Long-term effects
Contribution
(1) (2)
Temperature -0.341∗ -0.468∗∗
(0.193) (0.204)
Personal characteristics N Y
Month of birth & Village FE N Y
N 257 257
adj. R2 0.006 0.140
Notes: SE clustered at the level of running month of birth and game group in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Personal characteristics: Female, Age, Age×Female.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
When Montesquieu (1748, book 15, chapter 1: 7) wrote that excess heat makes
people “slothful and dispirited,” he pointed out that the fact is often used as
a justification for slavery. It is perhaps due to the negative connotations of
this argument that few social scientists studied the effects of heat on human
behavior until quite recently. With global climate change driving temperatures
to historically unprecedented levels, this attitude has drastically shifted.
There is now some cross-country evidence suggesting that prevailing extreme
temperatures negatively affect health outcomes (Wells and Cole, 2002), and
hamper economic production (Burke et al., 2015). Looking exclusively at such
cross-country studies, one could be tempted to conclude that it is absolute
temperatures that drive health and behavioral changes, and that geographical
location largely predetermines health and economic outcomes. In such a world,
children in tropical countries would be born underweight (Wells and Cole, 2002),
suffer from the various negative consequences of poor birth outcomes (Black et al.,
2007), and grow up in inefficient economies (Burke et al., 2015). In the context
of this study, they would become less cooperative than their luckier counterparts
from more temperate climates.
Within-country analyses, however, paint a more complex picture. Due to their
longitudinal nature, they have to control for any trends and seasonal patterns
not associated with temperature (typically by including time fixed effects in their
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models), effectively netting out seasonal and long-term temperature patterns as
well. Their findings suggest that unexpected deviations from normal temperatures
– rather than absolute temperatures – are responsible for observed health and
behavioral changes (Dell et al., 2009; Deschênes et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013).
In the context of this chapter, one would thus expect a person born in an unusually
warm year in Northern Uganda to be less cooperative than their neighbor born in
an unusually cold year. One would, however, not know whether they should be
more or less cooperative than somebody born on the same day in North Holland,
for example.
Relying on longitudinal data from two locations in Uganda, I follow Dell et al.’s
(2009) recommendation to include time fixed effects in this chapter. I find that
exposure to higher than normal ambient temperatures during gestation reduces
the probability that a child contributes to the public good. The estimated
effect is large and robust to controlling for potential confounders including other
environmental factors, markers of early-life deprivation, prenatal stress, postnatal
conflict exposure and caregiver preferences. The negative effect of prenatal
exposure to abnormally high temperatures lasts into adulthood.
Thus, people’s willingness to cooperate – a prerequisite for much of economic
production – may decline as the likelihood of extreme temperatures increases.
The welfare implications of this are substantial in my stylized behavioral games.
Their estimation in practice is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter, and
should instead be the focus of future research. Similarly, it will be important to
study the extent to which adaptation to new climatic realities may mitigate the
behavioral effects of higher temperatures. Until these questions are answered, at
least the possibility of such effects should be taken into account when constructing
the damage function of climate change and assessing the benefits of climate
policies.
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Table 2.A.1 – The main result is robust to outlier exclusion
Child cooperation
All Low leverage Low influence
(1) (2) (3)
Temperature -0.143∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗
(0.067) (0.077) (0.084)
Child & caregiver characteristics Y Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y Y
N 518 434 469
Area under ROC curve 0.736 0.687 0.725
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Caregiver characteristics:
Female, Age (in years), Age×Female, Acholi, Years of education. Low leverage: hat < µhat + σhat. Low influence:
|DFBETA| < 2/√N.
Table 2.A.2 – The main result is robust to spatial restrictions
Child cooperation
All Born in same area
(1) (2)
Temperature -0.208∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.066)
Child characteristics Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y
N 499 458
Area under ROC curve 0.742 0.734
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Caregiver characteristics:
Female, Age (in years), Age×Female, Acholi, Years of education.
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Table 2.A.3 – The main result is robust to a placebo test
Child cooperation
(1) (2)
Temperature -0.208∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.068)
Temperature (previous year) -0.086
(0.075)
Child characteristics Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y
N 499 499
Area under ROC curve 0.742 0.744
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Caregiver characteristics:
Female, Age (in years), Age×Female, Acholi, Years os education.
Table 2.A.4 – The main result is robust to alternative assumptions about gestational
period
Child cooperation
Probit IV Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature (normal) -0.180∗∗ -0.155∗∗
(0.070) (0.077)
Temperature (premature) -0.133∗∗ -0.198∗∗
(0.065) (0.080)
Child characteristics Y Y Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y Y Y
N 518 518 518 518
Area under ROC curve 0.740 0.735 0.728 0.724
Notes: Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the level of running month of birth in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Child characteristics: age, female, age×female. Normal pregnancy extreme temperature
instrumented by premature pregnancy extreme temperature in (3). Premature pregnancy extreme temperature
instrumented by normal pregnancy extreme temperature in (4).
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Table 2.A.5 – The long-term result is robust to outlier exclusion
Contribution
All Low leverage Low influence
(1) (2) (3)
Temperature -0.468∗∗ -0.489∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.243) (0.207)
Personal characteristics Y Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y Y
N 257 222 222
adj. R2 0.340 0.346 0.447
Notes: SE clustered at the level of running month of birth and game group in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Personal characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female. Low leverage: hat < µhat + σhat.
Low influence: |DFBETA| < 2/√N.
Table 2.A.6 – The long-term result is robust to a placebo test
Contribution
(1) (2)
Temperature -0.468∗∗ -0.403∗∗
(0.204) (0.203)
Temperature (previous year) -0.228
(0.267)
Child characteristics Y Y
Month of birth & School FE Y Y
N 257 257
adj. R2 0.140 0.140
Notes: SE clustered at the level of running month of birth and game group in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Personal characteristics: Female, Age (in months), Age×Female.
Appendix 2.B: Detailed variable definitions
Temperature. Mean ambient air temperature in the month of the respondent’s
birth and the preceding 8 months (in °C). All values are taken from Willmott
and Matsuura (2015)—a monthly time series interpolated to a 0.5°×0.5° grid. To
obtain the mean temperature for the children, I averaged the values from four
gird cells (2.5°N-3.5°N, 32.5°E-33.5°E) covering the former Pader district. Values
for the adults in my secondary sample come from a single grid cell (0.5°S-1.0°S,
30.0°E-30.5°E), which covers all the surveyed villages.
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Cooperation. A dummy representing the respondent’s choice in a one-shot
dichotomous public goods game: “group card” or “private card”. The cooperative
choice “group card” takes value 1, the non-cooperative choice “private card” takes
value 0.
Female. A dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent is female, 0
otherwise.
Age. Respondent’s age in months (unless specified otherwise).
Height-for-age. The child’s height standardized for his age class (de Onis et al.,
2007).
BMI-for-age. The child’s body-mass-index standardized for his age class
(de Onis et al., 2007).
IQ-for-age. The child’s IQ, measured using standard Raven’s matrices and
standardized for his age class (in sample).
2D:4D. A child level measure of the relative length of the index finger of the
right hand with respect to the ring finger (in cm).
Prenatal stress. A child level variable derived by standardizing the 2D:4D
(z-score): DigitRatioi = − 2D:4Di−2D:4Dσ . The negative sign is added for ease
of interpretation.
(Postnatal) conflict exposure. The child’s postnatal conflict exposure is
proxied by the conflict exposure of his primary caregiver multiplied by the fraction
of violent conflict events that took place after the child’s birth. The caregiver’s
conflict exposure index is derived from answers to 23 war-witnessing questions (see
Macksoud, 1992).
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Precipitation. Mean precipitation in the month of the respondent’s birth and
the preceding 8 months (in mm/day). All values are taken from Willmott and
Matsuura (2015)—a monthly time series interpolated to a 0.5°×0.5° grid. To
obtain the mean temperature for the children, I averaged the values from four
gird cells (2.5°N-3.5°N, 32.5°E-33.5°E) covering the former Pader district. Values
for the adults in my secondary sample come from a single grid cell (0.5°S-1.0°S,
30.0°E-30.5°E), which covers all the surveyed villages.
Consumer prices. Mean linearly de-trended consumer price index in the month
of the respondent’s birth and the preceding 8 months (International Monetary
Fund, 2016).
Age at birth of child. Caregivers age at her last birthday before the birth of
the child.
Christian. A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is Christian by religion, 0
otherwise.
Acholi. A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is ethnically Acholi, 0
otherwise.
Munyankole. A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is ethnically Munyankole,
0 otherwise
Years of education. The number of years of education the respondent
completed.
Married. A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise.
Functional literacy. A dummy equal to 0 if the respondent never reads a
newspaper, 1 otherwise.
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Household size. The number of household members permanently residing in
the homestead.
Wealth. An index constructed following Sahn and Stifel (2003) by taking the
principal factor of assets possessed by the respondent’s household.
Risk aversion. A dummy equal to 0 if the respondent chose the least risky of
several lottery options; 1 otherwise.
Contribution. The mean number of tokens contributed over 5 rounds of a
standard public goods game.
Appendix 2.C: Public goods game cards
Figure 2.C.1 – Individual card Figure 2.C.2 – Group card
Chapter 3
The Effect of Prenatal Stress on Cooperation
Evidence from Violent Conflict in Uganda
Abstract: Are preferences endogenously determined in the womb? We play a
public goods game with Ugandan children born during a conflict characterized by
high civilian victimization. Children whose caregivers suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder are more likely to free-ride in the game. Genetic and environmental
factors alone do not explain the relationship, but children’s 2D:4D digit ratio–a
marker of fetal hormone exposure associated with epigenetic effects of maternal
distress–does. Our findings extend the fetal origins literature to the domain of
preferences. By reducing next generation’s taste for cooperation, conflict may
have father-reaching economic consequences than previously thought.
This chapter is based on:
Cecchi, F. and J. Duchoslav (2017). The Effect of Prenatal Stress on Cooperation:
Evidence from a Violent Conflict in Uganda. Working paper.
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3.1 Introduction
The nine months in utero may well be the most critical time in a person’s life
(Almond and Currie, 2011). Later-life characteristics are increasingly associated
with “fetal origins”. Suffering from severe trauma and stress during pregnancy
alters the hormone exposure of the child, triggering epigenetic processes that may
shape brain evolution and behavior (Dörner et al., 2001; Keverne and Curley,
2008). Among others, this was shown to affect future abilities, personality, and
health trajectories. Do these in utero changes extend to the domain of social
preferences?
We play a non-strategic public goods game with 442 children born in Pader district
in Northern Uganda during the 1998-2006 period of intense fighting between
government forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The game requires a
one-shot dichotomous choice on whether to cooperate or not—free-riding being the
only dominant strategy. Simultaneously we conduct an extensive socio-economic
questionnaire including violent conflict exposure (victimization), post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and a closely related public goods game with
the child’s main caregiver.
We find that children who’s caregivers suffer from PTSD symptoms are
significantly more likely to free-ride in the game. We speculate that this results
from a combination of genetic and environmental intergenerational transmission
mechanisms, but also epigenetic ones—through changes in hormone exposure
during early fetal development. While it is impossible to measure the exact
hormonal profile of fetuses later in life, we can proxy for it using one of the
many biometric markers of in utero hormone exposure, which develop mostly
during early gestational stages and remain relatively stable throughout life. We
opt for the 2D:4D digit ratio, which measures the relative length of the index
finger with respect to the ring finger, and is therefore non-intrusive and relatively
easy to measure (Manning et al., 2003; Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng and Cohn,
2011). Like other biometric markers of prenatal hormonal exposure, the digit
ratio is established through an epigenetic process in which hormones released
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by the mother’s body modify the gene expressions of the fetus—rather than
altering the genetic code itself. As such, it represents an interaction of nature
– the child’s genetic code – and nurture—the mother’s hormonal reaction to
environmental stimuli. In particular, the 2D:4D digit ratio is negatively related to
the fetal testosterone-to-estradiol (T:E2) ratio (Manning et al., 2003; Lutchmaya
et al., 2004). Higher levels of maternal distress are associated with higher fetal
testosterone levels (Ward and Weisz, 1980), higher fetal T:E2 ratios (vom Saal
et al., 1990), and lower offspring 2D:4D digit ratios (Lilley et al., 2010). In fact, the
children in our sample exhibit significantly lower digit ratios than their biological
mothers and siblings born before the war. We also find that caregiver PTSD
predicts lower digit ratios in children, but caregiver digit ratios do not predict
caregiver traumatization—suggesting that in our setting self-selection into trauma
is not the main driver of this relationship. Under the assumption that violent
conflict exposure and traumatization were conditionally unconfounded in our
context (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Blattman, 2009; Blattman
and Annan, 2010), we therefore argue that the digit ratio may help us discern
whether prenatal stress represents a third separate causal mechanism explaining
the increased free-riding.
We show that prenatal stress does indeed affect preferences for cooperation: one
standard deviation from the mean of our marker reduces the child’s probability
of contribution to the public good by around 7% points (i.e. -17% of the mean
prevalence). To test whether this is a separate mechanism we introduce nature
and nurture influences on the child, captured by the caregivers’ choice in a closely
related public goods game and in a simple risk game. As expected, caregiver
cooperation significantly influences the child’s independent decision to cooperate,
while their risk preferences do not. Importantly, the effect of prenatal stress on
cooperation remains robust and stable. Next we control for alternative mechanisms
that may potentially yield a spurious correlation, such as early life deprivation and
conflict exposure after birth (both likely correlated with prenatal stress levels), and
discuss the sensitivity of our findings to exogeneity assumptions, investigating the
likelihood that they are driven by unobserved characteristics.
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We shed light on an alternative, epigenetic mechanism of preference
transmission—beyond the standard nature-nurture debate. Preferences for
cooperation may be endogenously determined right from the womb. If prenatal
stress affects next generation’s taste for cooperation, violent conflict may have
farther reaching socio-economic consequences than previously thought. High
incidence of severe prenatal stress may affect long-run development trajectories
and post-conflict recovery across generations, even if the episodes of violence are
limited in time.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature
on the subject. Section 3.3 describes the context and background. Section 3.4
outlines the experimental design. Section 3.5 illustrates the empirical strategy
and results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conflict, preferences, and prenatal stress
This chapter explores the fetal origins of social preferences. It builds upon three
strands of literature—that on the role of violent conflict in shaping preferences,
that on the consequences of trauma in utero, and that on the relationship between
prenatal hormone exposure and economic behavior.
The relationship between violent conflict and the functioning of societies has
been at the forefront of economic debate for years. War violence persistently
impacts health, education, and poverty (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Chamarbagwala
and Morán, 2011; Gates et al., 2012), but also affects individual preferences and
behavior. It has been found to increase community participation and political
engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009), out-group aggressiveness
and competitiveness (Miguel et al., 2011; Cecchi et al., 2016), as well as risk
propensity, and discount rates (Voors et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2014). Individuals
exposed to inter-community violence display more altruistic behavior, higher
public good contributions, and trust within their networks (Voors et al., 2012;
Gilligan et al., 2014). Intra-community violence instead decreases social cohesion
and trust, and increases sentiments of group identity (Cassar et al., 2013; Rohner
3.2 Conflict, preferences, and prenatal stress 49
et al., 2013). Given the existing evidence of the transmission of preferences across
generations (Dohmen et al., 2012), these changes may be expected to be passed on
to the next generation both genetically (i.e. in case of survival bias) and through
changes in nurture. Yet, especially for children conceived during or soon after
severe violence, a third mechanism may be at play: that of epigenetic alterations
caused by maternal stress while still in utero. To the best of our knowledge this is
the first study attempting to gauge the effect conflict-related stress on the social
preferences of individuals that had yet to be born at the time that it first affected
them.
Several studies have investigated the physical and psychological consequences of
stress and traumatic events in utero. In fact, maternal prenatal anxiety may
suppress the development of a functioning immune system, increasing the incidence
of several health complications in infants (Stott, 1973). Moreover, exposure to
violence during pregnancy has been found to deteriorate birth outcomes, typically
in terms of birth weight, fetal growth, and preterm delivery (Mancuso et al.,
2004; Lauderdale, 2006; Camacho, 2008; Black et al., 2016; Koppensteiner and
Manacorda, 2016; Quintana-Domeque and Ródenas-Serrano, 2017).1 Independent
positive shocks, such as a rise in cocoa price at birth – expected to reduce
financial distress in cocoa-producing areas of Ghana with respect to other regions
– decrease the likelihood of mental distress during adulthood (Adhvaryu et al.,
2015). Prenatal negative shocks, such as extreme weather or military invasions,
are instead associated with higher prevalence of schizophrenia and autism (van Os
and Selten, 1998; Walder et al., 2014).
In adults, the prolonged emotional disturbance and distress induced by conflict
increases the likelihood of trauma, mental health problems, and PTSD (de Jong,
2002; Lopes Cardozo et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2008). The higher the
post-traumatic hormonal release, the greater the chance that subjects develop
PTSD (Delahanty et al., 2000). PTSD, in turn, increases the likelihood of
1While the mechanisms through which maternal stress influences birth outcomes are still
subject to intensive investigation, the leading hypotheses identify three channels: endocrine,
inflammatory/immune, and behavioral. See Hobel et al. (2008) and Dunkel Schetter (2011) for
an overview of the biopsychosocial processes.
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persistent hormonal imbalance, particularly with respect to cortisol—the human
stress hormone (de Kloet et al., 2008; Song et al., 2008; Steudte et al., 2011).
During pregnancy, maternal stress is transmitted to the fetus through hormonal
releases (Mancuso et al., 2004; Weinstock, 2008). Due to obvious ethical
considerations, experimental studies of this mechanism are generally limited to
laboratory rodents. Prenatally stressed rodents exhibit higher concentrations of
serum testosterone and higher testosterone to estradiol ratios (Ward and Weisz,
1980; vom Saal et al., 1990). In turn, the fetal testosterone to estradiol ratio
is negatively related to the 2D:4D digit ratio (Manning et al., 2003; Lutchmaya
et al., 2004). Connecting the dots, Lilley et al. (2010) show that high levels of
maternal corticosterone, the rodent equivalent to cortisol, are associated with
lower offspring 2D:4D digit ratio. They suggest that the latter may be a useful
phenotypic indicator of maternal distress during early fetal development.
The 2D:4D digit ratio measures the relative length of the index finger with respect
to the ring finger. It is established through changes in gene expression which take
place without a change in the DNA sequence – known as epigenetic modifications
(Jirtle and Skinner, 2007) – and is widely accepted as a noninvasive marker
and “lifelong signature of prenatal hormonal exposure” (Zheng and Cohn, 2011).
During early fetal development, increased androgen hormones (e.g. testosterone)
or the inactivation of the estrogen receptor (ER-α) stimulate the ring finger growth,
which leads to a lower 2D:4D ratio. On the other hand, the addition of estrogen
(e.g. estradiol) or the inactivation of the androgen receptor (AR) decrease the ring
finger growth, resulting in a higher 2D:4D ratio (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng
and Cohn, 2011).
But why should prenatal hormonal changes affect later-life social preferences?
On the one hand, the literature on violent conflict and preferences shows that
economists increasingly agree that preferences are not hard-wired traits, but rather
may change in response to shocks and life experiences. This literature however
falls short of investigating if preferences can be shaped right from the womb. On
the other, the “fetal origins” literature does investigate the relationship between
prenatal hormones and later life cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Several
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studies have shown a correlation between the digit ratio and preferences. In the
lab, Garbarino et al. (2010) show that a low 2D:4D is associated with greater
risk-taking. This is confirmed by evidence that low digit ratio MBA students
self-select more into risky finance careers (Sapienza et al., 2009), and that the
financial ability among male high-frequency traders is negatively related to their
2D:4D ratio (Coates et al., 2009). Its relationship to social preferences is relatively
less studied, especially on non-experimental populations. Among undergraduate
students, Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) find a non-monotonic impact of the digit
ratio on altruism. Also, self-assessed low digit ratios (2D<4D) predict lower
giving in ultimatum, trust, and public goods games (Buser, 2012). We combine
the literature about the epigenetic effects of maternal distress with that on the
correlation between the digit ratio and preferences, bringing them to a natural
experimental setting characterized by indiscriminate violence against unarmed
civilians and high prevalence of maternal traumatization. We use the 2D:4D digit
ratio as a marker of maternal distress to explore how prenatal stress reflects on
the preferences for cooperation of the next generation, trying to isolate its causal
mechanism from other potential influences of direct and indirect violent conflict
exposure.
3.3 Context and background
In the last 25 years Uganda achieved high and steady GDP growth rates, averaging
about 6.7% per year (World Bank, 2016). However, since independence in 1962,
Uganda has witnessed many long periods of violence and constitutional suspension
and only few short periods of peace and relative prosperity. In fact, even while
the country’s overall growth rate was faster than that of many of its neighbors
by the end of the millennium, the North was enduring the last of a long series of
conflicts: Joseph Kony’s LRA insurgency (1987-2006).
Violence has been escalating recurrently in Uganda since 1971, when Idi Amin took
power from the discredited President Milton Obote.2 Amin ruled the country until
2In 1966 Obote was implicated in a corruption scandal together with the then commander of
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the 1979 Uganda-Tanzania War led to his ousting. Obote’s comeback instead
triggered the Ugandan Bush War against the southern rebels of the National
Resistance Army (NRA) headed by the current President of Uganda, Yoweri
Museveni. Obote lost power for the second time in 1985, shortly before the NRA
faction assaulted Kampala—gaining the power it still holds today (Finnström,
2008).
As the balance of power shifted southwards, rebel movements in the North gathered
under the flag of the LRA (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). Limited in numbers and
resources, the LRA resorted to pillaging villages and abducting local youth: an
estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people were abducted over two decades (Annan et al.,
2006; Pham et al., 2007). Throughout the years, weak government responses and
the setup of an Acholi self-defense militia invigorated the LRA, which scaled up
operations to discipline the local population (Finnström, 2008; Dolan, 2009).3 The
widespread killing and mutilation of Acholi civilians escalated dramatically after
1996, especially in the Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader.4 In these
districts, more than a quarter of the males aged 10 to 25 at the end of the war
had been abducted for at least two weeks, and only 80% of them returned from
captivity (Blattman and Annan, 2010).
Pader district was particularly hit from 1998 onwards, when LRA operations
gained momentum and moved southwards (Figure 3.1).5 Civilian fatalities peaked
in 2002, after the start of “Operation Iron Fist” against rebel bases in South Sudan
set off a bloody reaction by LRA forces. A truce between the LRA and the
government was signed in 2006, and fighting in Uganda has been sporadic ever
since.6
armed forces, Idi Amin. He responded by suspending the constitution.
3Civilian victimization in these years was not only the result of LRA violence, and abuse from
government troops was not uncommon.
4Between 1994 and 2002, in response to Uganda’s support for the rebels in South Sudan, the
Sudanese government provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment.
5Source: ACLED Version 5, 1997-2013
6The LRA has not been disarmed nor demilitarised following the 2006 truce with the Ugandan
government, and has been active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African
Republic and South Sudan.
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Figure 3.1 – Civilian targeting in Pader district
At its peak, LRA violence was largely indiscriminate and apparently random in
nature. Small groups of roughly 15 fighters ventured into Uganda from their
Sudanese bases for weeks at a time, ambushing government forces and raiding
homesteads for supplies and recruits along the way. Homesteads, which tend
to be relatively isolated in Northern Uganda, were targeted in an unplanned,
arbitrary manner, regardless of their wealth or make-up (Doom and Vlassenroot,
1999; Jackson, 2002; Blattman, 2009). The randomness of the attacks was
oftentimes deliberate, serving as a force multiplier to increase the perception of
undiscerning threat in the civilian population (Vinci, 2005). Figure 3.2 shows
the relative level of traumatization (PTSD), corresponding with the diameters of
the circles representing each school in our sample. Coherent with literature, we
find that traumatization shows no detectable spatial autocorrelation on the school
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level (Moran’s I = −0.030), nor are they correlated within schools (intra-class
correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.020).7 We come back to the plausibility of selection
bias and the sensitivity of our results to the unconfoundedness assumption in
Section 3.5.5.
Figure 3.2 – Average traumatization per school
3.4 Experimental design
Employing new data from behavioral games, biometric measurements and an
extensive socioeconomic survey, we exploit the quasi-experimental variation in
war exposure generated by rebel raids in Northern Uganda villages to gauge the
impact of prenatal stress on later-life cooperation.
7See Figure 3.B.1 for a graphic representation of the distribution of war exposure instead.
See Tables 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 for full results of spatial autocorrelation and intra-class correlation
analysis respectively for both war exposure and traumatization.
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3.4.1 Sample and setting
Our sample includes 442 children and their caregivers from Pader district in
Northern Uganda. In November 2012 we visited 42 primary schools in the district,
and randomly selected 12 students from a list of pupils enlisted at the beginning
of the year.8 The descriptive statistics for the children are presented in Table 3.1.
The average digit ratio – our marker of prenatal stress – is 0.94 in our sample,
and 41% of the children chose to cooperate in the public goods game. Sections
3.4.2 and 3.4.3 below discuss the details of the digit ratio measurement and of the
public goods game set-up respectively. On average the children are 11 years old,
half of them are female, and their body mass and height are respectively 0.4 and 1
standard deviation below the mean for their age (de Onis et al., 2007).9 To control
for additional potential confounds, we also collect information about the children’s
cognitive ability (IQ) through standard Raven’s progressive matrices (Kaplan and
Saccuzzo, 2012), as well as their time and risk preferences (Voors et al., 2012).
Child postnatal war exposure is a composite measure derived from the exposure
of the caregiver and the child’s year of birth (see Section 3.4.4).
To account for environmental and genetic effects on preferences, we also
interviewed each child’s main caregiver—the adult household member with whom
the child spends most time. The descriptive statistics for the caregivers are
presented in Table 3.2. About half of the caregivers in our sample chose to
cooperate in the public goods game (see Section 3.4.3 for details about the
public goods game). Caregivers are on average 42 years of age,10 53% are
female. Additionally, we collected information about their education level and risk
preferences. All caregivers were exposed to at least some kind of conflict-related
violence (thought the level of exposure varies greatly in our sample),11 and
8The randomization was stratified according to grade: 4 students were selected from grade
2, 4 from grade 4, and 4 from grade 6. Out of a total of 504, 62 students born prior to the
intensification of violence in the area around 1998 were excluded from the analysis.
9Based on WHO recommendations for treating outliers (de Onis et al., 2007), we truncate
the biometric data at 6 standard deviations from the mean. This results in 1 and 2 dropped
observations for height-for-age and BMI-for-age respectively.
10Two caregivers did not know their age, reducing the number of observations to 440.
11Two caregivers refused to complete the war exposure module of the survey, reducing the
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics (children)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
2D:4D 0.943 0.042 0.733 1.111 442
Public good contribtion 0.414 0.493 0 1 442
Age 11.045 2.160 6 14 442
Female 0.500 0.501 0 1 442
School grade 3.575 1.494 2 6 442
Height-for-age -0.428 1.381 -4.82 5.80 441
BMI-for-age -1.034 1.088 -5.98 2.01 440
IQ-for-age 95.59 15.00 79.92 162.73 442
Time preferences 0.253 0.435 0 1 442
Risk preferences 0.403 0.491 0 1 442
War exposure 0.537 0.249 0 0.958 440
Notes: See Appendix Appendix 3.C: for variable definitions.
40% suffer from PTSD symptoms. The details of war exposure and trauma
measurements are discussed in Section 3.4.4 below. Almost the entire sample
is ethnically Acholi and Christian by religion. Households are typically composed
of 8 people. We also collected information about their relative asset wealth (Sahn
and Stifel, 2003).
Table 3.2 – Descriptive statistics (caregivers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
2D:4D 0.957 0.038 0.844 1.066 154
Public good contribution 0.507 0.501 0 1 442
Age 42.03 11.87 19 92 440
Female 0.534 0.499 0 1 442
Education level 0.839 0.802 0 4 442
Risk preferences 0.312 0.464 0 1 442
War exposure 0.752 0.166 0.174 1 440
PTSD (dummy) 0.391 0.489 0 1 442
PTSD (factor) 0.000 1.000 -1.926 2.339 442
Christian 0.991 0.095 0 1 442
Acholi 0.973 0.163 0 1 442
Household size 8.093 2.988 2 25 442
Asset index 0.000 1.000 -0.571 5.507 442
Notes: See Appendix Appendix 3.C: for variable definitions.
number of observations to 440. This reduction carries over to the measure of child postnatal war
exposure, which is derived from that of their caregiver.
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In our setting, information about the current main caregivers can only serve as a
proxy for environmental and genetic influences to which the children have been
subjected throughout their lives. Of the 442 caregivers in our sample, only 190
are biological mothers. Another 163 are biological fathers, while the remaining 87
were grandparents, uncles/aunts, siblings or other relatives (in descending order of
prevalence). 2 caregivers were not blood-related to the child at all. Nonetheless,
the average caregiver in our sample had been taking care of the child for 93% of
the child’s life, making the information about the caregivers a strong proxy for the
environment surrounding the children.
3.4.2 The digit ratio
The index and ring finger lengths were measured on the ventral surface of the
right hand from the midpoint of the basal crease to the tip of the digit. Given
the contextual constraints and instruments available, measurement precision does
not exceed 1 mm, resulting in an error of ±3.3% at the mean of our estimations.12
While this is still far from the precision obtained in the lab (see Voracek et al.,
2007), independent raters measured the digit lengths unaware of their scientific
significance; errors should therefore result in unbiased random noise.13
3.4.3 Public goods game
We measure children’s and caregivers’ willingness to cooperate by involving them
in a one-shot dichotomous public goods game similar to Cárdenas et al. (2009) and
Barr et al. (2014). In each school, children played in randomly assigned groups
of 6, and anonymously decided whether to select a “private card” or a “group
12In a pilot, 30 raters separately measured 35 right hands, revealing comparable margins.
13Approximately two years after the main data collection we re-measured the digit lengths
for a non-random sub-sample of 258 respondents. While the absolute length of the fingers had
undoubtedly changed in the meanwhile, their ratio should remain relatively stable throughout
lifetime. In line with expectations, the average error was ±3.7%. Results are not driven by
systematic measurement error, and excluding measures with potentially greater error does not
significantly alter the results (see Table 3.A.3).
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card”.14 Children could in no way infer which other 5 participants belonged to
their group (out of the 11 other children selected in that school). The private card
allotted 3 candies to themselves and none to other unknown group members. The
group card gave instead 1 candy to each group member including themselves (a
graphical representation of the two cards can be found in Figure 3.B.2). The joint
surplus is therefore maximized when all participants choose the group card, such
that each group member receives 6 candies. Nevertheless, free riders selecting
the private card may obtain up to 8 candies. The Nash equilibrium is reached
if everyone selects the private card, receiving 3 candies only. Caregivers played
a very similar game, but played in groups of 12 instead of 6. The game was
played in an isolated environment – typically their home – and caregivers where
unaware of the identity of other participants. The private card was worth 4,000
UGX, equivalent to approximately 1.5 USD; the group card was instead worth
500 UGX. The non-cooperative equilibrium thus yielded 4,000 UGX each, joint
maximization returned 6,000 UGX each, and free riders could earn as much as
9,500 UGX.15 On average, 41% of the children and 51% of the caregivers opted
for the cooperative option offered by the group card.
3.4.4 War exposure and trauma
Given their young age at the time of the conflict, we do not ask children war-related
questions. Instead, we use information on the individual war exposure of their
caregivers, and weigh it against the war violence that happened after the year of
birth of the child. We use an adapted version of the War Trauma Questionnaire
(WTQ), excluding the questions about shelling and bombardment which are
14Contrarily to many public goods games in which participants can choose their preferred
contribution level, we opted for a dichotomous choice: respondents could either cooperate or
not. While this reduced our ability to pick up the nuances present in the experimental sample,
we believe that it facilitated the decision making process, especially for the youngest.
15The variation in pay-outs between the child and caregiver versions of the game was
determined during a pilot. We adjusted the relative values of the “private” and “group” cards to
maximize the variance of the responses in both samples and thus facilitate parametric analysis.
Specifically, the number of candies assigned by the “private” card in the child version was dropped
from 4 to 3 to increase the likelihood that children would select the “group” card.
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not relevant to our setting (Macksoud, 1992; Papageorgiou et al., 2000). This
questionnaire provides information on 23 war related traumatic events that a
person may have witnessed, rated through “yes” or “no” statements. We create
a war exposure (victimization) index using the average of positive responses to
these violence related questions (Bellows and Miguel, 2009). On average, caregivers
responded positively to 75% of the questions, with a minimum observed exposure
of 17%. To proxy the child’s postnatal war exposure we weight the caregiver’s war
exposure index by the portion of violence potentially witnessed by the child after
birth. To this end, we take the fraction of total civilian fatalities that occurred in
Pader district following the child’s birth (see Figure 3.1).16
We measure caregiver PTSD symptoms using the civilian version of the PCL
self-report checklist (Weathers et al., 1993).17 We convert individual scores into a
PTSD dummy, following the recommendations of the US Department of Veteran
Affairs, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM4).18 As an additional robustness check, we perform factor analysis
to extrapolate a factor for trauma.
3.5 Analysis and results
We start with the observation that children of caregivers with PTSD symptoms
are less likely to contribute to the public good. By showing that caregiver PTSD
16Source: ACLED Version 5, 1997-2013
17The civilian version of the PCL self-report checklist – a 17-item questionnaire – has been
found to have strong psychometric properties, high internal consistency, and high test-retest
reliability (Blanchard et al., 1996; Ruggiero et al., 2006; Conybeare et al., 2012). Moreover, it is
strongly correlated with alternative measures of PTSD such as the Mississippi, MMPI-2 Keane,
IES, and CAPS scales (Weathers et al., 1993; Dobie et al., 2002; Freedy et al., 2010).
18In our setting, we expect high rates of PTSD (Roberts et al., 2008; Pfeiffer and Elbert,
2011). We therefore take a conservatively high threshold for PTSD, at >66% of the maximum
item score, to minimise the likelihood of false positives (Keen et al., 2008). We therefore find
a lower PTSD prevalence (40%) than previous studies in the region that do not apply this
correction. The DSM4 cut-off point requires at least 1 moderately positive answer in questions
1-5, 3 in 6-12, and 2 in 13-17. At the selected threshold, only 4 out of 442 caregivers do not meet
this requirement. Our analysis is robust to their inclusion or exclusion from the PTSD count.
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predicts lower 2D:4D digit ratio in their children, and that children born during
conflict have lower digit ratios than their biological mothers and same-mother
siblings, we confirm that the 2D:4D digit ratio is a reliable marker of prenatal
stress. Together with caregiver preference for cooperation, it explains the entire
effect of caregiver PTSD on child behavior in the public goods game. We continue
by showing that the relationship between prenatal stress and contribution to the
public good is robust to controlling for other mechanisms through which conflict
could influence cooperative preferences, including early life deprivation and direct
conflict exposure. Finally, we account for self-selection into conflict exposure and
trauma along observable characteristics through propensity score matching, and
show that any unobserved factor would have to have an unrealistically large effect
on cooperative behavior in order to change our result.
3.5.1 Caregiver PTSD and child cooperation
We first test whether caregiver PTSD significantly changes the child’s likelihood to
free-ride in our public goods game. Table 3.3 shows that children whose caregivers
suffer from PTSD symptoms are up to 9% points less likely to contribute to the
public good (i.e. -22% of the mean prevalence). The result is robust to controlling
for sub-county fixed effects, child and caregiver characteristics, household size and
asset index, as well as child risk and time preferences (columns 1 to 5).
Result 1: Children whose caregivers suffer from PTSD symptoms are robustly
less likely to contribute to the public good.
3.5.2 Prenatal stress and child digit ratio
While this result is interesting in itself, it does not say much about the mechanisms
through which traumatized caregivers may transmit a preference for lower
cooperation to the child. The literature on the intergenerational transmission of
preferences predicts that caregivers transmit their own preferences both genetically
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Table 3.3 – Caregiver PTSD predicts lower child cooperation
Public Good Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Caregiver PTSD -0.072∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Child controls N Y Y Y Y
Caregiver and peer controls N N Y Y Y
Sub-county FE N N N Y Y
Child risk and time preferences N N N N Y
Household size and assets index N N N N Y
Observations 442 442 440 440 440
R2 0.005 0.011 0.038 0.041 0.042
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer
controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies. See Table 3.A.6 for the full list of coefficients.
(i.e. directly transmitting their own hard-wired preference set) and through
environmental influences (i.e. more or less voluntarily “teaching" the child to
free-ride or cooperate). We hypothesize that a third mechanism may be at
play: the epigenetic effect of prenatal stress. To proxy for this, we introduce a
standardized measure of the 2D:4D digit ratio—an indicator of maternal distress
during early fetal development. As digit ratios are expected to become smaller
in response to increased maternal distress during early fetal development (i.e.
increased fetal testosterone to estradiol ratios), we use the negative standardized
digit ratio as relative measure of prenatal stress:
DigitRatiois = −2D : 4Dis − 2D : 4D
σ
(3.1)
where 2D : 4Dis is the digit ratio of individual i; 2D : 4D is the mean digit
ratio in the sample; σ is the standard error; and the negative sign produces a
positive relationship between our proxy and actual prenatal stress—for ease of
interpretation.
Yet, for our marker of prenatal stress to plausibly explain part of the relationship
we observe in Table 3.3, we need to find evidence in our data that it is affected by
victimization during the conflict. Through a series of paired t-tests we compare
the digit ratio of (84) biological mothers to that of their offspring (Table 3.4, row
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1), and of their female offspring only (43) (Table 3.4, row 2). Moreover, we identify
same-mother siblings born between 1990 and 1996, a relatively non-violent period
in Pader district. We test the hypothesis that (43) siblings born prior to the
intensification of war violence have a significantly different digit ratio (Table 3.4,
row 3), and verify its robustness by looking at (26) same-sex siblings ( Table 3.4,
row 4). Children born during the conflict have significantly smaller digit ratios
than their relatives born before the conflict.19
Table 3.4 – Children born during the conflict exhibit lower digit ratios than their
relatives
Observations 2D:4D
Child Control Child Cont. Diff.
Biological mothers 84 84 0.942 0.956 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.005)
Biological mothers (female child) 43 43 0.940 0.953 -0.013∗∗
(0.006)
Same-mother sibling 43 43 0.936 0.948 -0.013∗
(0.008)
Same-mother sibling (same sex) 26 26 0.941 0.950 -0.009
(0.008)
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
This result is in line with previous evidence that prenatal stress results in smaller
digit ratios (Ward and Weisz, 1980; vom Saal et al., 1990; Lilley et al., 2010). In
particular, we observe a reduction in the digit ratio of approximatively 1/4 of a
standard deviation. Next we test wether PTSD of the caregiver actually predicts
lower digit ratio in children using the following model:
2D : 4Dis = α+ βCaregiverPTSDis + γ
′Xis + ζs + εis (3.2)
where CaregiverPTSDis is a measure of the PTSD symptoms of the caregiver,
Xis is a vector of child characteristics including age, gender, and their interaction,
and caregiver characteristics including age, gender, their interaction, ethnicity
19This involved a separate step of data collection: in 2014 we traced back as many mothers
and older siblings of the sampled children as possible given the time gap, and measured their
digit ratios.
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and education. ζs represents sub-county fixed effects, and εis is a stochastic error
term.
Table 3.5 shows that PTSD in caregivers is associated child 2D:4D digit ratios that
are lower by approximatively 0.3 of a standard deviation (columns 1 and 2), As a
robustness check, columns 3 and 4 show instead a traumatization factor derived
from the same PTSD questions: one standard deviation increase in traumatization
results in a lower digit ratio by about 0.1 standard deviations (columns 3 and
4).
Table 3.5 – Caregiver trauma predicts lower digit ratio in children
Standardized digit ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTSD -0.296∗∗ -0.289∗∗
(0.111) (0.123)
Trauma factor -0.116∗∗ -0.109∗
(0.051) (0.058)
Child controls N Y N Y
Caregiver controls N Y N Y
Sub-county FE N Y N Y
Observations 442 440 442 440
R2 0.021 0.043 0.013 0.035
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Acholi, Education.
Result 2: Children born during the conflict exhibit significantly lower digit
ratios than their biological mothers and same-mother siblings. Also, caregiver
trauma predicts lower digit ratios in children.
We then proceed to test whether genetic, environmental, and epigenetic
mechanisms explain away the relationship of Table 3.3. We first introduce as
additional explanatory variable the caregiver’s choice in the public goods game to
capture the effects of nature and nurture (columns 1 and 2), and later our marker
of prenatal stress (columns 3 and 4). Column 1 and 2 of Table 3.6, show that while
the coefficient of PTSD is lower, it is still significant. Columns 3 and 4 of Table
3.6 show that once the 2D:4D digit ratio is introduced, the direct effect is further
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reduced and becomes insignificant. Moreover the adjusted R2 actually increases
once PTSD is removed from the model.
Table 3.6 – Caregiver cooperation and prenatal stress explain the effect of PTSD on
child cooperation
Public Good Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.069∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Caregiver public good contribution 0.150∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.042) (0.047)
PTSD -0.056 -0.077∗∗ -0.036 -0.059
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Child controls N Y N Y
Caregiver and peer controls N Y N Y
Sub-county FE N Y N Y
Observations 442 442 442 442
R2 0.028 0.033 0.047 0.051
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer
controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies. See Table 3.A.6 for the full list of coefficients.
3.5.3 Child digit ratio and public good contribution
Having established a negative relationship between caregiver PTSD and child digit
ratio, we continue by analyzing the relationship between children’s digit ratios
and their cooperation in the public goods game graphically. From Buser (2012)
we expect it to be negative. Indeed, Figure 3.3 illustrates that the prevalence
of public good contributions decreases among children with lower digit ratio—as
prenatal stress increases.
Parametrically, we show this relationship by estimating a specification with only
the prenatal stress proxy as a regressor:
Cooperationis = α+ βDigitRatiois + εis (3.3)
where Cooperationi is a dummy taking value of 1 if individual i played the group
card in the public goods game; DigitRatiois is our measure of prenatal stress.
Standard errors are clustered for 42 schools.
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Figure 3.3 – Digit ratio quartiles and prevalence of public good contributions
We find that our marker of prenatal distress is negatively correlated with the
child’s probability of contribution to the public good (Table 3.7, column 1). Yet,
this relationship could potentially be driven by other child characteristics. First,
of course, the preferences of children may be driven by those of their caregivers
through environmental as well as genetic mechanisms (Dohmen et al., 2012). We
find a strong relationship between the social preferences of the caregiver and
the child, but not between the risk preferences of the caregiver and the social
preferences of the child. Children are about 15% points more likely to contribute
if their main caregiver contributes to the public good in a separate game.20 Second,
prosocial preferences develop throughout childhood and adolescence, and become
increasingly gender-dependent with approaching adulthood (Eisenberg et al.,
20For a sub-sample of 154 parents, we verify that the parents’ digit ratio is not driving our
result—i.e. the genetic component does not foreshadow the epigenetic effect. We find no effect
of parental digit ratios on the cooperation of children (see Table 3.A.4).
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2006). Controlling for age, gender, their interaction, for school grade and for tribe
does not, however, alter the result (see Table 3.7, column 3). Third, the probability
of contributing to the public good may also be influenced by the social environment
in which a child is growing up. Both family and peer demographics have been
linked to children’s prosocial behavior, though the evidence is often inconclusive
(Eisenberg et al., 2006). To account for possible environmental influences, we
control for caregiver characteristics including the level of education, gender, age,
and the interaction of the latter two. We also control for the proportion of children
who participated in the public goods game, but were excluded from the analysis
due to their age (column 4).21 The inclusion of these additional covariates does
not affect the main result (see Table 3.7, column 3), nor does the inclusion of
spatial fixed effects (see Table 3.7, column 5). We also control for family size and
wealth, both of which have been associated with children’s prosocial preferences
(Zaff et al., 2003), as well as for the child’s risk and time preferences, to reach the
following fully specified linear probability model in column 6:22
Cooperationis = α+ βDigitRatiois + γ
′Xis + δs + ζs + η′Zis + εis (3.4)
21We initially sampled 4 second-graders, 4 fourth-graders and 4 sixth-graders from each of the
42 schools, resulting in a total sample of 504 children. All 12 children from each school would
participate in the public goods game, but only those born after the re-escalation of violence in
Pader district in 1998 were included in our analysis, resulting in a removal of between 0 and 5
children per school. Since prosocial preferences increase with age, younger children playing the
game in a group with a high share of older children may be more likely to contribute to the
public good due to both peer effects and rational expectations about the behavior of the older
children.
22Literature highlights several trade-offs between linear probability (LPM) and probit models.
First, compared to a probit, the LPM does not estimate the structural parameters, but this
chapter is mostly concerned with marginal effects (intuitively interpretable with LPM). Second,
LPM error terms are heteroskedastic by construct; we thus use cluster robust standard errors,
which are heteroskedasticity-consistent. Finally, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) show that the
potential bias of LPM increases with the fraction of predicted probabilities that lie outside the
(unconstrained) unit interval. In our main specification, the predicted probabilities lie between
0.003 and 0.815; we thus expect our estimations to be largely unbiased and consistent. In fact,
marginal effects calculated through a probit very closely resemble those of our selected LPM (see
Table 3.A.5, column 1).
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where most notation is the same as above. Additionally δs represents the fraction
of children in a school excluded from our analysis, and Zis is a vector of covariates
including household size, assets, time preferences and risk preferences of child i.
Standard errors are still clustered for 42 schools.
The additional covariates included in vector Zis are potentially endogenous to our
model. Since, they do not alter the main result (see Table 3.7, column 6), nor is
their correlation with the probability to contribute to the public good statistically
significant (see Table 3.A.6), we exclude them from any further analysis.
Throughout several specifications – controlling for an increasingly extensive set of
covariates – the main result remains stable: One standard deviation drop in the
digit ratio decreases the child’s probability of contribution to the public good by
around 7% points, or around 17% of the mean prevalence.
Result 3: Prenatal stress reduces the taste for cooperation. One standard
deviation drop in the digit ratio decreases the child’s probability of contribution
to the public good by 17%
3.5.4 Alternative mechanisms
Next, we investigate potential alternative mechanisms. First, Section 3.2 highlights
the role of postnatal war exposure in shaping individual preferences. The
children in our sample were at most 8 years of age at the end of hostilities,
but postnatal witnessing of conflict-related violence may still have affected their
taste for cooperation (Bauer et al., 2014). Second, the literature discussed in
Section 3.2 predicts that prenatal stress may capture the effect of early life
deprivation. Height, for instance, is an anthropometric indicator of early-life
experiences comparable to longitudinal measures such as height and weight at birth
(Currie and Vogl, 2013). Similarly, low birth weight is associated with later-life low
BMI (Walker et al., 2002), and severe deprivation at an early stage has persistent
effects on cognitive ability (Beckett et al., 2006; Figlio et al., 2014). Both these
postnatal mechanisms could be correlated with both prenatal stress, and possibly
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public good contributions. This could therefore result in a spurious correlation
between the 2D:4D digit ratio and cooperation.
We find that in our sample postnatal war exposure does not significantly affect
cooperation when controlling for child, caregiver and peer characteristics (Table
3.8, columns 1-2), and does not wash out the effect of prenatal stress. On the
other hand, we find that height-for-age is positively associated with cooperation:
one standard deviation increase in the height-for-age increases the likelihood of
contribution to the public good by between 3% points and 6% points in the
simple and fully specified models respectively. BMI-for-age and IQ-for-age do not
enter significantly (Table 3.8, columns 3-4). Nonetheless, prenatal stress remains
significant even when controlling for these potential alternative mechanisms
together: its coefficient is stable and robust to controlling for markers of early
life deprivation (column 5).
Table 3.8 – Alternative mechanisms: postnatal war exposure and early life
deprivation
Public Good Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.076∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Postnatal war exposure 0.024 -0.005 0.007
(0.021) (0.031) (0.032)
Height-for-age 0.025∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
BMI-for-age -0.015 -0.017 -0.018
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
IQ-for-age -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
Child controls N Y N Y Y
Caregiver and peer controls N Y N Y Y
Sub-county FE N Y N Y Y
Observations 440 438 440 438 436
R2 0.027 0.057 0.030 0.073 0.074
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer
controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies.
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Result 4: The relationship between prenatal stress and cooperation is stable and
robust to controlling for early life deprivation markers and postnatal war exposure.
On top of this, we conduct a final series of robustness checks. The main result
holds when we limit the sample to only blood related caregiver-child pairs, to
parent-child pairs, and to mother-child pairs (see Table 3.A.7). The result also
holds when estimated using a probit model, when including school and enumerator
fixed effects, and when clustering standard errors on both school and year-of-birth
levels (see Table 3.A.5, columns 1-4). We also split our sample at the median
of the digit ratio, finding that caregivers of children with low 2D:4D ratio (high
prenatal stress) are not only more likely to suffer from PTSD, but also less likely
to contribute to the public good (see Table 3.A.8). The difference in PTSD rates
is expected, but the difference in cooperation rates could introduce a selection bias
into our results. To account for any such observable bias, we match participants
using kernel matching over all our child and caregiver control characteristics,
including caregiver cooperation, and perform a propensity score matching analysis
on the common support area. The resulting average treatment effect is again
robustly significant (see Table 3.A.5, column 5).
3.5.5 Causality and unobserved selection
If certain types of caregivers – with a certain preference for cooperation or risk
before the war – self-selected into or out of traumatic events, they may have passed
their preferences on to the children through genetic and environmental channels.
Even though we control for the preferences of caregivers, this may not suffice to
net out the selection bias. One way to test whether the patterns found in Table
3.A.8 are explained mostly by endogenous preference formation or by selection
bias is to look at the relationship between the caregiver’s digit ratio and their
traumatization. Table 3.9 shows that, while caregiver war exposure is a strong
predictor of their traumatization,23 caregiver digit ratios are not. In other words,
23We find a robustly positive and significant relationship between war exposure and trauma
among caregivers, with a higher prevalence of PTSD among women. A one standard deviation
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while Table 3.5 shows that caregiver traumatization is negatively correlated with
child digit ratios, caregiver digit ratios are uncorrelated with their likelihood of
being traumatized.
Table 3.9 – Conflict exposure predicts caregiver trauma, caregiver digit ratio does
not
PTSD Trauma factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War exposure 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0454) (0.0527) (0.0492) (0.0960)
Female 0.284∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0859) (0.106) (0.156)
Caregiver digit -0.0855 0.906
ratio (1.184) (2.220)
Caregiver controls N Y Y N Y Y
Sub-county FE N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 440 438 154 440 438 154
R2 0.028 0.105 0.157 0.033 0.129 0.229
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age×Female, Acholi, Education.
Again, this does not allow us to exclude all forms of self-selection. We are unable
to conclusively verify the randomness of the behavior of armed groups, or the
influence of other pre-war characteristics. Our causal interpretation of the results
may thus suffer from potential bias due to the omission of such unobservables.
Following Blattman and Annan (2010), we provide a graphical benchmark of
the sensibility of our results to exogeneity assumptions (Imbens, 2003; Harada,
2013). The curve in Figure 3.4 represents the locus of partial correlation points of
a hypothetical pseudo-unobservable with our assignment and outcome variables,
that would reduce estimated effect below significance at the 5% level.24 The
selective contour is conservative, as it only reduces the coefficient size by about one
quarter.25 Yet, the potentially confounding mechanisms we identify and discuss
above (i.e. caregiver cooperation preferences, early life deprivation, and postnatal
increase in our war exposure index increases the likelihood of PTSD by almost 10%, and scores
on the trauma factor by 20% of a standard deviation.
24H: Height-for-age; C: Caregiver cooperation; P: Postnatal war exposure
25Blattman and Annan (2010), for instance, plot a contour that decreases the effect of the
assignment by one half. This would be equivalent to shifting the contour in Figure 3.4 outwards.
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war exposure) lie far below the selected threshold. To rule out the effect of prenatal
stress, any unobserved covariate not considered in our analysis would require a
partial correlation with both the treatment and the assignment well above the
curve of Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 – Sensitivity to the unconfoundedness assumption
3.6 Conclusions
“The womb may be more important than the home”, wrote the late David J. Barker
(1990) in his seminal work on the fetal origins of adult disease. Barker’s hypothesis
has spawned a large volume of literature exploring its economic implications. This
study builds upon the fetal origins literature, and tests the hypothesis that prenatal
events may not only alter later-life individual abilities and health trajectories
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(Almond and Currie, 2011), but also social preferences. In particular, we look
at the impact of prenatal stress on the preferences for cooperation among children
born during an armed conflict. We play a dichotomous one-shot public goods game
in Pader, a district in Northern Uganda, with children born during the 1998-2006
period of intense fighting between government forces and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA). Our identification strategy exploits variations in the 2D:4D digit
ratio—a marker of in utero hormone exposure negatively associated with high
maternal distress during early fetal development. It also exploits the assumption
that war exposure and traumatization where conditionally unconfounded in our
context (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Blattman, 2009; Blattman
and Annan, 2010). We find that a rise in our marker of prenatal distress robustly
reduces the child’s probability of contribution to the public good. The estimated
effect is quantitatively large, stable, and robust to controlling for alternative
mechanisms such as early life deprivation, caregiver public good contribution
preferences, and war exposure after birth. We also show that it is robust to relaxing
the assumption of unconfoundedness and self-selection. In other words, we show
that preferences are endogenously determined right from the womb.
Our results thus support three separate findings from previous studies. Firstly
– and perhaps obviously – violent conflict exposure is traumatizing. Secondly,
a mother’s traumatization during pregnancy affects the hormonal balance of the
fetus as observable through its 2D:4D digit ratio. Thirdly – and most importantly
– in utero hormonal balance affects later-life social preferences. By analyzing
these three relationships concurrently in a post-conflict context – where violence
has differentially impacted large portions of the population – we find evidence
supporting the entire causal chain: from conflict in one generation to economic
behavior in the next one. Prenatal stress triggers adaptive mechanisms that go
far beyond the well-established relationship between postnatal war exposure and
preferences. The socio-economic consequences of conflict may thus be reaching
much further than previously thought, and the womb may well be far more crucial
than Barker ever imagined.
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Appendix 3.A: Tables
Table 3.A.1 – Spatial autocorrelation of war exposure and trauma
War exposure PTSD
(1) (2)
Moran’s I -0.045 -0.030
E(I) -0.024 -0.024
sd(I) 0.056 0.055
z -0.364 -0.099
p-value 0.358 0.461
Observations 42 42
Notes: p-values are based on a 1-tail test.
Table 3.A.2 – Intraclass correlation of war exposure and trauma
War exposure PTSD
(1) (2)
ρ 0.043 0.020
Observations 440 442
Groups 42 42
Notes: ρ is the fraction of variance due to school-level random effects from a GLS regression.
Table 3.A.3 – Sensitivity of results to the exclusion of potentially biased measures
Public Good Contribution
All Δ< 5% Δ< 3% Δ< 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.078∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗ 0.099
(0.025) (0.037) (0.044) (0.280)
Child controls Y Y Y Y
Caregiver and peer controls Y Y Y Y
Sub-county FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 440 189 131 39
R2 0.046 0.082 0.115 0.409
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female,
Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies.
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Table 3.A.4 – Robustness of the main result to controlling for parental digit ratios
Public Good Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.139∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040)
Caregiver digit ratio -0.048 -0.077∗ -0.060 -0.079∗
(biological parents only) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040)
Child controls N Y N Y
Caregiver and peer controls N Y N Y
Sub-county FE N Y N Y
Observations 154 154 154 154
R2 0.010 0.123 0.065 0.162
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗. Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female,
Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies.
Table 3.A.5 – Robustness of the main result to alternative specifications
Public Good Contribution
Probit School Enumerator Two-way Kernel
model FE FE clustering PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.083∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗
(0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.052)
Child controls Y Y Y Y Y
Caregiver and peer controls Y Y Y Y Y
Sub-county FE Y N Y Y Y
School level clustered SE 42 N 42 42 N
Year of birth clustered SE N N N 9 N
Observations 440 440 440 440 425
R2 0.043 0.137 0.172 0.057
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female,
Age×Female, Acholi, Education; Peer controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies. Standard errors in (5)
are bootstrapped with 100 iterations.
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Table 3.A.6 – Prenatal stress reduces cooperation (all coefficients)
Public Good Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.072∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Caregiver PG contribution 0.144∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Caregiver risk averse 0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.014 0.013
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)
Child age 0.003 0.020 0.018 0.018
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Child female -0.178 -0.185 -0.191 -0.202
(0.243) (0.246) (0.256) (0.258)
Child age × female 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Caregiver age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Caregiver female -0.306∗ -0.303∗ -0.311∗
(0.174) (0.173) (0.174)
Caregiver age × female 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Caregiver Acholi 0.010 -0.004 -0.000
(0.119) (0.142) (0.148)
Caregiver education 0.015 0.016 0.013
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
Proportion of excluded peers -0.466∗ -0.508 -0.514
(0.272) (0.330) (0.342)
P2 0.124 0.121 0.122
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
P6 0.017 0.020 0.017
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064)
Lira Palwo sub-county -0.036 -0.045
(0.076) (0.079)
Lukole sub-county -0.034 -0.039
(0.077) (0.079)
Parabongo sub-county -0.032 -0.040
(0.083) (0.085)
Patongo sub-county -0.069 -0.072
(0.139) (0.137)
Awere sub-county -0.093 -0.096
(0.073) (0.078)
Pajule sub-county 0.018 0.009
(0.101) (0.102)
Puranga sub-county -0.025 -0.026
(0.087) (0.092)
Child risk preferences 0.007
(0.046)
Child time preferences -0.016
(0.057)
Household size 0.006
(0.009)
Asset index 0.008
(0.020)
Observations 442 442 440 440 440
R2 0.046 0.050 0.075 0.078 0.080
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
Atanga sub-county is taken as reference category, and therefore omitted.
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Table 3.A.7 – Sensitivity of results to caregiver relationship to the child
Public Good Contribution
All Blood-related Parents Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.076∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.033)
Child controls Y Y Y Y
Caregiver and peer controls Y Y Y Y
Sub-county FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 440 438 351 189
R2 0.057 0.056 0.053 0.105
Notes: Standard errors corrected for school level clustering (42) are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗. Child controls: Age, Female, Age×Female; Caregiver controls: Age, Female (excluding column 4), Age×Female
(excluding column 4), Acholi, Education; Peer controls: Proportion of excluded peers, Class dummies.
Table 3.A.8 – Split-sample balance (caregivers)
High child 2D:4D Low child 2D:4D
(Low prenatal stress) (High prenatal stress)
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Diff. Std. err.
2D:4D 76 0.957 78 0.956 -0.001 0.006
Public good contribution 221 0.561 221 0.452 -0.109∗∗ 0.047
Age 220 42.3 220 41.8 -0.5 1.1
Female 221 0.489 221 0.579 0.090∗ 0.047
Education level 221 0.864 221 0.814 -0.050 0.076
Risk preferences 221 0.299 221 0.326 0.027 0.044
War exposure 220 0.746 220 0.758 0.012 0.016
PTSD (dummy) 221 0.317 221 0.466 0.149∗∗∗ 0.046
PTSD (factor) 221 -0.142 221 0.142 0.284∗∗∗ 0.094
Christian 221 0.977 221 0.968 -0.009 0.015
Acholi 221 0.995 221 0.986 -0.009 0.009
Household size 221 7.92 221 8.26 0.34 0.28
Asset index 221 -0.028 221 0.028 0.056 0.095
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗.
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Appendix 3.B: Figures
Figure 3.B.1 – Average war exposure per school
Figure 3.B.2 – Private and group cards in the public goods game for children
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Appendix 3.C: Variable definitions
2D:4D. A child level measure of the relative length of the index finger of the
right hand with respect to the ring finger (in cm).
Standardized digit ratio (-). A child level variable derived by standardizing
the 2D:4D (z-score). The negative sign is added for ease of interpretation.
Public good contribution (child and caregiver). An individual level
dummy for both child and caregiver representing the individual choice in the public
goods game: “group card” or “private card”. The choice “group card” takes value
1, 0 otherwise.
Age (child and caregiver). Age of respondent (child and caregiver) i in years,
rounded down to the last birthday.
Female (child and caregiver). An individual level dummy taking value of 1
if respondent (child and caregiver) is female, 0 otherwise.
Class dummies (P2, P4, P6). Child-level dummies indicating the current
school grade of child i.
Height-for-age. The height of child i standardized for his age class (de Onis
et al., 2007).
BMI-for-age. The body-mass-index of child i standardized for his age class
(de Onis et al., 2007).
IQ-for-age. The IQ of child i, measured using standard Raven’s matrices and
standardized for his age class (in sample).
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Time preferences. A child level dummy taking value of 1 if child prefers
to receive two candies at the end of the survey rather than one half way, 0
otherwise.
Risk preferences (child). A dummy equal to 1 if the child consistently chooses
for the riskier option in a two dichotomous lottery choices; 0 otherwise.
Risk preferences (caregiver). A dummy equal to 0 if the caregiver chose the
least risky one of several lottery options; 1 otherwise.
War exposure (child and caregiver). A caregiver level victimization index
derived from answers to 23 war witnessing questions (see Macksoud, 1992). The
postnatal war exposure of child i is proxied by the war exposure of the caregiver
multiplied by the fraction of violent conflict events that took place after the birth
of child i.
Education level. A caregiver level variable indicating the number of completed
years of education.
PTSD. A caregiver level measure of post-traumatic stress disorder, calculated
using the PCL-civilian checklist.
Christian. A dummy taking value of 1 if the caregiver is Christian by religion,
0 otherwise.
Acholi. A dummy taking value of 1 if the caregiver is ethnically Acholi, 0
otherwise.
Household size. The number of people sharing the same roof and sharing the
same pot.
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Asset index. A principal factor (see Sahn and Stifel, 2003) of assets possessed
by the caregiver’s household.

Chapter 4
Institutional Change and the Dynamics of Social
Capital
Experimental Evidence from Uganda
Abstract: We explore how the introduction of formal insurance affects the
within-village dynamics of social capital in south-western Uganda. As a proxy
for social capital we use contributions in a public goods game. Consistent with
existing evidence, our data suggests that formal insurance crowds out social
capital. However, and surprisingly, overall contributions to the common pot do
not go down because insurance adopters reduce their contributions. Instead, social
capital erodes because the uninsured, or the local poor, lower their contributions.
We discuss what might explain this finding.
This chapter is based on:
Cecchi, F., J. Duchoslav, and E. Bulte (2016). Formal Insurance and the
Dynamics of Social Capital: Experimental Evidence from Uganda. Journal of
African Economies 25 (3), 418–438.
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4.1 Introduction
Institutions are constraints devised by humans to shape human interaction
(North, 1990, p. 3). This broad definition captures both formal and informal
institutions, where the former are often treated as exogenous constraints, enforced
by an outside party (possibly “the state”), and the latter are endogenous
constraints—self-enforcing rules representing the sub-game perfect equilibrium of
a repeated game (e.g. Greif, 1993; Aoki, 2001a,b). While recent empirical work has
identified institutions as a key determinant of economic performance (e.g. Rodrik
et al., 2004), much remains unknown about how institutions evolve over time, or
about the interaction between different (types of) institutions.
In this article, we ask how the introduction of a new formal institution
affects the performance of a preexisting informal one. This topic is gaining
importance as, globally, systems of formal institutions are expanding. For
example, global value chains are penetrating further into societies hitherto oriented
towards subsistence activities; the formalization of land rights increasingly affects
customary institutional tenure arrangements; and the expanding reach of the state
and formal court system is altering informal judicial institutions. The current wave
of experimentation with (index) insurance products in environments characterized
by informal sharing arrangements represents another example. While some
theoretical work exists to analyze how (exogenous) changes in formal institutions
affect the equilibrium of repeated games (e.g. Aoki, 2001b), empirical work in this
domain remains very scarce. Roland (2004) describes the interaction between slow-
and fast-moving institutions and argues that, depending on the context, specific
institutions may be complements or substitutes (see also Williamson, 2009; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015). Institutional innovations in one domain may therefore crowd
out, or solidify, existing institutional arrangements.1
In this chapter, we seek to enhance our understanding of the impact of a
specific formal institutional innovation on local cooperation (“social capital”)
using experimental methods. We focus on the provision of insurance—a domain
1For recent experimental work along these lines, refer to Chandrasekhar et al. (2016).
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relatively well-studied by economists. Rural producers in developing countries are
exposed to various shocks and typically are better off when pooling their risks (in
particular when the co-variation of risks across individuals is modest or absent).
Since, until recently, prohibitive transaction costs typically precluded the writing
of formal insurance contracts, rural producers by and large depended on informal
insurance arrangements to secure their livelihoods (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Udry,
1994; De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011). Such sharing could take various forms,
including redistribution within friendship or kinship networks (e.g. Fafchamps and
Gubert, 2007; Alger and Weibull, 2010), or transfers in patron-client relationships
(Richards, 1996). In recent years, however, various agencies have experimented
with the provision of formal insurance for rural households, based on written
contracts and possibly outside enforcement. This development was facilitated by
improvements in communication technology, which lowered transaction costs, but
also by the creation of “new” insurance products such as index insurance.
Insofar as formal and informal insurance are “substitutes”, one might expect that
the introduction of formal insurance possibilities will crowd out informal insurance
arrangements. A small literature seeks to empirically test this hypothesis,
providing some support for it. Dercon and Krishnan (2003) find that public
transfers in the form of food aid crowd out informal sharing in rural Ethiopia.2
Landmann et al. (2012) use data from the Philippines to show that formal
insurance lowers voluntary transfers among members in social networks. Klohn
and Strupat (2013) examine the link between the provision of formal health
insurance and informal transfers in Ghana and find that formal insurance reduces
both the probability of making transfers and amounts transferred. Lin et al. (2014)
confirm the crowding out thesis in a laboratory setting.3
The main objective of this chapter is to empirically explore how the introduction
2Also see Bähre (2011), who examines the relation between formal financial arrangements and
personal networks in post-apartheid South Africa, finding that increasing redistribution created
frictions within networks.
3A related literature concerns the effects of migration (remittances) as a mechanism to provide
insurance. For example, Morten (2016) establishes that temporary migration decreases informal
risk sharing.
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of formal health insurance affects within-village cooperation and social capital in
a sample of Ugandan villages. We first compare the behavior of villagers with
and without access to formal health insurance and obtain an intention-to-treat
effect at the village level. We proceed by disentangling behavior of adopters and
non-adopters. Unlike existing work, we consider a voluntary insurance program
with imperfect uptake—allowing us to probe intra-village implications. Moreover,
we do not use informal transfers as our measure of social capital. Instead, our
main dependent variable is based on behavior in public goods (PG) games. The
PG game captures the ability of communities to coordinate on first-best outcomes
and represents a measure of social capital at the village level (e.g. Fearon et al.,
2009; Voors et al., 2011). Following Klohn and Strupat (2013) and Morten (2016),
one may hypothesise that formally insured village members depend less on their
fellow villagers to sustain their livelihoods and, as a consequence, invest less in
social relations.4 If so, the result will be erosion of social capital, translating into
lower contributions to the local public good.
In areas with access to formal insurance, we find that uptake is far from uniform
and skewed towards the sub-sample of wealthier villagers. We also find that
average contributions to the public good are lower in areas with access to formal
insurance. These results corroborate simple game theoretical predictions (outlined
below) and are consistent with the empirical findings mentioned above. Next,
we zoom in on within-village social capital dynamics, documenting patterns in
the data that are harder to explain. Lower aggregate contributions to the
public good are not due to the withdrawal of insurance adopters. Instead,
reduced average contributions are fully explained by declining contributions of
non-adopters. Moreover, we find that non-adopters only contribute less when
matched with adopters. Following sociological theories of social embeddedness
(Granovetter, 1985) and the anthropological “weapons of the weak” perspective
formulated by Scott (1985), we speculate that sending behavior by non-adopters
4Of course there are other reasons why the introduction of formal insurance (or storage)
possibilities may cause adopters to opt out of informal institutions or networks. Klohn and
Strupat (2013) discuss that formal institutions may crowd out altruistic behavior (see Bowles,
2008) or may reduce (the bite of) social sanctions associated with exit (see Grimm et al., 2017).
4.2 Formal and informal institutions 87
serves as a signal. Specifically, our empirical results are consistent with the story
that non-adopters signal their discontent caused by the feeling of being left behind.
If the wealthy adopt formal insurance, they may opt out of informal sharing
networks in the future, leaving non-adopters worse off. However, we cannot rule
out several alternative explanations, so the exact mechanism linking non-adoption
to low contributions should be explored more fully in future research.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we outline and
illustrate the conventional economic perspective on the evolution of informal
institutions in response to changes in the environment. In Section 4.3, we
provide context regarding the case study and describe the insurance intervention as
implemented by a local NGO. In Section 4.4, we summarize our data, outline our
identification strategy and formulate four research questions. Section 4.5 contains
our empirical results, which we speculatively seek to interpret in Section 4.6. The
conclusions ensue.
4.2 The interaction between formal and informal
institutions
We outline a simple economic perspective on the interaction between formal and
informal institutions— an issue fitting in an emerging literature on the co-evolution
of institutions and culture (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, for a recent overview).
The economic perspective lends itself naturally to game-theoretic analysis, and
economists have developed a coherent framework in which informal institutions
are seen as the equilibrium outcomes of repeated interactions—outcomes that
are persistent over time, shaping expectations and gradually evolving into norms
of appropriate behavior. See, for example, Aoki (2001b) for a treatment of
institutions as endogenous and self-enforcing equilibrium outcomes of a repeated
game.5
5We emphasize that non-economists have also contributed important ideas to the issue
of co-evolving institutions and informal (cultural, traditional) norms and arrangements. For
example, and focusing on the interaction between traditional society and “the state”, the
sociologist Galvan (2004) describes a process referred to as “institutional syncretism”. This
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Consider the case of informal insurance via sharing as an example. Economists
have studied the evolution of such arrangements as alternative insurance
opportunities emerge. Informal insurance via gifts and transfers occurs within
networks of family members (or friends) because of altruism and may involve
support to deal with persistent shocks (chronic illness or disability— see De
Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011). Informal insurance may also be motivated by
expected reciprocity among individuals (or households) in a context of repeated
interaction (e.g. Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon et al., 2002; De
Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011). The theoretical literature has emphasized that
such non-altruistic sharing arrangements should be self-enforcing; individuals are
willing to help others facing a temporary shock because of the credible promise
of reciprocity in the future. Participation constraints limit the extent of risk
sharing that is possible, as villagers balance the short-term benefit from reneging
on sharing obligations against the loss of foregoing the (expected) potential benefits
from sharing in all future periods.
How does the emergence of formal insurance affect a binding participation
constraint? An individual who is expelled from the insurance network now has the
option to adopt formal insurance—paying a fixed fee every period and receiving a
payment in case of a health shock. Because an actuarially fair insurance product
improves the autarky outcome of adopters in the future, the set of self-enforcing
informal insurance transfers decreases. Intuitively, because individuals have access
to a substitute insurance product tomorrow (other than transfers from peers), it
is more tempting to renege on obligations today and opt out of the network. Only
a menu of small transfers can now be supported as the new equilibrium outcome,
and insurance options for non-adopters unambiguously deteriorate (see Coate and
Ravallion, 1993; Ligon et al., 2002).
The main message is that substitute insurance mechanisms lower the value
attached to informal sharing arrangements (for those able to adopt the substitute).
Substitutes could be formal insurance, as above, but alternatives exist. For
involves the reworking of state-imposed institutions from below by peasants to make these new
(and sometimes alien) institutions consistent with tradition.
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example, Ligon et al. (2002) focus on the implications of self-insurance via storage,
which also increases the value of autarky. As above, individuals who were
previously (almost) indifferent between participating in the sharing network and
autarky will now renege when they have the option to store, and subsequently
opt out of the network. While their welfare improves as a result, the utility of
individuals remaining in the network decreases unambiguously. They are worse
off because the network shrinks and loses part of its ability to absorb shocks.
Ligon et al. (2002) demonstrate that introducing the possibility of storage may
even reduce overall welfare. Migration-induced remittances may provide yet an
alternative substitute mechanism to protect households from health shocks, and
Morten (2016) indeed demonstrates that migration tends to decrease insurance
provided via informal networks.
Theory does not necessarily suggest that the provision of formal insurance will
always crowd out informal sharing. For example, Dercon et al. (2014) demonstrate
that informal (within-group) sharing and index insurance are complements, rather
than substitutes—so that the provision of insurance crowds in, rather than crowds
out, informal sharing arrangements. The reason is that the basis risk implied
by index insurance creates demand for additional informal insurance. Dercon
et al. (2014) argue that “the benefits of encouraging groups to combine these
products with increased risk sharing among members might be large, resulting in
substantially larger take-up rates”.6 Nevertheless, in the context of idiosyncratic
risk and indemnity-based payments, such as the context we study below, the
economic perspective proposes that the introduction of formal insurance crowds
out informal insurance.
Importantly, informal insurance is only one specific dimension of social capital.
In reality, villagers will typically interact in different social spheres and have to
address a range of social dilemmas. The ability of groups of subjects to overcome
social dilemmas provides a measure of that group’s social capital. In the words
of sociologist Granovetter (1985), economic transactions are “socially embedded”.
6de Janvry et al. (2014) also argue in favor of selling insurance to groups rather than
individuals, to overcome coordination failures and to internalize positive externalities.
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Aoki (2001a) writes that “the economic transaction domain is embedded in a
social exchange domain in which the same members repeatedly interact socially
and invest in, and enjoy returns from, social capital”. This perspective can
be worked out formally using game theory, by linking multiple games and
expanding the payoff structure. For example, Aoki (2001a,b) demonstrates that
linking an economic exchange and social interaction game may expand the set
of equilibria that can be supported in the exchange game.7 If so, the reverse is
also true—de-linking institutions should contract the set of feasible equilibria in
other domains of exchange. Specifically, societies will be less able to overcome
social dilemmas (e.g. provide public goods) after substituting informal insurance
between villagers by formal insurance provided by an outside agent. Partial
formalization of exchange in societies may curtail cooperation in informal domains
of interaction.
In what follows we test whether formal insurance affects voluntary contributions of
villagers to the local public good—distinguishing between those adopting insurance
and those not adopting insurance. To empirically probe this issue, we organized
behavioral games in a sample of rural Ugandan communities.
4.3 The case study: health insurance in Uganda
Approximately half the population in Uganda is below 14 years of age, and this
population is expected to double in size in the next 20 years (UN DESA, 2012). To
help sustain strong post-war economic recovery during the last decade, Uganda
focuses on health interventions and the accumulation of human capital (World
Bank, 2011).
We focus on Kitagata sub-county, located in the South-Western Sub-region of
Uganda. A local not-for-profit organization called Save for Health Uganda (SHU)
7Aoki (2001a,b) writes that interlinkages between institutions may be “understood in terms
of a general-equilibrium-like feedback among the strategies of individual agents across different
domains of the economy. Then an economy as a whole may be viewed as a robust and coherent
overall cluster of mutually interdependent institutions”.
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has recently implemented a health micro-insurance project across four parishes
in Kitagata, with the ultimate mid-term goal of covering the entire sub-county.8
In what follows, we refer to households from these parishes as having “access” to
formal health insurance—i.e. in these parishes households actively decided whether
to adopt insurance, or not. Each village in the covered parish is encouraged and
facilitated to create a so-called Community Health Financing (CHF) scheme, which
provides health insurance to member families. Members receive an insurance card,
allowing access to all services provided by contracted facilities.9 These services
include transport to the hospital in case of delivery, ante-natal care, out-patient
services, admission services and surgery (SHU, 2013).
Although there was slight variation with respect to the starting date of village level
schemes, SHU required villages within the same parish to begin simultaneously,
ensuring relatively homogeneous up-take rates. When we collected our data in
August 2012, all the randomly selected villages from areas with access to the
insurance had a running scheme, to which approximately 53% of the families
had subscribed. The great majority of the villagers in access areas (some 95%)
indicated to be familiar with CHF schemes. In parishes without access to the
formal insurance, around 56% of the people interviewed had heard about the
schemes, but were aware that it was not (yet) available to them.10 On average,
member households were expected to pay just above 26,000 USh (or 10 USD)
to cover the yearly insurance premium, with some variation depending on village
and family size. Premiums were not sufficient to cover insurance costs, which are
subsidized by international donors and sponsors. Nonetheless, only 18% of the
participating families had been able to pay the full yearly premium to that date,
with average payment rates hovering around 34%.11 Families that have not fully
8Since then, Kitagata Sub-county has been administratively divided into two sub-counties:
Kitagata and Kasaana. SHU, however, keeps working in both sub-counties with a single program.
9Contracted facilities include one private hospital and two public healthcare facilities.
10Notably, SHU had already undertaken informational and sensitization meetings in two
parishes in no access areas by the time of our fieldwork, and while the scheme was neither
active nor running, the insurance was scheduled to start there in the near future.
11Dekker and Wilms (2010) find that participants in a similar private health-insurance scheme
in five rural and two urban communities in Uganda face comparable difficulties in paying the
premium: only 37% of participating households were able to pay.
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paid the premium do not yet qualify for compensation; so many families currently
have one foot in the formal system but also need to continue investing in informal
arrangements.
We believe that there is considerable demand for formal health insurance schemes,
but that paying for the premium remains a challenge for many families. The latter
is confirmed by many open-ended exit interviews after the public goods game.
While we did not collect hard evidence on pre-existing informal arrangements
of mutual insurance, anecdotes complement the (qualitative) literature on local
informal arrangements (Taylor et al., 1996; McDonald et al., 1999) and stress the
importance of relatives, neighbors and friends in providing financial support in
times of hardship.12 We interpret this context as one of being in institutional flux,
in which a considerable share of the local population appears “in limbo” between
alternative insurance modalities.
4.4 Experimental identification, data and design
The health insurance scheme was implemented according to a pipeline approach.
While the ultimate aim is to establish a running CHF in every parish, logistical
constraints forced the implementing agency to gradually roll out their intervention
so that some parishes are treated earlier than others. We refer to households living
in parishes where the intervention had not yet taken place as not having access
to formal insurance. Strictly speaking, the selection of (early) access parishes
was arbitrary and not based on an explicit randomization procedure. But, not
surprisingly, access and no-access households are very similar across almost all
dimensions we measured. Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that access
parishes are comparable to no-access parishes and that there are more differences
between villages within the same parish than between parishes. Moreover, villages
with and without access are not significantly different in terms of total number
12The open-ended questionnaire highlighted that people help each other in times of illness,
contributing to hospital bills and helping the family financially though donations of food and
money, or by transporting sick persons to the hospital. In the words of one respondent, “here
the story is that people help each other [...] when they are sick, and in case of unlucky events”.
4.4 Experimental identification, data and design 93
of households, distance and time from a major road and from the Sub-County
headquarters (see Table 4.1).13
Table 4.1 – Group means of socio-economic variables
Variables No-access parishes Access parishes Diff. SE
N Mean N Mean
Village size (households) 23 65.13 21 58.05 -7.08 4.27
Time to main road 23 6.13 21 7.24 1.11 1.56
Distance from main road 23 2.33 21 2.47 0.14 0.66
Time to town 23 15.70 21 14.67 -1.03 3.18
Distance from town 23 5.50 21 4.31 -1.19 0.89
Female participant 230 0.47 210 0.42 -0.05 0.05
Single 216 0.05 207 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Married/Engaged 216 0.79 207 0.79 0.00 0.04
Widowed 216 0.15 207 0.16 0.01 0.02
Male household head 230 0.75 210 0.76 -0.01 0.04
Age household head 216 46.61 199 50.23 3.61∗∗ 1.54
Education household head 230 5.31 209 4.95 -0.36 0.41
Household size 230 6.13 210 6.05 -0.08 0.23
Mothers in house 230 0.74 210 0.79 0.05 0.41
Watch TV weekly 230 0.87 210 0.88 0.01 0.03
Read newspaper weekly 230 0.24 210 0.24 0.00 0.04
Radio 230 0.91 210 0.91 0.00 0.03
Phone 230 0.84 210 0.78 -0.06 0.04
Bicycle 230 0.45 210 0.42 -0.03 0.05
Motorbike 230 0.15 210 0.11 -0.04 0.03
Television 230 0.04 210 0.04 0.00 0.02
Car 230 0.04 210 0.04 0.00 0.02
Generator 230 0.02 210 0.03 0.01 0.01
Wealth factor 230 0.04 210 -0.05 -0.09 0.08
House features index 230 1.40 210 1.35 0.05 0.08
Common assets index 230 2.20 210 2.11 0.05 0.08
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
We randomly selected 21 villages from three access parishes, and another 23
villages from five neighboring parishes (in what follows: no-access villages). Four
of these parishes are located in the same sub-county as the access parishes
(Kitagata), and one parish containing five villages is located in neighboring
13Both distance (km) and time (minutes) where measured following the route most commonly
used by locals. We used a motorbike taxi as reference for time, as it represents the most
commonly used motorized vehicle by locals, as well as the means of transport typically used
by SHU extension agents.
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Mitooma sub-county, bordering the largest parish with an active insurance scheme
(see Figure 4.1 for a spatial representation of the distribution of access and
no-access villages). In each village, we first constructed a census of all households
and then randomly selected 10 households per village. After a household survey,
we randomly selected one adult family member to participate in our lab-in-field
experiment.14 We have no relation with the NGO offering the insurance product,
and to avoid gift exchange and demand effects, we did not emphasize the insurance
program in our sessions.
Figure 4.1 – Distribution of villages with and without access to the insurance
Notes: Cross represents surveyed villages in parishes with access, circles represent surveyed
villages in parishes without access. The dotted line represents the main road crossing the
Kitagata sub-county.
14Enumerators made a list of each eligible family member before randomly selecting one name
through a transparent ballot. Households were informed that the selected participant would be
the only accepted household representative in the experiment and that failure to comply with
the rule would result in the exclusion of the household from the study. Furthermore, 44.5% of
selected participants were female (see Table 4.1) and compliance averaged 93%. The plausible
non-random attrition bias is discussed in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.1 summarizes the household data, distinguishing between access and
no-access households. We first establish that access and no-access respondents
are indistinguishable according to most socio-economic dimensions—the two
groups appear balanced. This is consistent with information given to us by the
implementing NGO—they did not use a specific targeting rule when prioritizing
villages to enroll in the program. Age of the household head is the only variable
that differs, but this difference is small and presumably caused by chance. A key
variable for our purposes is the so-called wealth factor. This variable is constructed
by factoring out a wealth index from a series of dummy variables related to asset
ownership (i.e. phone, radio, television, generator, bicycle, motorbike and car)
and house features (iron roofing, brick walls and cement floors) locally perceived
as primary indicators of wealth. The average asset index score is not significantly
different in access and no-access villages. Also, for the full range of socio-economic
variables, bias-corrected variance estimates within parishes are greater than those
across parishes. For definitions of the remaining variables, refer to Appendix
4.A.
In terms of analysis, we first explain variation in adoption of insurance in access
villages. Surveys identified lack of financial resources as the most frequent reason
for opting-out of the insurance scheme.We therefore expect wealthy households to
be more likely to join the scheme—non-random adoption of the new technology
based on income or wealth.On the other hand, because health status is also
likely to vary with wealth, demand for insurance may also be greater among the
non-wealthy. Ultimately, the distribution of effective demand for formal insurance
across social groups is an empirical question and using the sub-sample of treated
parishes (villages), we estimate the following probit models:
Pr(Ii = 1|Wi) = α+ βWi + γW 2i + εi (4.1)
and
Pr(Ii = 1|Pi) = α+ βPi + γ′Xi + εi (4.1′)
where Ii is a dummy for insurance uptake by household i, W is a standardized
96 Institutional Change
factor of wealth (based on a range of assets, discussed above), P is a poverty
dummy, X is a vector of individual and household characteristics and εi is a
random error term. The poverty dummy takes a value of one when a household
does not own more than one of the three most common assets (phone, radio and
bicycle) and not more than one improved house feature (iron roof, brick wall and
cement floor).15 In words, we explain adoption status by variables measuring
wealth or poverty, and our first research question reads as follows:
RQ 1: Are wealthy households more likely to pick up health insurance than
poor ones?
Next, we are interested in explaining the effect of adoption of insurance on
village-level social capital. To construct a measure of social capital, we follow
Fearon et al. (2009) and organized a lab-in-field experiment, or a standard PG
game with five participants. A PG game captures the ability of groups of
respondents to overcome free riding incentives. It likely also picks up altruism
and trust (as respondents want to avoid outcomes where they feel others have
taken advantage of them), as well as the extent to which norms of sharing
and cooperation are internalized by villagers. These issues speak to different
dimensions of (cognitive) social capital. Our measure of social capital is thus
quite broad and extends beyond a willingness to share risk and income informally
(as would be measured more cleanly and saliently by, for example, the solidarity
game proposed by Selten and Ockenfels (1998)). Intuitively, one might expect that
picking up effects across domains of social interaction are more demanding than
picking up impact within the same domain (say: protecting individual respondents
from idiosyncratic shocks by either formal insurance or sharing). In that sense,
our test based on the PG game is perhaps more challenging than tests based on
solidarity game data.
15The chosen poverty line corresponds to a wealth level that is one standard deviation below
the average wealth index in our sample. This yields a poverty headcount of 17.8% that matches
the region’s poverty headcount based on DHS data (see Daniels, 2011).
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We randomly divided our 10 participants from each village into two groups of five
individuals, carefully explained the rules of the game, and played a trial round.
While individual contributions were not revealed, the people knew with whom
they were matched for the five rounds of the PG game (and presumably whether
these peers had adopted the formal insurance, or not). We gave five tokens to each
participant, who could then anonymously contribute any integer amount into the
common pot. After participants made their contributions, we doubled the amount
in the pot and split this amount equally across all group members. As is well
known, the joint surplus is maximized when all participants contribute the full
amount to the pot, but the privately optimal contribution (the Nash equilibrium)
in the context of a finitely repeated game is to give nothing. A large body of
evidence from other contexts (and other games) suggests that many respondents
are not entirely selfish, and willing to contribute positive amounts.
After the trial round, participants were informed that they would play the game
an unknown number of times (up to a maximum of five) and that their pay-out
at the end of the game would be based on a randomly selected round (determined
by a simple lottery).16 Participants were sitting at a distance of about 5 m from
each other, in a circle, facing outwards (not facing each other). Decisions about
how many tokens to share were shown privately to the experimenters by placing
the shared tokens in the closed left hand, while keeping the rest in the closed right
hand. In turns, experimenters would approach participants and open their left
fist rapidly to count and record the number of shared tokens. It was impossible
for participants to observe each other. Payoffs for participants averaged around
USD2.20—or about two-third of daily rural household incomes in the Western
region, as estimated by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics.17
16In the absence of group reshuﬄing, game dynamics of reputation, retaliation and learning
are expected to drive contribution decisions in repeated games (Rand et al., 2009). Our intent,
however, is to proxy real life dynamics. For this reason, our analysis is based solely on the choices
performed during the first round of each game version. Successive iterations were performed so
that defection is not necessarily the only Nash equilibrium present: players may cooperate on
an equilibrium path, provided that they are sufficiently interested in future outcomes (Dal Bó,
2005). For the same reason, the exact number of repetitions was not revealed to participants.
17http://www.ubos.org/UNHS0910/chapter7.Average%20Monthly%20Household%20Income.html.
The payoffs after the trial round were not revealed so as not to influence subsequent play in
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Figure 4.2 – Sharing decisions of participants with and without access to formal
insurance
If formal insurance crowds out informal insurance and reduces cooperation at the
local level, we expect aggregate (or average) contributions to the common pot to
be lower for respondents with access to the formal insurance scheme. We seek to
pick up an intention-to-treat effect (as did Klohn and Strupat, 2013) and estimate
the following two models:
the game. On average, participants without access to the formal insurance shared 2.89 tokens,
against the 2.60 tokens shared by adopters and 2.39 by non-adopters with access. Similarly,
only 25.5% of the participants with access made a “high contribution” to the common pot (four
or five tokens), against 34.8% of those without access (see Figure 4.2). Our empirical analysis is
based on contributions in the first round. Contributions in subsequent rounds are less likely to
be independent observations, because players may respond to each other as the game unfolds.
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Si = α+ βIi + εi (4.2)
and
Pr(SHi = 1|Ii) = α+ βIi + ε (4.3)
where S represents the number of tokens shared in the common pot, I is again
a dummy with value 1 for respondents living in access villages; β measures an
intention to treat effect and SH is a dummy for having shared a high amount (i.e.
four or five tokens), so this model is estimated using a probit specification. In
some models, we control for a vector of observables, and in all regression models
we will cluster standard errors at the village level. In words, by estimating (4.2)
and (4.3) we ask:
RQ 2: Is the possibility to access a formal insurance associated with lower
average contributions to the public good in a PG game?
We now analyze contributions to the common pot more closely. The conventional
economic perspective on the evolution of informal insurance suggests that formal
insurance provides a substitute mechanism for the wealthy, who could subsequently
choose to opt out of existing informal arrangements and cease cooperation with
fellow villagers.We estimate the following “naïve” models, which resemble equations
(4.2) and (4.3) above but distinguish between adopters and non-adopters:
Si = α+ βAi + γNAi + ε (4.4)
and
Pr(SHi = 1|Ai, NAi) = α+ βAi + γNAi + ε (4.5)
where A is a dummy with value 1 for actual adopters (in access villages), and NA is
a dummy with value 1 for non-adopters (in access villages). Respondents without
access are the omitted category. Note that models ((4.4) and (4.5)) are naïve and
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possibly produce misleading results because of the endogeneity of adopter status.
Households self-select in the insurance scheme, and variables explaining this choice
may also drive behavior in the public good game. With this (important) caveat
in mind, our third research question is:
RQ 3: Assuming that the introduction of formal insurance is associated with
reduced aggregate contributions to the common pot in a PG game, who is
responsible for these lower contributions: adopters, non-adopters, or both?
As mentioned, correlations obtained in our regression framework may be spurious.
To attenuate concerns about omitted variables, we expand the empirical analysis.
First, we explain adoption status (based on observations in access parishes only)
and, based on the resulting regression coefficients, we predict the probability
of non-adoption for all households (including those in no-access villages). This
analysis enables us to compare public good contributions for (predicted) adopters
and non-adopters across villages with and without access to insurance. We are
interested in establishing whether predicted non-adopters without access behave
similarly to predicted non-adopters with access, and estimate
Pr(SHi = 1|Pr(n− a)) = α+ βPr(n− a)i + εi (4.6)
and
Pr(SHi = 1|Pr(n− a), I) = α+ βPr(n− a)i + γIi + δIi × Pr(n− a) + εi (4.6′)
where 0 ≤ Pr(n − a) ≤ 1 is the predicted probability of non-adoption, and I ×
Pr(n − a) is the model with interaction term between Pr(n − a) and access to
insurance (I).
Second, we also estimate a propensity score matching (PSM) model, matching
respondents from access and no-access areas. To probe whether contributions
by predicted non-adopters are similar, or not, we then compare contributions
of non-adopters, with credibly similar respondents in no access-areas, based on
nearest neighbor matching.
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RQ 4: Do predicted non-adopters with access to formal insurance behave the
same as predicted non-adopters without access—is behavior of non-adopters
driven by population characteristics or by insurance?
Finally, to examine the mechanism explaining our empirical results we will also
estimate a placebo model based on inter-group variation of group composition.
We outline this step below, after first addressing research questions 1–4.
4.5 Empirical results
We first test the prediction that wealthier households are more likely to purchase
formal health insurance than relatively poor households. Focusing on parishes
where insurance was offered, we explain variation in adoption across households.
Results are reported in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate a positive
correlation between wealth and adoption. This relation may possibly be non-linear
(Column (1)), but a linear relation ensues when we omit two outliers from the
sample (see Column (2)). A one standard deviation increase in wealth increases the
probability of adopting formal insurance by about 12%. The finding that relatively
wealthy households are more likely to adopt formal insurance is confirmed in
Columns (3) and (4), where we replace the wealth variables with a poverty dummy.
We report probit marginal effects, so poor households are 20% less likely to adopt
health insurance than non-poor households in access villages.18
We next ask how the introduction or formal insurance affects play in the PG
game. We first use the number of tokens shared as the dependent variable and
examine how this quantity varies with access status. Our access dummy captures
whether or not a respondent’s household resides in a village that has an active
18This finding is confirmed by abundant anecdotal evidence. Many respondents cite “financial
problems” as the main reason for not purchasing the insurance. They claim that their income
is too low in comparison to the fee and would have joined the scheme “if only they had more
money”. Others state that they would join if there was a “reduction on the fee that SHU asks
from them”, or stress that they “joined but paid half of the money”, and thus could not benefit
from the insurance coverage.
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Table 4.2 – Wealth and the adoption of health insurance
Insurance adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Wealth factor 0.122∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.050) (0.054)
Wealth factor squared -0.111∗∗ -0.070
(0.048) (0.074)
Poverty dummy -0.226∗∗ -0.198∗∗
(0.098) (0.093)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Cluster robust s.e. 21 21 21 21
N 210 208 210 185
Correct predictions at p = 0.5 63% 63% 62% 70%
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects. Wealth factor based on vector of
household level asset dummies. Model (2) removes the highest outlier from the sample. Probit marginal effects for
Model (3); Poverty dummy takes the value of unity when household owns not more than one of the three most common
assets (phone, radio, bicycle) and not more than one improved house feature (iron roof, brick wall, cement floor).
Additional controls include age household head, male household head, education household head, single, household
size, female participant, mothers in house, watch TV weekly, read newspaper weekly. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
CHF scheme, regardless of its own adoption status. Of 440 households interviewed,
only 409 correct household representatives showed up for the afternoon (PG) game
session. The other 31 participants were substituted by a random villager that was
not a member of any of the interviewed households. We do not find detectable
self-selection bias into the experiment and therefore estimate the model using OLS,
Poisson and Probit.19 In Column (1), we find that respondents with access to the
formal insurance share on average fewer tokens than their counterparts, consistent
with findings by Klohn and Strupat (2013). Using a Poisson model yields similarly
significant results.
In Columns (2)–(4), we attempt to go further and identify who is responsible for
the lower PG contributions—adopters or non-adopters. While one may expect
that adopters will reduce their contribution to the PG—as they have less use
for social capital in the future—our empirical results suggest something different.
Lower public good contributions are driven by relatively lower contributions of
19We also ran a Heckman selection model. While some observed characteristics affect the
likelihood of showing up (i.e. if the household head is male, or if the randomly selected respondent
is female), the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant.
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non-adopters. On average, non-adopters with access to the formal insurance
contribute about 0.4 tokens less than respondents without access, or over
one-quarter of a standard deviation. In Column (3), we distinguish between
households that have paid their premium (i.e. eligible to benefit from the
insurance) and those that have only paid in part. Again, non-participants drive
the reduction in contributions. In Column (4), we show the same result using a
Poisson specification instead.
Similarly, we try to explain the incidence of high contributions (i.e. the
contribution of four or five tokens). There are fewer high contributors in access
areas (Column (5)), which is driven by non-adopters (Columns (6) and (7)). They
are 33% less likely to be high contributors, again representing about one-quarter
of a standard deviation.
Table 4.3 – Sharing in the public goods game
Tokens shared (Si) High contributor (SHi)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS Poisson Probit Probit Probit
Insurance access -0.281∗ -0.093∗∗
(0.144) (0.045)
Adopter -0.188 0.082
(0.185) (0.057)
Full payment 0.008 0.003 0.049
(0.352) (0.125) (0.132)
Partial payment -0.234 -0.087 -0.112∗
(0.192) (0.072) (0.054)
Non-adopter -0.402∗ -0.402∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.226) (0.226) (0.091) (0.046) (0.046)
Cluster robust
s.e.
44 44 44 44 44 44 44
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 409
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (5)-(7). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Other factors may explain both adoption and contribution rates. Table 4.2,
for instance, shows that non-adoption is primarily explained by wealth—poor
households are significantly less likely to adopt insurance. If poorer households
systematically contribute less to the common pot, the correlations in Table 4.3 may
be spurious. We next use information about the propensity to be a non-adopter
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(based on regression results in Column (4), Table 4.2). This enables us to compare
“predicted non-adopters” in access areas to “predicted non-adopters” in no-access
areas.
Results are reported in Table 4.4. In Column (1), we only use data from villages
with access to the insurance product and demonstrate that predicted non-adopters
are less likely to share a high fraction of their tokens in the PG game. These
results, of course, echo those in Table 4.3. However, when estimating the same
model for the sub-sample of respondents with no-access, we find that the sign of the
coefficient of interest changes—from negative to positive (Column (2)). Predicted
non-adopters without access are more likely to contribute four or five tokens to the
common pot. This may reflect the greater importance attached to social capital
by relatively poor households. Upon pooling the data and including an interaction
term (predicted non-adoption probability multiplied by insurance access), we
capture these results in one specification. According to Columns (3) and (5),
predicted non-adopters in no-access areas are more likely to contribute more to the
common pot, but this is not true for predicted non-adopters in access villages—the
interaction effect dominates the level effect of predicted non-adoption. Results in
(3) are robust to clustering at the parish level (8 clusters) instead of the village
level (44 clusters), using wild bootstrap inference to correct for the small number
of clusters (Cameron et al., 2008).
As an alternative approach, in Columns (4) and (6) we use PSM to compare
non-adopters to similar counterparts in no-access areas. We thus exclude the 106
adopters from this analysis. The average treatment effect obtained through nearest
neighbor matching is consistent with previous findings. Matching is based on the
same variables as in Column (4) of Table 4.2. A logit model is used to calculate
propensity scores. Balancing properties are satisfied for all matching variables, in
each of the five blocks of equal score range. Also, the mean propensity score in each
block is not different for non-adopters (in this setting, the “treated”) and no-access
participants (“controls”). The predicted scores range between 0.044 and 0.688 for
non-treated and between 0.045 and 0.602 for controls, so the common support
region ranges between 0.045 and 0.602 (suggesting adequate overlap between
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Table 4.4 – Predicted non-adoption and sharing in the public goods game
High contributor (SHi) Tokens shared (Si )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Poisson Probit Probit
Pr(n− a) -0.325∗ 0.309∗ 0.305∗ 0.691
(0.171) (0.165) (0.162) (0.523)
Insurance access 0.247∗∗ 0.424
(0.110) (0.351)
Insurance access -0.635∗∗∗ -1.258∗
×Pr(n− a) (0.235) (0.678)
Non-adopter -0.105∗ -0.402∗∗
with access (0.058) (0.186)
Cluster robust s.e. 21 23 44 No 44 No
N 185 184 369 303 369 303
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (1)–(3). Average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) using nearest neighbor matching with random draw. The propensity score in (4) and (6) is calculated
on poverty dummy, age household head, male household head, education household head, single, household size, female
participant, mothers in house, watch TV weekly, read newspaper weekly (see Table 4.2, Column (4)); the same variables
are used to predict non-adoption in Columns (1)–(3) and (5). Clustering at the parish level in (3), and correcting for the
small number of clusters following Cameron et al. (2008), yields a p-value of 0.020 for the interaction term, significant
at the 5% level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
groups). Restricting the analysis to the common support region (N= 303) yields
an ATT of -0.105 in (4), and of -0.349 in (6). The former coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 10% level, the latter at the 5% level. Kernel matching
with bootstrapped standard errors yields similar results to Table 4.4.
We interpret these findings as tentative support for the idea that our results in
Table 4.3 are not driven by spurious correlation. Non-adopters do not contribute
less in public good games because they are poor, but because of the interaction
between poverty and formal insurance availability.
4.6 Towards a speculative interpretation
Our empirical results indicate that (i) the average contribution to the common
pot is lower in villages with access to insurance than in no-access villages and
(ii) that non-adopters are responsible for the fall in contributions. These results
are consistent with a theory based on signal sending. Non-adopters may feel “left
behind” after the relatively wealthy have purchased formal insurance: they fear
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that the quality of the informal sharing network is compromised if the wealthy
opt out, and signal their discontent by foregoing cooperation in other domains of
social interaction.
Such a story is consistent with work by the anthropologist Scott (1985), who
studied the consequences of mechanization in rice farming in a Malay village.
This process invited consolidation of farms (e.g. by inviting landowners to start
reneging on long-term tenure arrangements) and dramatically reduced demand
for hired labor. The result was a “proletarization” of small farmers and landless
laborers—the creation of an underclass of society members whose well-being was
increasingly inconsequential for the upper strata of society (and whose interests
were increasingly ignored). This is the unraveling of social networks caused by
selective exit of the privileged (i.e. the adopters). Scott then demonstrates
that “losers” in one sphere of interaction (e.g. the labor market) are fully
aware of their situation, resent it and seek to remind the adopters of their
historical responsibilities and social obligations by retaliation in other spheres of
interaction—including everyday social life.
Scott (1985) investigates such strategies in detail. Peasants recognize their limited
(economic, political and symbolic) power and typically prefer non-rebellious and
non-revolutionary acts of resistance. Typical “weapons of the weak” consist of
low-key recalcitrance, foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering,
feigned ignorance, chicanery, slander, arson and acts of minor sabotage. Resistance
strategies range from gossip and character assassination to strikes (such as when
machines break down and landowners suddenly need labor to harvest their
fields) and boycotts of social activities such as weddings and political rallies
organized by those well-off. More in general, resistance signals a reduced overall
tendency to cooperate. This indicates a deterioration of local levels of social
capital, undermining the ability of communities to overcome social dilemmas
and coordinate on first-best outcomes. Even though the adverse consequences
of insurance for non-adopters are more indirect and less immediate than the
consequences of mechanization for unskilled workers, we believe our findings neatly
fit this narrative.
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To probe the plausibility of this particular causal mechanism explaining our results,
we considered a placebo treatment. Random assignment of villagers to groups
implied that the share of adopters varied across groups, and some groups did not
contain any adopters. In such groups, non-adopters cannot signal their discontent
by contributing little to the common pot. If our hypothesis is correct, non-adopters
should contribute more to the common pot in group without adopters. To test
this, we focus on behavior of non-adopters (from Treatment villages). There are 82
of such non-adopters in our total sample. We regress common pot contributions
of these non-adopters on a dummy variable indicating the absence of adopters
in their experimental group. We also estimate models based on the full sample
of observations from treatment villages and regress common pot contributions on
the interaction of non-adopters and the group dummy indicating the absence of
adopters.
Results are presented in Table 4.5 and reveal that non-adopters give less in the
presence of adopters. Comparing group sessions with and without adopters,
we find that non-adopters give almost 1.7 tokens more when there is no need
to signal discontent (Column (1)). Based on the full sample of respondents
from treatment villages, we observe that our subjects contribute on average 0.88
fewer tokens when they are matched with non-adopters. However, when they
are a non-adopter themselves, they contribute 2.55 tokens more (so that, net,
non-adopters again donate 1.7 tokens more when they play the public goods game
with fellow non-adopters).
However, we hasten to point out that our results cannot “prove” the weapons of
the weak theory, as alternative explanations may fit the data as well. For example,
the way the insurance product was marketed could have encouraged individualistic
thinking (e.g. by suggesting to senior household members that they alone were
ultimately responsible for the well-being of their families and that this product
would help them meet their responsibilities). If so, lower public good contributions
by non-adopters might be a response to a widening aspiration gap. Alternatively,
the uptake of insurance could be viewed by non-adopters as a signal of wealth
on the part of the takers, and of their own relative poverty in an environment
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Table 4.5 – Signal sending as the causal mechanism?
Tokens shared Share high Tokens shared Share high
non-adopters non-adopters treatment treatment
only only villages villages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit OLS Probit
Zero others adopt 1.671∗ 0.439 -0.877∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.278) (0.346) (0.0358)
Non-adopter -0.366∗ -0.0523
(0.213) (0.0526)
Zero others adopt 2.547∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
× non-adopter (0.908) (0.0255)
N 82 82 188 188
(Pseudo-)R2 0.050 0.027 0.048 0.046
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (2) and (4). ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
where relative wealth is typically only imperfectly observed. If so, lower public
good contributions could be due to the activation of a norm about richer people
contributing more to local public goods, and poorer people contributing less
(e.g. Ensminger, 2004). A third explanation could be that non-adopters seek to
cement relationships with (remaining) non-adopters and re-allocate their spending
accordingly. Disentangling the merits of these alternative explanations is left for
future research.
4.7 Discussion and conclusions
Social capital is a key determinant of the ability of communities to overcome
social dilemmas, and fostering social capital and cooperation has become a
policy goal in and of itself. For example, Fearon et al. (2009) demonstrate that
outside innovations may facilitate investments in social capital. However, not all
interventions have such benign effects. Specifically, interventions which benefit a
sub-sample of the population may weaken mutual dependencies and erode social
capital. Our study provides evidence to support the latter—our data are consistent
with a broad perspective on social interactions, where reduced inter-dependencies
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in one domain (informal insurance) invite behavioral changes in other domains
(public good contributions).
Formal insurance provides a substitute for informal insurance, crowding out
social capital and informal cooperation. Anecdotally, we find evidence of such
dynamics in our open-ended exit questionnaire. Respondents lament that since the
introduction of the formal insurance, some of the informal risk sharing mechanisms
have deteriorated. A non-adopter states that, in contrast to insurance holders,
when she fell sick she had to “totally cater for herself”. Another respondent
claims that someone “had joined SHU, and therefore refused to help a neighbor
who had a sick son”. In the words of other respondents, the insurance scheme
“spoils care for those who can’t pay for the scheme”, and “if you are not a member
you are not catered for”. But the deterioration of mutual assistance works both
ways. Various respondents emphasize that (non-adopting) neighbors refuse to take
insurance holders to the hospital (even if transport costs are typically not part
of the insurance package). Another respondent mentions the case of a pregnant
woman whom “people refused to help, because she is in the insurance”. Apparently,
non-adopters are not passively undergoing their plight—they take action and signal
their discontent by ceasing cooperation in other domains, in an effort to “discipline”
adopters.
Indeed, one important new finding of our study is that the erosion of social capital
is not primarily caused by adopting community members—those respondents who
may opt out of the insurance network. Instead, the deterioration of social capital
in our field experiments is explained by a behavioral response of non-adopters.
Non-adopters contribute less to the public good, but only when they are matched
with adopters.
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Appendix 4.A: Detailed variable definitions
Female participant. A dummy equal to 1 if selected game participant is female,
0 otherwise.
Single. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head is single, 0 otherwise.
Married/Engaged. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head is married or
engaged, 0 otherwise.
Widowed. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head is widowed, 0
otherwise.
Age household head. Age class of the household head, in 20-year blocks from
adulthood (18).
Male household head. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head is male, 0
otherwise.
Education household head. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head has
completed primary school.
Household size. Number of people that usually eat at least one daily meal
together with the household head, acknowledging its authority and living with the
rest of the household.
Mothers in house. A dummy equal to 1 if the household comprises at
least one pregnant woman or mother taking care of a child at present time, 0
otherwise.
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Watch TV weekly. A dummy takes value of 1 if the household head declares
to watch TV at least once a week, zero otherwise.
Read newspaper weekly. A dummy equal to 1 if the household head declares
to read the newspaper at least once a week, 0 otherwise.
Radio. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of radio, 0
otherwise.
Phone. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of phone, 0
otherwise.
Bicycle. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of bicycle, 0
otherwise.
Motorbike. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of
motorbike, 0 otherwise.
Television. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of
television, 0 otherwise.
Car. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of car, 0
otherwise.
Generator. A dummy equal to 1 if the household possesses any type of
electricity generator, 0 otherwise.
Wealth factor. A principal factor obtained by factor analysis following Sahn
and Stifel (2003), from the above-mentioned asset list (radio to generator)
possessed by the household.
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House features index. The sum of three dummy variables representing
improved house features, i.e. iron roof, brick wall and cement floor.
Common assets index. The sum of three dummy variables representing the
three most common assets, i.e. radio, phone and bicycle.
Poverty dummy. A dummy equal to 1 if the household scores 1 or less in
the House features index and scores 1 or less in the Common assets index, zero
otherwise.
Adopter. A dummy equal to 1 if a household is residing in a parish (village)
with an active and running CHF insurance scheme, and adopted the insurance, 0
otherwise.
Non-adopter. A dummy equal to 1 if a household is residing in a parish (village)
with an active and running CHF insurance scheme, and knowingly renounced
participation, 0 otherwise.
Full payment. A dummy equal to 1 if a household that adopted the CHF
insurance scheme has fully paid the due premium, 0 otherwise.
Partial payment. A dummy equal to 1 if a household that adopted the CHF
insurance scheme has only partially paid the due premium, 0 otherwise.
Insurance access. The sum of Adopter and Non-adopter. It takes value 1 if
the household has access to the formal insurance, regardless of its adoption status;
zero otherwise.
S. The number of tokens contributed to the common pot of the public goods
game by a given participant, minimum is 0 and maximum is 5.
Appendix 4.A: Detailed variable definitions 113
SH. A dummy equal to 1 if the participant has contributed 4 or 5 tokens to the
common pot of the PG game—(i.e. one standard deviation or more above the
average), 0 otherwise.
Non-adoption probability Pr(n−a). The probability of adoption as predicted
for respondents from access areas, based on the individual and household level
socio-economic characteristics of Column (4), Table 4.2.

Chapter 5
Towards Prosocial Policy
Evaluating the Impact of Performance-Based Financing in
Ugandan Health Facilities
Abstract: We estimate the effect of introducing performance-based financing
on the allocative efficiency and quality of healthcare provision. We use a unique
panel of output and expenditure data from small private not-for-profit healthcare
facilities in Uganda in combination with a patient satisfaction survey focused on
the perceived quality of healthcare. In the observed facilities, performance-based
financing increases output and allocative efficiency by more than 25% with no
apparent reduction in quality. The result is robust to more traditional estimation
techniques.
This chapter is based on:
Duchoslav, J. and F. Cecchi (2017). Evaluating the Impact of Performance-Based
Financing in Healthcare Provision: A Case Study in Uganda. Working
paper.
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5.1 Introduction
Improvements in healthcare provision form one of the cornerstones of economic
development: 3 of the 8 Millennium Development Goals were directly related to
healthcare, and the new Sustainable Development Goals call for increased health
financing in developing countries. There is certainly room for improvement in
this respect. According to the World Bank (2016), low-income countries spent
7 times less money per capita on health than middle-income ones, and 26 times
less than non-OECD high-income countries in 2014. However, when expressed as
a percentage of GDP, health expenditures were roughly the same in low-income
countries (5.7%) as in middle- and high-income non-OECD countries (5.8% and
5.5% respectively).1 If low-income countries are to increase spending on health,
they must either divert it from elsewhere, or wait for economic growth to increase
the total available funds. Alternatively, they can try to do more with less—to
increase allocative efficiency.
Performance-based financing (PBF) is becoming a popular measure to do just
that (Hecht et al., 2004; Brenzel, 2009; Eldridge and Palmer, 2009; Honda,
2013). As the term suggests, PBF makes the amount of funding a healthcare
provider receives conditional on performance, most commonly defined in terms of
output. Healthcare providers and their staff should respond positively to such
incentive schemes as long as the marginal revenue offsets the marginal costs
associated with higher effort and increased output (Rusa et al., 2009). While
this mechanism is straightforward in theory, the evidence that it works well in
practice is inconclusive, and mostly focuses on partial outcomes (Eijkenaar et al.,
2013). Moreover, Scheﬄer (2010) points out that most evaluations lack proper
control groups, or confound the effect of performance incentives with additional
elements of the program that might impact practices. Even the most rigorously
designed randomized control trials (RCTs) often prove to be unworkable, or prone
to last-minute political and organizational interferences that weaken the validity of
1High-income non-OECD countries include for example Argentina, Russia or Saudi Arabia.
OECD countries, whose healthcare spending figures are somewhat inflated by the United States,
spent 12.6% of their GDP – or 149 times more per capita – than their low-income counterparts.
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the findings, especially in the context of developing countries (Soeters et al., 2006).
In 2012, an editorial of the Bulletin of the World Health Organization about PBF
in low- and middle-income countries advocated the use of other robust evaluation
designs if conducting an RCT is not feasible. One option is an interrupted time
series, in which outcome data are collected at regular intervals during baseline
and post-intervention periods (Fretheim et al., 2012). We take this approach in
the present chapter, using a panel dataset from a network of private not-for-profit
health facilities in Uganda to estimate the effects of introducing PBF on healthcare
output and – by extension – on the allocative efficiency of healthcare service
delivery.
In Section 5.2 we provide the background for the study, focusing on the latest
literature on PBF and a description of the healthcare system in Uganda. Section
5.3 describes the data, while the methodological approach is outlined in Section
5.4. The results are presented in Section 5.5 and discussed in Section 5.6. Section
5.7 concludes.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 PBF: a policy to improve healthcare provision
The growing evidence that the health of its population is an important determinant
of a country’s economic growth (Bloom and Canning, 2000; Weil, 2007) has
provided an additional argument – besides the ethical ones – for the need for
functional and accessible healthcare provision. This in turn is essentially a function
of structural inputs (including people, infrastructure, knowledge, drugs, material,
equipment, and technology) and the processes transforming these inputs into
outputs (Eichler, 2006). Though usually thought of as complementary, the right
processes can – to an extent – make up for the lack of inputs (Peabody et al.,
2004). By improving the transforming processes, more output can be produced
using the same limited inputs.
In recent years, PBF has become one of the favorite ways to stimulate such
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improvements (Hecht et al., 2004; Brenzel, 2009; Eldridge and Palmer, 2009;
Honda, 2013). However, while the principal-agent problem has been successfully
reduced by conditioning payment on performance in many other contexts, it is
rather difficult in processes with such multi-dimensional output as healthcare, the
production of which is complicated to quantify.
Even if performance is understood in its most limited sense as output, the many
different types of output produced by a healthcare provider have to be taken into
account when assessing its performance – either individually or according to some
conversion logic. Expanding the notion of performance to include the quality
of produced output naturally complicates the matter even further. Some PBF
schemes have nonetheless made attempts to condition funding on performance in
quality indicators (Perrot et al., 2010). In Basinga et al. (2011) for example, quality
is measured as an index of observable structural and process measures, and enters
the payment formula as a multiplicative factor that may lower the output-based
payment. Soeters et al. (2011) instead try to ensure quality maintenance through
comprehensive agreements with providers and regulators, and measure it through
patient-perceived quality surveys that do not directly influence bonuses.
Besides the various ways in which they define and measure performance, PBF
schemes differ along three major lines (Perrot et al., 2010):
1. performance targets and associated payments may apply to individual
employees or to entire facilities;
2. conditional payments may make up the entire funding of the facility (or
salary of the individual) or there may be a fixed component; and
3. payments may be conditional on fixed targets or incremental.
Each PBF program is thus quite unique, and operates in a unique setting. It
is therefore hard – if not impossible – to agree on best practice (Ireland et al.,
2011). In our case, incentive payments are determined at the facility level, and
make up only a fraction of total facility income with capped incremental bonuses.
The allocation of the bonus payments is at the discretion of the in-charge of the
facility, and typically redistributed to employees.
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Existing literature identifies several potential pitfalls of PBF. Oxman and Fretheim
(2008) warn against the danger of widening the already existing gap between
poorly- and well-performing facilities. Other concerns include the risk of increased
gaming, i.e. systematic reporting bias (Lu, 1999), target-led distortions resulting
in the production of services with negative marginal value (Wynia, 2009), and
cherry-picking of patients who are most suited to achieve targets (Ireland et al.,
2011). Finally, the bureaucratization of healthcare delivery, which is – to an extent
– necessary to implement a PBF program, may end up crowding out intrinsic
motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001), inducing a decline in physician professionalism
and morale (Wharam et al., 2009).
Despite these issues, some of which we touch upon in the discussion, PBF is
receiving increasing attention from academics as well as policy-makers. Several
studies document positive effects of PBF on partial outcomes (Meessen et al., 2006,
2007; Soeters et al., 2011; Basinga et al., 2011; Sekabaraga et al., 2011; Bonfrer
et al., 2014), while others find no lasting effects (Banerjee et al., 2008; Morgan,
2010). The evidence to date is thus inconclusive (Eijkenaar et al., 2013), with
even the most rigorous studies suffering from various methodological shortcomings
(Fretheim et al., 2012).
5.2.2 Setting
The health sector in Uganda is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation
with a mixture of public, private not-for-profit and private for-profit healthcare
providers (Björkman and Svensson, 2009), with government health spending
representing only 30% of the total (Hunt, 2010). Although the Ugandan Ministry
of Health takes non-governmental providers into account in its planning, providing
partial funding to some of them, private health facilities and practices account
for half of Uganda’s reported healthcare output and operate independently of
public ones (Governemt of Uganda - Ministry of Health, 2010). The policies
governing healthcare services in the country are consequently as diverse as the
service providers. In this complex situation, the Ugandan Ministry of Health
piloted a large-scale PBF program for healthcare providers, which mostly turned
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out to be a failure (Morgan, 2010).
In this chapter, we focus on one of the largest not-for-profit private healthcare
providers in the country – the Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB). The
UCMB runs an extensive country-wide network of hospitals and health centers
accounting for over a third of private healthcare facilities in Uganda (Governemt
of Uganda - Ministry of Health, 2010). The structure of the administration of
the UCMB healthcare facilities mirrors that of the Catholic church itself: each of
the 15 dioceses has its own health office, which is responsible for the operation
of the health units within its territory. The central UCMB office coordinates the
diocesan health offices, sets policy on the national level, monitors and evaluates
the diocesan offices and the individual health units, and represents them nationally
and internationally.
In 2008, the UCMB selected the diocesan health office in Jinja – one of the smaller
dioceses – to pilot a PBF scheme in its six mid-sized health centers2 to test the
practical feasibility of this new approach before possibly extending the scheme to
all its health units. The Diocese of Jinja was selected for its manageable size, for
its long cooperation with an international NGO which helped set the scheme up,
and for its historically good performance.3
The scheme was introduced in the 2008/2009 fiscal year. For each health unit, it
set an output target based on its performance in the previous 3 years. The targets
are defined in terms of the Standard Unit of Output (SUO) – a weighted average
of the most commonly performed procedures and services (see Section 5.3 for full
details). Starting in fiscal year 2009/2010, each of the participating facilities would
receive an incremental bonus, conditional on reaching its pre-specified target. On
2There are several levels of healthcare facilities in Uganda: dispensaries and aid posts (HC I),
health centers (HC II-IV from the smallest to the largest ones), and hospitals (HC V) (Björkman
and Svensson, 2009). The pilot PBF scheme targets solely the mid-level HCs III and IV. We
consequently limit our analysis to units of the same size.
3Due to the historically good performance of the pilot facilities, parallel trends cannot be
assumed, precluding the possibility of using standard difference-in-differences approaches when
estimating the effect of PBF. We instead use a panel-data structural break approach (see Section
5.4).
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average, the bonus would increase the income of the facilities – about a third of
which comes from user fees and the remainder from government grants – by about
5%. The targets were set sufficiently low for all units to reach them every year,
effectively making the scheme a fully incremental one. Although the targets are
set and the bonuses paid at the unit level, the heads of the units typically use
the extra income to top up the salaries of their employees proportionally to their
hours worked, thus bringing individual incentives in line with those at the facility
level.
5.3 Data
To gauge the effect of PBF on the allocative efficiency of healthcare delivery, we
use a range of output and input measurements collected by the UCMB from all its
health units, which amount to a panel spanning up to 246 mid-sized health units
over a period of thirteen years (fiscal year 2001/2002 – fiscal year 2013/2014). The
last six fiscal years follow the introduction of PBF in the treated centers.
Output is measured using the Standard Unit of Output (SUO) – a unit in which
the PBF targets are defined. The SUO is constructed from common services
typically provided by small health facilities, taking into account their relative
input requirements in terms of cost and time:
SUO = outpatients+ 5× inpatients+ 2× deliveries
+0.3×ANC + 0.2× immunizations
(5.1)
where outpatients, inpatients, deliveries, ANC, and immunizations are the
numbers of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, deliveries, ante-natal care visits
(including family planning) and immunizations respectively. Total expenditures
are measured in millions of 2014 Ugandan Shillings (UGX). Panel descriptive
statistics for SUO – as well as for the other two main factors of production,
i.e. the total number of staff (staff) and capital proxied by bed capacity (beds)
– are presented in Table 5.1. Figure 5.1 shows the trends in output of PBF and
control facilities. It plots a two-year moving average of output for PBF and control
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Table 5.1 – Panel descriptive statistics
year Obs. PBF SUO expenditures staff beds
2001/02 79 N 10,471 78.1 11.7 19.8
(8,753) (95.3) (7.4) (16.7)
2002/03 60 N 10,892 79.9 12.0 22.6
(10,309) (56.9) (8.0) (16.8)
2003/04 120 N 11,982 86.7 11.7 19.4
(8,760) (88.1) (7.8) (15.6)
2004/05 122 N 13,587 93.9 12.1 20.7
(9,543) (91.2) (8.3) (16.0)
2005/06 145 N 12,798 86.4 10.8 19.8
(9,917) (89.3) (7.4) (15.7)
2006/07 151 N 13,180 79.1 11.0 20.3
(10,012) (75.6) (7.7) (15.7)
2007/08 170 N 12,956 72.3 10.4 19.5
(10,729) (77.2) (7.4) (16.9)
2008/09 167 Y 15,533 75.9 9.8 18.3
(12,370) (79.9) (6.6) (15.2)
2009/10 184 Y 18,361 97.7 10.7 21.3
(14,918) (127.0) (6.7) (16.4)
2010/11 184 Y 15,635 91.1 11.0 20.8
(12,963) (105.2) (7.6) (16.0)
2011/12 173 Y 14,660 91.3 11.2 22.0
(11,803) (135.4) (8.3) (16.0)
2012/13 184 Y 15,063 85.0 11.5 21.9
(11,799) (111.6) (6.9) (16.1)
2013/14 164 Y 15,042 92.4 12.1 22.3
(10,295) (116.1) (7.7) (15.8)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
facilities after standardizing each facility’s output at 100 at the beginning of the
observed period.4 The dotted vertical line marks the introduction of the PBF
scheme.
4Using a moving average instead of a simple one smooths the plots, especially in the case of
the PBF facilities, which are few in number. Standardizing the output of each facility to 100 in
fiscal year 2001/2002 prevents gaps in the data from affecting the average.
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Figure 5.1 – Output trends
5.4 Empirical strategy
When asked to estimate the effect of the introduction of a new technology –
such as PBF – on productivity and efficiency, a development microeconomist
or a student of industrial organization might instinctively turn to estimating
the parameters of a production function (with an additional technology-shifting
term indicating whether or not PBF is in place) by means of regression analysis
or some more general parametric approach such as the generalized method of
moments (GMM). Yet, most such analyses of healthcare production typically
involve data envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
approaches (Hollingsworth, 2008). Each approach has its advantages as well as
drawbacks.
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DEA does not require one to make any distributional assumptions nor to impose a
functional form on the production technology, but it is very sensitive to outliers and
measurement error due to its non-stochastic nature. This is a problem especially
in the context of developing countries where data are often sketchy at the best.
SFA and various regression methods are considerably less sensitive to outliers
and measurement error than DEA, but require one to impose assumptions on the
distribution of efficiency or the error term and about the form of the production
function. DEA and SFA are commonplace in the field of productivity and efficiency
analysis, while the results of standard regression and GMM approaches can be
more readily interpreted by a traditionally trained microeconomist. Moreover,
GMM allows for healthcare production to be modeled as the dynamic process
that it is (Scott and Coote, 2010), bringing the econometric model closer to
reality.
In what follows, we start with a simple pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
model, gradually relaxing various assumptions to arrive to a dynamic system
GMM model which fully accounts for the dynamics inherent to the healthcare
production process. We then compare the results to those obtained from DEA
and SFA methods.
5.4.1 Panel regression analysis and dynamic system GMM
We first estimate a simple pooled OLS model, regressing output on PBF and the
equivalent of a translog production function with expenditures, number of staff
and capital (proxied for bed capacity) as factors of production. We then correct a
bias due to the presence of facility-level fixed effects by estimating a fixed-effects
(FE) model, and we include fiscal year fixed effects to produce the following fully
specified model:
lnSUOit = α+ βPBFit + γ
′factorsit + ηi + τt + εit (5.2)
where PBFit is a dummy equal to one if PBF is in place in the given facility and
fiscal year. factorsit is a vector representing a translog production function with
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expendituresit (total expenditures in millions of UGX), staffit (total number of
staff), bedsit (bed capacity proxying for capital) as production factors. ηi are
facility-level fixed effects, τt are fiscal year fixed effects, and εit is a stochastic
error term.5
Although we technically estimate the effect of PBF on output rather than on
allocative efficiency, it has no consequence for the magnitude and statistical
significance of the estimated effect β since all factors of production enter on the
right-hand side of the regression equation. Substituting allocative efficiency for
output on the left-hand side would only affect the values of γ, leaving β unaffected.
We choose the present specification for the ease of its interpretation as a translog
production function.
Since it can be expected that performance in one period is heavily influenced by
performance in previous time periods (Scott and Coote, 2010), we reestimate the
model using a three-step feasible generalized least squares estimator (FGLS) to
correct for autocorrelation in the data.6
The static models developed so far may be further biased by imbalance of the
panel—48% of observations are missing. This would not be a major issue if
the observations were missing at random. It is however quite conceivable that
better-administered units enter the dataset early on, potentially biasing down
any time trend. Indeed, the unbalancedness of the panel stems mainly from an
expansion of the dataset through time (there are 79 observations in 2001 against
164 in 2014), and to a much lesser extent through attrition and time-series gaps.
5The full model is thus specified as follows:
lnSUOit =α+ βPBFit + γ1 ln expendituresit + γ2 ln staffit + γ3 ln bedsit
+ γ4(ln expenditures)
2
it + γ5(ln staff)
2
it + γ6(ln beds)
2
it
+ γ7(ln expenditures× ln staff)it + γ8(ln expenditures× ln beds)it
+ γ5(ln staff × ln beds)it + ηi + τt + εit
6We test for serial autocorrelation following Wooldridge (2002). We verify the assumption of
stationarity using a series of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests such as the Fisher-type test
suggested by Choi (2001) and that of Im et al. (2003).
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We verify the possibility of non-random censoring using the procedure proposed
by Nijman and Verbeek (1992) to test for non-random attrition in panels. The
non-random imbalance of the panel makes it imperative to introduce dynamics
into the model. Our final estimator is therefore a panel-robust two-step system
GMM, which allows for correcting both autocorrelation and imbalances in the
panel.7
Dynamic panel data analysis helps reduce – if not resolve – key econometric
problems often arising from empirical studies that use conventional cross-sectional
or time-series datasets. The large number of data points increases the efficiency
of econometric estimates and, by utilizing information on both the inter-temporal
dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated, it better controls
for the effects of missing or unobserved variables (Hsiao, 2003). Also, by following
facilities over a 13-year time span, we can construct a proper recursive structure
to study the before-after effect, addressing concerns over the short-lived nature
of PBF-induced increases in performance (Oxman and Fretheim, 2008; Maynard,
2012).
5.4.2 Data envelopment analysis
To verify the robustness of the results, we also estimate the effect of PBF on
productivity following the more traditional approaches of DEA- and SFA-based
two-stage procedures. The DEA approach, where efficiency scores are obtained
non-parametrically through linear programming methods and regressed on facility
characteristics, is popular because its non-stochastic first stage does not require
one to make any assumptions about the functional form of production technology.
Instead, the efficiency factor θ is defined as the output of each facility – or
decision-making unit (DMU) in the parlance of DEA – relative to the output of a
7In order to eliminate selection bias (and serial autocorrelation), we follow Roodman
(2009), using a panel-robust two-step Blundel-Bond system GMM estimator with forward
orthogonal-deviations, both first differences and levels of the independent variables as standard
instruments, and a GMM-style instrument that collapses all available lags of the lagged dependent
variable for each time period into one moment.
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virtual facility with the same levels of input, which in turn is a linear combination
of the most efficient facilities in the dataset. As such, θ is a facility’s current
output expressed as a fraction of its maximum potential output given the current
levels of inputs and maximum efficiency. Formally, we solve the following linear
program for each facility in each fiscal year:
min
θ,λ
θ,
s.t.− 1
θ
SUOi + SUO
′λ ≥ 0,
xi −X′λ ≥ 0,
N ′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0 (5.3)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, SUOi is the output of the i-th facility, xi is a vector of its inputs
(expenditures, beds, staff), SUO is a vector of outputs of all the N facilities in
a given year, λ is an N×1 vector of constant weights, and N is a N×1 vector of
ones.
In the second stage, we estimate the effects of the introduction of PBF
on θ, using the double-bootstrapped maximum likelihood truncated regression
procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to correct for biases arising from
within-facility correlation of efficiency:
θit = α+ βPBFit + δi + τt + εit (5.4)
where PBFit equals 1 if the i -th facility had a PBF program in place in fiscal year
t and 0 otherwise, δi are spatial fixed effects on the diocese level, and τt are fiscal
year fixed effects.8
8To estimate the second stage double-bootstrapped maximum likelihood truncated regression,
we adapt Stata code written by Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) and kindly provided by
the authors.
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5.4.3 Stochastic frontier analysis
The deterministic nature of DEA gives the first stage of this approach the
advantage of not necessitating any functional or distributional assumptions, but
it also renders it extremely sensitive to outliers. The issue is further aggravated in
developing country contexts like ours, where data collection methods are often
suboptimal, making the data exceptionally noisy. SFA – the most common
alternative to DEA – is considerably less sensitive to outliers and noise in the
data, but does require an explicitly defined production. We use the same translog
production function as in (5.2):
lnSUOit = α+ γ
′factorsit + (vit − uit) (5.5)
where uit is measure of inefficiency (a Euclidean distance from the estimated
production frontier) with a truncated normal distribution and vit a normally
distributed stochastic error term. Following Battese and Coelli (1995), we use
a maximum likelihood random effects model to estimate the impact of PBF on
uit:
uit = ζ + βPBFit + δi + τt + wit (5.6)
where wit is a normally distributed stochastic error term and the rest of the
notation is the same as above, so that:
lnSUOit = α+ γ
′factorsit + (vit − (ζ + βPBFit + δi + τt + wit)) (5.7)
5.5 Results
To estimate the effects of introducing PBF on healthcare output and, as we control
for factors of production, also on the allocative efficiency of healthcare service
delivery, we start with a naïve pooled OLS model (Table 5.2, column 1), which
yields a large, positive and statistically very significant effect of PBF on output, but
is potentially biased as it ignores the panel structure of the dataset. We therefore
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proceed with estimating a fixed effects model (Table 5.2, column 2),9 additionally
controlling for a possible time trend by including fiscal year fixed effects (Table
5.2, column 3).10 To correct for first-order autocorrelation,11 we also estimate the
model using an FGLS estimator (Table 5.2, column 4).
The static models produce large, significant effects of PBF on output and
productivity. However, the panel is heavily unbalanced and autocorrelated.12 To
address these issues, our final estimator is a system GMM (Table 5.2, column 5).
Moving from a naïve static pooled OLS model to a fully specified dynamic GMM
one, assumptions are progressively relaxed and various problems corrected for, and
the magnitude of the estimated effect of the introduction of PBF on healthcare
output decreases drastically from a hardly believable value of 73% in model (1) to
a more realistic 27% in model (5). Its statistical significance also decreases in the
process, but always remains below the 5% level.
Result: The introduction of PBF increases output through improved allocative
efficiency of healthcare provision by 27%, or over a third of a standard deviation.
As a robustness check, we also estimate the effect of PBF on productivity using
the more traditional two-stage DEA and SFA approaches. The linear program
9A Wald test confirms the presence of facility-level fixed effects (F (215, 1677) = 5.07 is
significant at the 1% level). A cluster-consistent Hausman-type test following Arellano (1993)
reveals that a random effects model would be inconsistent (χ2(10) = 28.251 is significant at the
1% level).
10A Wald test confirms the joint significance of fiscal year fixed effects (F (12, 215) = 12.65 is
significant at the 1% level).
11Following Wooldridge (2002), we reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation
in the panel (F (1, 192) = 61.532 is significant at the 1% level). We verify the assumption
of stationarity through a series of ADF tests, all of which reject the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity at the 1% significance level.
12Applying the procedure proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992), we find that the censoring
of the data is non-random (see Table 5.A.3 in Appendix Appendix 5.A: for details).
13To avoid proliferation of instruments in the system GMM model, we take the spatial fixed
effects one level up within their nested structure, using diocese- instead of facility-level fixed
effects.
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Table 5.2 – PBF effects on output and efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE FGLS sysGMM
Dep. var. lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO
PBF 0.734∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗
(0.129) (0.123) (0.131) (0.095) (0.130)
lnSUOit−1 0.377∗∗∗
(0.053)
Translog inputs Y Y Y Y Y
Facility FE N Y Y Y N
Diocese FE13 N N N N Y
Time FE N N Y Y Y
SE clustered by facility Y Y Y N N
Mean dep. var. 9.321 9.321 9.321 9.321 9.372
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.699) (0.699) (0.699) (0.699) (0.684)
Obs. 1903 1903 1903 1896 1572
R2 0.594 0.276 0.384
Wald χ2(230) 11063∗∗∗
Instruments 52
AR(2) z 0.76
Sargan χ2(8) 7.30
Hansen χ2(8) 7.64
Diff. in Hansen χ2(1) 1.66
Notes: Robust SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Inputs: expenditures, staff, capacity.
See Table 5.A.1 in Appendix Appendix 5.A: for full results.
in the first DEA stage produces largely varied efficiency scores θ across the
sample of facilities and years with mean value µθ = 0.439 and standard deviation
σθ = 0.240. In words, the health facilities have on average been producing only
44% of the output that they could potentially produce, given their inputs and
the efficiency of the best-performing units.14 In the second double-bootstrapped
maximum-likelihood stage, we estimate that the introduction of PBF increases
efficiency θ by 20.1% points (i.e. by 45.8%) – or almost one standard deviation
(Table 5.3, column 1).
Though estimated simultaneously, the SFA approach can effectively be thought
of as a two-stage process which first estimates a production frontier corrected for
inefficiency u, and then regresses u on PBF. We estimate that the introduction
14It is important to note that the magnitude of θ can easily be biased down by outliers. This
does not however affect the relative changes due to technology shifters such as PBF.
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Table 5.3 – PBF effects on output and efficiency – robustness
(1) (2)
DEA SFA
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Dep. var. θ lnSUO u
PBF 0.201∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗
(0.038) (0.241)
Translog inputs Y Y Y
Time FE Y N Y
Diocese FE Y N Y
Mean dep. var. 0.439 9.321 0.817
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.240) (0.699) (0.228)
Obs. 1903 1903
Wald χ2 (df) 1045.71 (31) 2877.92 (9)
Notes: (Cluster) robust (bootstrapped) standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See
Table 5.A.2 in Appendix Appendix 5.A: for full results.
of PBF reduces u by 0.476 (Table 5.3, column 2), which – by a simple arithmetic
manipulation – is an equivalent of a 61.0% increase in θ.
The SFA procedure is more robust to noise in the data than DEA, but both
techniques are likely to bias the coefficient estimates upwards due to their static
nature. Indeed, they produce statistically significant results similar in direction
and magnitude to those from regression estimations, but considerably larger in
magnitude than estimates from system GMM.
5.6 Discussion
As demonstrated in Section 5.5, PBF led to a statistically and economically
significant increase of allocative efficiency – and thus output – in the healthcare
facilities where it was introduced. A dynamic model results into a much lower
estimate (an increase of around 25%) than static models (an increase between
50% and 75%). This is consistent with Scott and Coote (2010), who assert
that healthcare provision is an inherently dynamic system, with current output
and efficiency predicting future output and efficiency. In a panel setting, static
models which ignore this positive autocorrelation will overestimate the effects of
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any positive external shock such as an introduction of a PBF scheme. Dynamic
estimators like system GMM can overcome this issue and are thus more suitable
for evaluating the impact of such shocks.
Although much smaller in magnitude than static estimation methods might
suggest, a 27% increase in output is far from modest, especially in light of the fact
that it is due to a financial incentive scheme worth only about 5% the total income
of the participating facilities. It is quite plausible that such a sudden rise in output
could come at the expense of its quality. To see whether this might be an issue,
we conducted a two-wave patient satisfaction survey in the PBF facilities and in a
sub-sample of those without PBF.15 Both survey waves took place after PBF had
been implemented (in 2012 and 2014), so we cannot infer much about the direct
effect of the introduction of PBF on the quality of services. The data nonetheless
clearly show that perceived quality of healthcare did not decline between the two
waves. In fact, patient satisfaction increased in both PBF and control facilities,
and there is even weak evidence that it rose faster in the PBF units (see Appendix
Appendix 5.B: for the full analysis).
Existing literature raises several other concerns about the potential pitfalls of
introducing a PBF scheme:
Lu (1999) points out that incentivized output targets may encourage facility
administrators to over-report output. While this is in general possible, we
are confident that such misreporting is unlikely in our case. Firstly, the PBF
scheme only adds a marginal amount of money to the budget. Most of the
facilities’ income is derived from fixed government subsidies and fee-for-service
user payments. Any doctoring up of data would require compensating the parallel
15While patient satisfaction is subjective, several studies endorse its validity as an instrument
for measuring quality of healthcare (Davies and Ware, 1988; Andaleeb, 2001; Johansson et al.,
2002) and it has recently been placed at the core of policy recommendations regarding PBF in
the United States (Ryan, 2009; Wharam et al., 2009). Leonard (2008) shows that satisfaction
is jointly produced with quality during the course of a consultation and that patients respond
to increased quality by being more likely to be satisfied. Moreover, patient satisfaction reflects
both process quality and clinical quality (Marley et al., 2004), making it a good measure of the
overall quality of healthcare delivery.
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increase in user fees, which makes this type of fraudulent reporting as unlikely as
it is expensive. Secondly, UCMB datasets have long been used at the national
level as an advocacy device, requiring high levels of reliability, as well as an
internal means of performance comparison across facilities, inducing all facilities
to minimize unintended under-reporting regardless of the financing mechanism
at play. Finally, unlike other healthcare providers in Uganda, UCMB engages
in monthly data verification and monitoring activities throughout the country.
To spot any plausible fallacies in the reporting, it also activated additional
post-episode-of-care verifications at the community level for PBF facilities.
Another potential issue arises from the way in which the targets are aggregated
from partial output indicators. If the relative weight given to individual indicators
does not reflect their actual cost in terms of factors of production, an introduction
of weighted output targets such as the present one defined in terms of the
SUO could distort the balance of provided services, potentially resulting in the
production services with negative marginal value (Wynia, 2009). This however
seems unlikely in a developing-country context where the supply of healthcare
services often falls short of demand. Indeed, the three output indicators which
constitute the largest part of total SUO production in observed facilities – the
number of outpatients (52% of total SUO production), inpatients (36%) and
immunizations (8%) – all rose at roughly the same rate following the introduction
of PBF (see Table 5.A.4 in Appendix Appendix 5.A:).
Furthermore, Frey and Jegen (2001) and Wharam et al. (2009) are concerned that
the bureaucratization of healthcare delivery, which is to some extent necessary to
implement a PBF scheme, may crowd out intrinsic motivation, inducing a decline
in the professionalism and morale of medical staff. We do not have any quantitative
data on staff motivation, but in-depth interviews we conducted with managerial
as well as rank-and-file staff in the PBF facilities suggest quite the opposite—the
additional salary bonuses which became possible thanks to PBF made staff feel
appreciated for their work, motivating them to increase their effort.
Finally, Oxman and Fretheim (2008) warn against the danger of widening the
already existing gap between poorly- and well-performing facilities. This could
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become an issue in cases where PBF is used to reallocate an existing pot of
funds in what could be described as a zero-sum game. In our case, however,
the performance bonuses come from an external source, precluding the necessity
to decrease funding of under-performing facilities in order to top up that of the
more successful ones. Any improvements should therefore be Pareto-efficient in
our case.16 It is nevertheless impossible to verify this in our present study given
the small number of treated facilities. A larger trial – if not an implementation
across the board – of the scheme would be needed in order to assert that no facility
is worse off as a result of PBF.
5.7 Conclusion
Using a panel of output and expenditure data from small private not-for-profit
healthcare facilities in Uganda, we estimate the contribution of performance-based
financing towards achieving greater allocative efficiency. We rely on a dynamic
panel estimation, verifying its robustness through more traditional two-stage DEA
and SFA procedures to find that healthcare providers respond strongly to targets
by increasing output through improved allocative efficiency. In our case, output
rose by over 25%. The result, though lower than those from more traditional
static models which are likely to be biased upwards, is economically significant,
and the increased efficiency does not come at the expense of quality. This shows
the potential of PBF in motivating healthcare staff to put additional effort into
their work, thus improving the performance of underfunded healthcare systems in
developing countries.
16This highlights a trade-off between Pareto-efficiency and financial sustainability of many
PBF schemes—a topic that is very policy-relevant, but beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Table 5.A.1 – PBF effects on output – full regression specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE FGLS sysGMM
Dep. var. lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO
PBF 0.734∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗
(0.129) (0.123) (0.131) (0.0945) (0.130)
lnSUOit−1 0.377∗∗∗
(0.053)
ln expenditures 0.655∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.158) (0.195) (0.073) (0.111)
ln staff 0.237 -0.334 -0.336∗ -0.351∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.202) (0.210) (0.184) (0.108) (0.143)
ln capacity 0.011 -0.032 -0.074 -0.085 0.058
(0.154) (0.172) (0.170) (0.085) (0.115)
(ln expenditures)2 -0.035 -0.047∗ -0.054∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.012) (0.017)
(ln staff)2 0.097∗∗ 0.016 0.044 0.060∗ -0.005
(0.047) (0.050) (0.051) (0.035) (0.049)
(ln capacity)2 0.029 0.031 -0.001 0.018 -0.013
(0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.016) (0.021)
ln expenditures× ln staff -0.046 0.110∗ 0.065 0.060∗ 0.013
(0.056) (0.062) (0.059) (0.036) (0.053)
ln expenditures× ln capacity 0.031 0.022 0.036 0.026 0.008
(0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.021) (0.028)
ln staff × ln capacity -0.051 0.018 0.041 0.015 0.029
(0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.031) (0.044)
Time FE N N Y Y Y
Diocese FE N N N N Y
SE clustered by facility Y Y Y N N
Mean dep. var. 9.321 9.321 9.321 9.321 9.372
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.699) (0.699) (0.699) (0.699) (0.684)
Obs. 1903 1903 1903 1896 1572
R2 0.594 0.276 0.384
Wald χ2(230) 11063∗∗∗
Instruments 52
AR(2) z 0.76
Sargan χ2(8) 7.30
Hansen χ2(8) 7.64
Diff. in Hansen χ2(1) 1.66
Notes: Robust SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.A.2 – PBF effects on output – full frontier analysis specifications
(2)
SFA
1st stage 2nd stage
Dep. var. lnSUO u
PBF -0.476∗∗
(0.241)
ln expenditures 0.670∗∗∗
(0.094)
ln staff 0.094
(0.082)
ln beds 0.170
(0.125)
(ln expenditures)2 -0.041∗∗
(0.016)
(ln staff)2 0.110∗∗
(0.046)
(ln beds)2 -0.013
(0.015)
ln expenditures× ln staff -0.053
(0.044)
ln expenditures× ln beds 0.057∗∗
(0.029)
ln staff × ln beds -0.045
(0.045)
Time FE N Y
Diocese FE N Y
Mean dep. var. 9.321 0.817
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.699) (0.228)
Obs. 1903
Wald χ2(9) 2877.92
Notes: SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A.3 – Nijman-Verbeek tests for non-random censoring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS sysGMM sysGMM
Dep. var. lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO lnSUO
PBF 0.505∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.264∗∗
(0.092) (0.123) (0.131) (0.130)
In previous FY 0.034∗∗ -0.007
(0.017) (0.072)
Number of FY 0.008∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Translog inputs Y Y Y Y
SE clustered by facility Y N N N
SE clustered by diocese N Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 9.337 9.321 9.372 9.372
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.691) (0.699) (0.684) (0.684)
N 1817 1896 1572 1572
Wald χ2 11118∗∗∗ 3452∗∗∗
Wald χ2 df 229 41
Instruments 53 53
AR(2) z 0.75 0.74
Sargan χ2(8) 7.35 7.66
Hansen χ2(8) 7.78 8.04
Diff. in Hansen χ2(1) 1.91 2.29
Notes: Robust SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.A.4 – PBF effects on individual output indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM
Dep. var. lnSUO ln outpatients ln inpatients ln immunizations
PBF 0.266∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.245 0.320∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.100) (0.197) (0.120)
Dep. var. it−1 0.377∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.042) (0.074) (0.060)
Dep. var. it−2 0.103∗∗
(0.043)
Translog inputs Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Diocese FE Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 9.319 8.705 6.513 8.333
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.705) (0.689) (1.078) (0.869)
Obs. 1572 1572 1380 1572
Instruments 52 52 51 52
AR(2) z 0.76 0.72 0.19 -0.22
Sargan χ2 (df) 7.30 (8) 5.15 (8) 4.02 (6) 11.43 (8)
Hansen χ2 (df) 7.64 (8) 4.01 (8) 3.55 (6) 9.55 (8)
Diff. in Hansen χ2(1) 1.66 0.35 0.02 0.06
Notes: SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Inputs: expenditures, staff, capacity.
An additional lag of the dependent variable (ln inpatientsit−1) is needed in model (3) to satisfy identification
requirements.
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To complement the input and output panel data, we also collected information
about the quality of healthcare delivery in a sub-sample of the facilities. The data
was only collected after the introduction of the PBF scheme, and it is therefore
not suited for analyzing the impact of PBF on healthcare quality. It can however
help us address some of the reservations one might have about an introduction
of a scheme that only incentivizes quantity, not quality. The relevant analysis is
presented in this appendix.
5.B.1 Data
While our sample contains facilities belonging to the same size class, we further
use the output and expenditure data along with several other characteristics to
match the six PBF facilities with six similar ones receiving fixed funding, identified
among other facilities in linguistically and culturally affine areas. The matches are
based on a propensity score calculated from a set of indicators not constituting a
building block of the SUO, as measured in the last year prior to the introduction
of the scheme.17 By matching on values collected before the implementation of
PBF, we ensure that the propensity scores are not influenced by any potential
confounding effects of the intervention.
To gauge the perceived quality of the services in these facilities, we adapted the
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS)
survey (Centers for Medicare and Medicade Services, 2011) to the Ugandan
environment and administered it in two waves in 2012 and in 2014. While patient
satisfaction is subjective, several studies endorse its validity as an instrument
for measuring quality of healthcare (Davies and Ware, 1988; Andaleeb, 2001;
Johansson et al., 2002) and it has recently been placed at the core of policy
17The matching characteristics include the facilities’ income and expenditures, catchment
population, number of staff, bed capacity, number of carried out diagnostic procedures and
minor surgical operations, average length of stay of admitted patients, number of fatalities, and
the availability of mental counseling.
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recommendations regarding PBF in the United States (Ryan, 2009; Wharam et al.,
2009). Leonard (2008) shows that satisfaction is jointly produced with quality
during the course of a consultation and that patients respond to increased quality
by being more likely to be satisfied. Moreover, patient satisfaction reflects both
process quality and clinical quality (Marley et al., 2004), making it a good measure
of the overall quality of healthcare delivery. To address concerns that perceived
quality might be highly dependent on the relative differences vis-à-vis the nearest
available alternatives, each of the units was further matched with the nearest
similarly-sized public facility as well as a village half-way between the catchment
areas of each private-public pair, resulting in a final sample of 24 facilities and 12
neighboring villages.
In the villages, we randomly selected 12 adult respondents from a previously
recorded household census. At the facilities, accidental sampling was used instead,
interviewing the first 10 people exiting the facility on an unannounced day. In
total, 384 interviews were carried out in each wave, which – excluding respondents
who had not visited the catholic facilities in the three years prior to the interview
– resulted in 440 incidentally truncated interviews. From answers to a set of
questions regarding various aspects of perceived quality of service, we factor
out an index of perceived quality (quality), scaled from 0 (most dissatisfied) to
1 (most satisfied). Other personal-level confounding characteristics measured
through the survey include a physical health index (health), an asset index
(assets) approximating wealth,18 education (primary) – a dummy equal to one
if the respondent completed primary education, sex (female) – a dummy equal
to one if the respondent is female, and age (age) in years. Finally, govt is the
mean perceived quality of the matched state-owned facility measured in the same
way as quality.19 As can be seen in Table 5.B.1, the sample was well balanced
across all the confounding characteristics (except for govt) in 2012, but completely
18The physical health index is based on the SF-12 Health Survey as proposed by Ware et al.
(1996). The asset index is obtained by principal factor analysis following Sahn and Stifel (2003)
19We use the mean perceived quality of the main public facility rather than the quality
perceived by each respondent, de facto controlling for the relative reputation of the public
competitor.
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Table 5.B.1 – Survey sample balance
Control PBF
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Diff. t
2012
quality 0.877 0.098 0.830 0.134 -0.047 2.7825∗∗∗
health 0.560 0.278 0.499 0.286 -0.061 1.5326
assets 0.267 0.186 0.268 0.200 0.001 -0.0420
primary 0.383 0.489 0.455 0.500 0.072 -1.0294
female 0.713 0.455 0.718 0.452 0.005 -0.0851
age 37.438 19.008 35.857 14.685 -1.581 0.653
govt 0.407 0.005 0.429 0.007 0.022 2.5974∗∗
2014
quality 0.904 0.101 0.903 0.110 -0.001 0.1028
health 0.607 0.280 0.624 0.278 0.017 -0.4787
assets 0.274 0.176 0.227 0.164 -0.047 2.1539∗∗
primary 0.431 0.498 0.489 0.502 0.057 -0.8851
female 0.734 0.444 0.832 0.375 0.098 -1.8556∗
age 41.633 16.562 35.827 15.580 -6.106 2.9377∗∗∗
govt 0.362 0.004 0.390 0.006 0.028 3.8334∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
unbalanced in 2014. We will address these issues below.
5.B.2 Empirical strategy
It is evident from the previous section that we only have data on perceived quality
of 12 selected facilities from two survey waves which took place several years after
the introduction of PBF in 6 of the units. Lacking a baseline survey, we clearly
cannot estimate the effect of the introduction of PBF on the perceived quality of
healthcare provision in a difference-in-differences (DID) setting. We can, however,
use the DID approach to compare the trends in the PBF and non-PBF facilities
after the new financing system had been introduced and after the management
and staff of the facilities had presumably gotten accustomed to it.
We already outlined above our choice to investigate quality through a
HCAHPS-type survey rather than through observable structural and process
measures. A meaningful measure of perceived quality of the health facilities can
only be obtained from respondents who had recently received treatment there.
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This can potentially introduce a serious self-selection bias. Before proceeding to
a full DID model specification for comparing the trends in perceived quality of
healthcare delivery in PBF and non-PBF facilities, we therefore first estimate
a bivariate sample-selection model as proposed by Heckman (1979) to check for
such bias. We then estimate the PBF trend effects using a simple DID model with
cluster-robust standard errors on the sub-sample of non-incidentally truncated
interviews, gradually adding covariates until reaching the following fully specified
model:
qualityit = α+ β1PBFi + β2(PBFi × FUt) + β3FUt + γ′Xi + δ′Zit + ζgovti + ηi + εit (5.8)
where FU is a dummy equal to one for all observations from the 2014 follow-up,
X is a vector of production factors proxying the size of the private facility
(expenditures, staff and beds), Z is a vector of respondent characteristics
comprising health (a physical health index), assets (an asset index approximating
wealth), primary (a dummy equal to one if the respondent completed primary
education), female (a dummy equal to one if the respondent is female), and age
(respondent’s age in years). govt is the mean perceived quality of the nearby
state-owned health facility, η are location type fixed effects indicating whether the
interview took place at a private facility, a public facility, or a village in between
the two, and ε is a stochastic error term.
Finally, to account for possible biases resulting from the imbalance in the 2014
sample, we further estimate a kernel propensity score DID model using Z and
govt to compute the propensity scores.
5.B.3 Results
In this section, we compare the trends in the perceived quality of healthcare
provision in PBF and non-PBF facilities following the introduction of the
new financing system in the former. Before proceeding to a full DID model
specification, we first estimate a Heckman bivariate sample-selection model to
check for self-selection into visiting the private facilities. While some of the
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observed respondent characteristics affect the likelihood of visiting the private
facility within 3 years prior to the interview, the coefficient on the inverse Mills
ratio is statistically insignificant (Table 5.B.2, column 1). In other words, the
self-selection bias in the sample does not affect the coefficient estimates in the
second stage. It is therefore safe to estimate the PBF trend effects using a
simple DID model with cluster-robust standard errors on the sub-sample of
non-incidentally truncated interviews.
Table 5.B.2 – PBF effects on trend in perceived quality of healthcare—regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman OLS OLS OLS
Dep. var. private quality quality quality quality
PBF × FU 0.037 0.038∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
PBF -0.045∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.040 -0.035
(0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
FU 0.031∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.031∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Facility size N Y Y Y Y
Respondent characteristics Y N N Y Y
Competitor quality Y N N N Y
Location type FE N N N N Y
SE clustered by facility pair N N Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880
Std. dev. dep. var. (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
N 743 430 440 430 430
Mills λ -0.027
(0.050)
R2 0.069 0.082 0.085
Notes: Robust SE in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Starting with a naïve specification which only includes the DID terms and size
controls (Table 5.B.2, column 2), we gradually include respondent characteristics
(Table 5.B.2, column 3), the mean level of perceived quality of the nearest
similarly-sized public facility (Table 5.B.2, column 4), and controls for the location
and timing of the interview (Table 5.B.2, column 5). To address the imbalance
in the 2014 sample, we also estimate a kernel propensity score DID model
using respondent characteristics and public competitor quality to compute the
propensity scores and controlling for the remaining covariates from the full DID
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OLS model (Table 5.B.3).
Table 5.B.3 – PBF effects on trend in perceived quality of healthcare—PSM
2012 2014
DID
Control PBF Diff. Control PBF Diff.
quality 0.851 0.889 -0.038 0.928 0.920 -0.008 0.030
SE (0.030) (0.023) (0.019)
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The estimates of perceived quality are stable across the specifications. Perceived
quality of healthcare increased between 2012 and 2014 in the PBF as well as
non-PBF facilities (see coefficients on FU in Table 5.B.2). There is also some
evidence that the increase was much more pronounced in the case of PBF facilities
(see coefficients on PBF × FU in Table 5.B.2), though the statistical significance
of this relationship falls below the 10% level when we account for self-selection
into attending a private facility by means of a PSM DID estimation (see column
DID in Table 5.B.3). It is nevertheless clear that PBF did not lead to a decline in
patient satisfaction between the two survey waves.
Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusions
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6.1 General discussion
In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) laid the foundations of modern
economics by noting that individuals cooperate not out of regard for each other’s
wellbeing, but for their self-love. In doing so, Smith did not, however, reject the
idea that people care about the welfare of others. Quite to the contrary, he wrote
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment,
like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means
confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel
it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
(Smith, 1761, p.2)
Economists have thus been well aware of the basic premise of prosocial preferences
by the time their discipline began its split from philosophy. For a long time
however, they tended to treat prosocial preferences – like any other preferences
– as traits which may form important components of economic models, but ones
which are exogenous to these models, and whose emergence and formation should
be the concern of other scientific domains (Friedman, 1962, p.13).
It is therefore not surprising that the first systematic attempts to understand
how preferences are shaped were not made by economists, but by psychologists.
Perhaps most notably, the (radical) behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner (1938) set
out to analyze the sources of human preferences in a quantitative way. Considering
the inner causes of behavior too vague to be precisely observed, Skinner instead
turned to the environment as an important behavioral determinant:
The practice of looking inside the organism for an explanation of
behavior has tended to obscure the variables which are immediately
available for a scientific analysis. These variables lie outside the
organism, in its immediate environment and in its environmental
history. They have a physical status to which the usual techniques
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of science are adapted, and they make it possible to explain behavior
as other subjects are explained in science. These independent variables
are of many sorts and their relations to behavior are often subtle and
complex, but we cannot hope to give an adequate account of behavior
without analyzing them. (Skinner, 1953, p.31)
Significant progress in understanding the physiological workings of the human
mind has been made since Skinner’s time, thanks largely to advances in various
fields of neuroscience (see e.g. Camerer et al., 2005; Keverne and Curley,
2008). Considering the ever more rapid changes in both our physical and social
environment, Skinner’s focus on finding the sources of human behavior outside the
body and mind is nevertheless as relevant now as it was in the heyday of radical
behaviorism. Indeed, economics has taken some clues from this approach in recent
years, investigating the effects of environmental shocks on a range of economic
outcomes (see e.g. Almond, 2006; Dell et al., 2009; Burke et al., 2015). While
certainly very informative, most of this literature only brushes over the behavioral
mechanisms which lead to the outcomes that are its main focus.1 By investigating
the effects of changes in the physical and social environment on individual prosocial
preferences, this thesis fills a part of the gap.
The word “environment” as it is used throughout this thesis should be understood
in its broad sense as the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, and influences
including the social and cultural forces that shape the life of a person or a
population (Dictionary.com, 2017), rather than in the stricter ecological sense,
in which it is commonly used. It encompasses purely physical conditions such
as ambient temperature (Chapter 2), the purely social ones in the form of
institutional arrangements (Chapters 4 and 5) as well as their intersection, where
social conditions – armed conflict – affect the physical conditions faced by unborn
children (Chapter 3).
There are almost certainly other environmental conditions that affect prosocial
(as well as other) preferences. Rather than to investigate them all, this thesis is
1Notable exceptions include, among others, Bowles (1998), Weinstock (2008), Voors et al.
(2012) or Cecchi et al. (2016).
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intended to illustrate their diversity. In doing so, I hope to achieve two long-term
goals. First, this thesis should serve as a springboard for further research into the
ways in which environmental changes shift individual preferences and thus people’s
behavior. Second, its findings, as well as those of related future research, should
be taken into account by policymakers whose decisions affect our environment. In
what follows, I review the main lessons learned from the research that underpins
this thesis, their policy implications, and the potential directions of future scientific
inquiry that they show.
6.2 Prenatal temperature shocks
The work of the late physician and epidemiologist David J. Barker (1990),
who proposed that adult disease may often originate in adverse environmental
conditions during gestation, has inspired a large volume of research which explores
its economic implications. In Chapter 2, I build upon the fetal origins literature,
testing the hypothesis that the consequences of prenatal events may extend beyond
effects on later-life individual abilities and health trajectories (Almond and Currie,
2011), also affecting social preferences. In particular, I investigate the impact of
temperature shocks faced by pregnant women on their children’s later-life prosocial
preferences. I find that exposure to higher than usual ambient temperatures during
gestation reduces a child’s probability of contribution to the public good, with the
negative effect lasting into adulthood.
This finding empirically links a chain of already established relationships. Ambient
temperature shocks during gestation have been shown to negatively affect birth
weight (Wells and Cole, 2002; Lawlor et al., 2005; Deschênes et al., 2009). Low
weight at birth predicts – among many other later-life outcomes – relatively
lower cognitive abilities (Hack et al., 2005), and those in turn reduce the taste
for cooperation (Moore et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 2015). Taken together, these
relationships suggest that a connection between prenatal ambient temperature
and prosocial preferences should exist. Nonetheless, this thesis is, to the best of
my knowledge, the first to provide explicit evidence of this link, albeit in a reduced
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form. The next logical step is the development and estimation of a structural form
model. Such a study will, by its nature, require a much more complete dataset
than mine. At the bare minimum, it will need to make use of medical birth records,
and more precise measurements of cognitive ability.
More generally, there is ample scope for research into the exact nature of
the mechanisms which are at play here. There is consensus on the fact that
temperature shocks negatively affect birth outcomes, but not on the physiological
processes involved. Reduced fetal nutrient intake caused either directly by altered
maternal nutrient intake or indirectly by impaired placental function is often
mentioned as a potential mechanism, as are hormonal imbalances caused by heat
shocks. There is some evidence that these mechanisms are at play in other
mammals such as sheep (Hansen, 2009; Bloomfield et al., 2003), but studies of
their role in human gestation are rare and inconclusive (Yajnik, 2002; Smith and
Nicholson, 2007). The mechanisms linking poor birth outcomes with cognitive
ability are perhaps even less explored (Aarnoudse-Moens et al., 2009). Considering
the ethical issues which render most experimental study designs off limits to
fetal and perinatal pathology, there may be scope for medical science to get
methodologically inspired by applied economics and its frequent use of innovative
econometric techniques and natural experiments.
Regardless of the underlying processes, the finding that prenatal temperature
shocks reduce later-life cooperation fits into a broader and growing body of
literature which links ambient temperature to various economically important
outcomes. Temperature has been found to influence the level of economic
production (Dell et al., 2009; Burke et al., 2015), the onset of conflict (Hsiang
et al., 2013), mental health (Adhvaryu et al., 2015), and even human reproductive
behavior—with consequences for physical health and educational outcomes of the
offspring (Wilde et al., 2017). These findings add weight to the (already important)
issues typically associated with climate change such as decreasing biodiversity, sea
level rise, or food and water security, and should be considered alongside them
when assessing the costs and benefits of policies to tackle climate change.
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6.3 Prenatal stress
Chapter 3 continues in the same vein as Chapter 2, building upon the fetal origins
literature. It investigates how prenatal stress induced by random violence affects
the preferences for cooperation among children born during an armed conflict,
exploiting variations in the 2D:4D digit ratio—a marker of in utero hormone
exposure negatively associated with high maternal distress during early fetal
development. In this chapter, I show that prenatal stress reduces the probability
that children contribute to the public good.
Similarly to the case of prenatal temperature shocks, there are empirically
established relationships which together suggest that a causal link between
prenatal exposure to conflict and later-life prosocial preferences should exist.
Firstly, exposure to violent conflict is a traumatizing experience (de Jong,
2002; Lopes Cardozo et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2008). Secondly, a mother’s
traumatization during pregnancy affects the hormonal balance of the fetus (Ward
and Weisz, 1980; vom Saal et al., 1990) as observable through its 2D:4D digit
ratio (Manning et al., 2003; Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Lilley et al., 2010; Zheng and
Cohn, 2011). Thirdly – and most importantly – in utero hormonal balance affects
later-life social preferences (Buser, 2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2013). To the best
of my knowledge, these three relationships have not been analyzed concurrently
before. By doing so, this research provides evidence which, for the first time,
supports the entire causal chain from conflict in one generation to economic
behavior in the next one.
This finding has several ramifications for both theoretical and applied economic
research. Moving away from the belief that preferences are hardwired (Stigler and
Becker, 1977), mosts economists now accept the idea that they are molded by the
environment in which an individual operates as well as by his genetic code. Several
models of preference transmission have been developed (Bisin and Verdier, 2001;
Bisin et al., 2004; Bulte and Horan, 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017), and the
debate now centers more on the relative importance of nurture and nature (see
e.g. Cesarini et al., 2008, 2009). The notion that prenatal stress affects later-life
6.4 Institutional change 151
preferences introduces an additional channel of preference transmission—one that
lies between the nature-nurture duality. Further research should test whether these
effects persist throughout life (like those of prenatal temperature shocks discussed
in Chapter 2), and verify their generalizability beyond the Ugandan context. If
confirmed in other settings, the epigenetic path should be considered in future
inquiries into intergenerational transmission of preferences.
The policy implications of the idea that conflict events may shape the preferences
of a generation yet unborn are twofold. First, the definition of a victim of war
may need to be expanded to include those who were traumatized before birth. In
practice, this means that organizations which intervene in post-conflict situations
to provide psychosocial support or help (re-)build positive intra-community
relationships may need to expand their target population as well as the time
horizon of their interventions. Second, the design of such interventions should take
into account the heterogeneous effects that exposure to conflict has on different
victims. While prenatal conflict exposure reduces the taste for cooperation,
postnatal exposure fosters it, at least within one’s social circles (Voors et al.,
2012; Gilligan et al., 2014). Recognizing these differences may help policymakers
fine-tune post-conflict interventions to better suit the composition of their target
population.
6.4 Institutional change
In Chapter 4, I move away from the physical aspects of human environment,
focusing instead on the social ones. I study the effects of a sudden introduction
of a formal institution on individual cooperative behavior within informal
arrangements. In particular, I look at how an NGO intervention which helped
create a mutual health insurance affected cooperative behavior in a public goods
game. In contrast with cases where outside institutional innovations increased
cooperation (Fearon et al., 2009), but in line with evidence that formal insurance
crowds out informal sharing (Klohn and Strupat, 2013), I find that the introduction
of formal insurance reduces contributions to the public good. This reduction in
152 Discussion and Conclusions
cooperation levels is, however, not due to the adopters of the formal insurance
who may now have less need for informal reciprocal networks, and who therefore
(partially) withdraw from them. It is instead the non-adopters who become less
cooperative towards the adopters.
The results are in line with sociological theories of social embeddedness (see e.g.
Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985) and the ‘weapons of the weak’ perspective
advanced by the political scientist and anthropologist James Scott (1985). Viewed
through this lens, the behavior of those who did not adopt the insurance towards
those who did can be interpreted as a signal of the former’s displeasure with the
new institution in which they do not want to – or more likely cannot afford to –
participate, and which may be undermining informal risk-sharing arrangements.
While anecdotal evidence from the field supports this interpretation, several
alternative explanations which also fit the data cannot be ruled out. For example,
if the uptake of insurance is understood as an indication of wealth on the part of
the adopters, lower public good contributions by non-adopters could be due to the
activation of a norm about people contributing to local public goods according to
their means relative to each other (Ensminger, 2004). Alternatively, non-adopters
may reallocate their contributions to other remaining non-adopters in expectation
of these relationships taking on a more important role now that the adopters
have an alternative to informal risk-sharing arrangements. Finally, it is possible
that the way the insurance product was marketed encouraged individualistic
thinking, widening the aspiration gap of those who could not afford to purchase
it. In response, non-adopters may have simply reallocated the means at their
disposal from contributing to the public good towards trying to close this gap.
Disentangling the merits of these alternative explanations should be the subject
of future research.
The fact that a well-intended institutional innovation – such as the introduction
of mutual health insurance to a previously uninsured community – can negatively
impact social capital and cooperation, has policy implications that are perhaps
obvious, but important to point out. It epitomizes two common shortcomings of
many development interventions. First, even interventions with clearly defined
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and well justified objectives – such as addressing the failure of markets to
provide functional insurance – can have undesirable consequences unforeseen
by the policymakers. It is important that they pay closer attention to the
potential externalities of their interventions, taking into account lessons learned
from previous successes and especially from previous failures. Second, too often
do development interventions conform to the funding cycle rather than to the
needs of their beneficiaries. The intervention on which this case study is based
was projected to last 5 years, for example, with no plans for future funding. The
immediate benefits of donor-subsidized insurance may well have outweighed the
associated social costs, but the former were likely to end with the intervention,
while the latter may linger on for much longer. To establish how long the social
costs persist would necessitate a follow-up study, which would ironically require a
new round of funding. If this situation is to be ameliorated, it is important that
development organizations plan their projects for the long term, follow up on their
beneficiaries even after the intervention ended, and be ready to come back in case
of unforeseen complications. For their part, donors should not only encourage such
behavior, but make their funding conditional on it.
6.5 Extrinsic motivation
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 illustrate how changes in both the physical and social
environment can be detrimental to individual prosocial behavior. Perhaps the
most obvious way to reverse such deterioration of prosociality (to the extent that
it is desirable—an assertion that few would dispute) would be to address its root
causes, that is to reverse the environmental changes themselves. This might not,
however, be the most practicable solution. While there is broad scientific – and
increasingly also political – consensus on the need to slow down and ideally reverse
climate change, the complexity of the task makes it one with which humanity will
likely keep grappling for a while. The elimination of armed conflict is an even more
elusive goal if history is any guidance. Finally, reversing institutional changes
may often not be desirable at all, considering that their intended outcomes are
often generally beneficial to society. This is of course not to say that research
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focused on tackling climate change, preventing conflict, and reducing the negative
externalities of institutional change should be discouraged. It does however mean
that such inquiry is well beyond the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 5 instead illustrates one of the many ways in which prosocial behavior
can be incentivized with a relatively simple and easily implementable policy. In
this chapter, I evaluate the impact of introducing performance-based financial
incentives on staff effort and, consequently, on allocative efficiency and output
in healthcare provision. I show that in the case under investigation, financial
incentives conditioned on output and worth roughly 5% of total expenditures
increased staff effort to the extent that output rose by over 25%, without any
detectable drop in the quality of the provided services. This not only shows
the potential of performance based financing to improve the performance of
underfunded healthcare systems in developing countries, but also that extrinsic
motivation can be used to foster behavior which benefits the society rather than
just the individual.
The simplicity and potentially high returns on investment of incentivizing prosocial
behavior with financial (or other) rewards make it an appealing policy tool.
However, there are circumstances in which putting a price tag on prosocial
behavior can actually discourage people from engaging in it (see e.g. Titmuss,
1970; Ariely et al., 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010a,b; Gneezy et al., 2011). In
fact, even interventions similar to the one described here have been unsuccessful
in many cases (see Eijkenaar et al., 2013, for an overview). More research into
the conditions under which extrinsic motivation succeeds in fostering prosocial
behavior is therefore needed. Until more progress is made in this direction,
policymakers should tread carefully when setting up incentive structures to
promote prosociality. In this respect, small scale pilots with impact evaluation
integrated into their design are an excellent way to establish best practices without
making big, expensive mistakes.
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6.6 Concluding remarks
This thesis identifies several ways in which environmental changes affect intrinsic
prosocial preferences, and outlines a possible direction for ameliorating any such
negative effects. While it provides some new insight into the complexity of the
formation of social preferences, it leaves many questions unanswered, and raises
several new ones.
As pointed out in the preceding 4 sections of this chapter, many of the mechanisms
that are behind the relationships described in this thesis are poorly understood,
and deserve the attention of the scientific community. Moreover, it is likely that
this thesis only scratches the surface when it comes to environmental effects on
preferences. The full range of environmental factors involved is unclear. Could
pollution, for example, affect our behavior? Or could it be shaped by the political
system in which we grow up? Questions also remain about the timing of these
effects. I show that prenatal temperature shocks reduce cooperativeness, but what
is their effect in early life or in adulthood? Finally, what other preferences might
be affected? I focus on prosociality as one of the building blocks of human society,
but if prosocial preferences can be affected by environmental change, why not risk
and time preferences, which are also fundamental to our everyday decisions and
– in their aggregate – to the economy at large? The scope for further research is
immense, and much of it will have to cut across disciplines if it is to fully answer
these questions.
The subject of this thesis – social preferences – is of fundamental interest to
economics. However, I start by borrowing the words of a theoretical physicist
about the necessity to work together, and go on to draw on the findings from many
other disciplines ranging from social anthropology and psychology to neurology
and endocrinology. While writing the thesis, I benefited from conversations with
biologists, sociologists, physicians, chemical, electrical and agricultural engineers,
anthropologists, agronomists, psychologists, climate scientists, nutritionists, and –
of course – economists. To me, there is no better illustration of the importance
of interdisciplinary communication. In fact, if I could start all over again, I would
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strive to not only communicate, but also collaborate more with people outside of
my own discipline. With this in mind, I find it fitting to end by quoting another
physicist, the great Isaac Newton (1675): “If I have seen further, it is by standing
on the shoulders of giants.”
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Summary
All economic activity requires some degree of cooperation, and the process of
economic development involves many social dilemmas. It is therefore crucial to
understand how the preferences which guide our behavior vis-à-vis these situations
are shaped. The ability and willingness to work for the benefit of the group rather
than just one’s own has evolved over many generations, and is – to some extent
– innate to any healthy human being. At the same time, individual prosocial
preferences are – also to a certain extent – endogenous to the physical and social
environment within which we operate. This thesis identifies several ways in which
environmental changes affect intrinsic prosocial preferences, and outlines a possible
direction for fixing any such negative effects.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the topic of prosocial preferences. I briefly describe how
prosociality has been viewed over the course of scientific history, and summarize
the current state of knowledge about the formation of social preferences. I further
outline how extrinsic incentives can influence prosocial behavior without affecting
the preferences which underpin it. Finally, the chapter contains an overview of
the methodologies used throughout this thesis.
In Chapter 2, I focus on an early formative factor of prosocial preferences—their
fetal origins. I study how temperature shocks faced by pregnant women affect their
children’s later-life prosocial preferences. I find that exposure to higher than usual
ambient temperatures during gestation reduces a child’s probability of contribution
to the public good, with the negative effect lasting into adulthood.
Chapter 3 continues in the same vein as Chapter 2, looking at the fetal origins of
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prosocial preferences. In this chapter, I investigate how prenatal stress induced
by random violence affects the preferences for cooperation among children born
during an armed conflict. To do so, I exploit variations in the ratio of the lengths
of the index and ring fingers—a marker of in utero hormone exposure negatively
associated with high maternal distress during early fetal development. I show
that prenatal stress reduces the probability that children contribute to the public
good.
In Chapter 4, I move away from the physical aspects of human environment,
focusing instead on the social ones. I study the effects of a sudden introduction
of a formal institution on individual cooperative behavior within informal
arrangements. In particular, I look at how an NGO intervention which helped
create a mutual health insurance affected cooperative behavior in a public goods
game. I find that the introduction of formal insurance reduces contributions to
the public good. This reduction in cooperation levels is, however, not due to
the adopters of the formal insurance who may now have less need for informal
reciprocal networks, and who therefore (partially) withdraw from them. It is
instead the non-adopters who become less cooperative towards the adopters.
To outline a possible direction for remedying the negative environmental effects on
prosocial behavior described in the previous three chapters, I illustrate one of the
ways in which prosocial behavior can be incentivized with a relatively simple and
easily implementable policy. In Chapter 5, I evaluate the impact of introducing
performance-based financial incentives on staff effort and, consequently, on
allocative efficiency and output in healthcare provision. I show that in the case
under investigation, financial incentives conditioned on output and worth roughly
5% of total expenditures increased staff effort to the extent that output rose by
over 25%, without any detectable drop in the quality of the provided services.
This not only shows the potential of incentive-compatible financing to improve
the performance of underfunded healthcare systems in developing countries, but
also that extrinsic motivation can be used to foster behavior which benefits the
society rather than just the individual.
Finally, I combine the main findings from the core chapters of the thesis in Chapter
187
6. I discuss their policy implications, and point out the some of the outstanding
questions, outlining the directions for future research.
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